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Abstract of Thesis 
This thesis is a study of corporate governance in the context of the Chinese 
economy. The starting point is that the observed patterns of corporate control and 
capital structure can not be fully explained if the world is characterised by 
comprehensive contracts that define all the future contingencies. Rather, contracts are 
incomplete, and economic agents are endowed with rights to specify actions in future 
contingencies that are not explicitly written in prior contracts. The combination of the 
incompleteness of contracts and the separation of ownership and control leads to agency 
problems because managers (agents) have their private interests that may conflict with 
those of the shareholders (principals). There is thus a need for a sound governance 
system to ensure that managers work effectively to maximise shareholders' wealth. 
The thesis focuses on four issues in corporate governance: ownership structure 
and the underpricing of initial public offering; ownership structure as a corporate 
governance mechanism; the determinants of capital structure; a governance perspective 
of corporate groups. Correspondingly, there are four main chapters. The first looks at 
why 1POs are underpriced, and we find that there is a negative relationship between the 
largest shareholding and the extent of the underpricing. The second is an empirical 
study of the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. We 
find that corporate performance, measured by Tobin's Q, is positively related to 
ownership concentration, but negatively related to State ownership. In the third chapter, 
the study is extended to debt finance, investigating the determinants of capital structure, 
and we find that the determinants of capital structure in China are similar with those in 
other economies and agency costs have an effect upon the debt ratio. The fourth 
provides a political economy perspective on the governance structures of Chinese 
corporate groups, and we argue that the contemporary governance structures are 
dependent both upon the impacts of the previous centrally-planned economy and the 
path of transition to the market economy. 
The thesis offers original contributions both in its theoretical work on corporate 
govemanc e, and in the empirical studies of governance in China for which there has so 
far been very little published analysis. 
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1.1 What is Corporate Governance? 
This is a study of corporate governance, with particular reference to listed companies in 
China. The theoretical framework underpinning the thesis is the incomplete contracts, or 
property rights, approach which recognises that issues related to firms' ownership 
structure, capital structure' and corporate control cannot be fully understood if one 
assumes a world of comprehensive contracts that can define all future contingencies. 
Rather, contracts are incomplete and economic agents are endowed with rights to 
specify actions in future contingencies not specified in prior contracts, that is they are 
endowed with property or ownership rights. 
In applying this framework to modem corporations, we find that the combination of the 
separation of ownership and control, and the incompleteness of contracts, may lead to 
agency problems: i. e. a situation where the management2 of the corporations, who are 
the agents of the shareholders (the principals), may have private interests that conflict 
with those of some or all of the shareholders. There is thus a need for a sound corporate 
governance system through which management can be induced to ensure the 
maximisation of shareholders' wealth whilst protecting the interests of all parties 
involved, including the managers, large and small shareholders, and creditors. 
1 The term 'capital structure' has been used in the literature to refer both to the relative composition of 
different types of contracts (e. g. of debt and equity), and to the relative composition of these contracts 
between different groups of investors (e. g. between an entrepreneur and any external investors). In this 
thesis, we adopt the definitions provided by Jenson and Meckling (1976) who define 'capital structure' as 
'the relative quantities of bonds, equity, warrants, trade credit etc. ', and 'ownership structure' as 'the 
relative amounts of ownership claims held by insiders (management) and outsiders (investors with no 
direct role in the management of the firm'. 
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Two decades ago, the term 'corporate governance' had not been coined (Kay and 
Silberston, 1995), yet the associated issues date back to the formation of joint stock 
companies and stock markets. Today, corporate governance is a central political and 
economic topic, not only in well-developed market economies but also in emerging 
economies. However, there is still considerable debate as to what corporate governance 
actually entails, as the following selection of definitions will testify: 
" 'Corporate governance is an institutional arrangement by which suppliers of finance 
to corporations assure themselves of getting a proper return on their investment. ' 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 737) 
" 'The purpose of corporate governance is to minimise the total cost in aligning 
managers and shareholders' incentives, and in unavoidable self-interested 
managerial behaviours. ' (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
" 'The phrase corporate governance is often applied narrowly to questions about the 
structure and function of boards of directors to the rights and prerogatives of 
shareholders in boardroom decision-making. Now this definition has been 
broadened to refer to the whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements 
that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, how 
that control is exercised, and how the risks and returns from the activities they 
undertake are allocated. ' (Blair, 1996, p. 3) 
" 'Corporate governance is the system or process by which companies are directed 
and controlled. ' (Cadbury, 1992, p. 2) 
" 'Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed 
and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of 
rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as, 
the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules 
and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also 
provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the means 
of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance. ' (OECD, 1999) 
" Zingales (1998) defines corporate governance as including anything that affects the 
ex post bargaining power over the value created in the firm. This definition gives 
the broadest coverage of corporate governance. It recognises the potential conflicts 
between involved parties, including the large shareholders, the small shareholders 
and management, and the institutional arrangements which entitle specific parties 
with rights when disputes arise which are not foreseen prior to the establishment of 
contracts. 
In drawing upon these definitions, we would like to make the following points: 
2 In this thesis, we refer to 'management' as all people and institutions who directly undertake strategic 
decision-making in the corporation, including senior managers as employees as well as the Directors of 
the Board as delegates of the general shareholders. 
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0 All definitions of corporate governance are concerned with the objectives of the 
corporation: whose interests the corporation should take care of and how? But there 
are heated debates about which stakeholders (including employees, input suppliers, 
and customers) should be taken into consideration (Blair, 1996), and the way of 
putting theory into practice is still unknown. 
0 In this study, we focus more narrowly on the institutions and mechanisms by which 
the suppliers of finance to corporations (i. e. the owners) exert control over the 
managers to ensure satisfactory returns on their investment. 
0 There is good corporate govemance, as well as poor corporate govemance. Good 
corporate governance can improve corporate performance by minimising the total 
cost of aligning managers' and shareholders' incentives, and of unavoidable self- 
interested managerial behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Good corporate 
governance should provide proper incentives for the Board and management' to 
pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders, and 
should facilitate effective monitoring thereby encouraging firms to use their 
resources more efficiently. In contrast, poor corporate governance can damage the 
interests of the parties involved, either the managers or the shareholders, and may 
lead to poor performance and the collapse of the corporation. 
Corporate governance is only part of a larger economic context in which firms 
operate which includes, for example, macroeconomic policies and the degree of 
competition in product and factor markets. The corporate governance framework 
also depends on the legal, regulatory, and institutional environment. In addition, 
factors such as business ethics, and corporate awareness of the environmental and 
societal interests of the communities in which it operates, can also have an impact 
on the reputation and the long-term success of a company. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The overall aim of this thesis is to examine the effectiveness of the corporate 
governance system in China, and to suggest ways of improving it. We take the view that 
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one of the objectives of the reform of Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOES) is to seek 
an appropriate mechanism of corporate governance which (a) provides sufficient 
incentives for management to work hard, (b) prevents management from asset 
appropriation, and (c) replaces them when they are found to be incompetent. These 
issues are particular relevant in context of the reform of the SOEs and the establishment 
of a modem enterprise system in China, which are embedded in the whole process of 
transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy. Furthermore, these 
notions of modern corporations, the corporatisation of SOEs, and corporate governance 
are closely linked to a perception of superior corporate performance. 
We focus on the case of Chinese listed companies using data from the two leading 
Stock Exchanges, viz., the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE). Both Exchanges have been established for twelve years, and list 
stocks for more than 1,100 corporations. We focus on listed companies for similar 
reasons to those discussed by Zingales (2000): 
9 The first is that this thesis is about corporate governance issues, hence we must 
consider corporations, and not other types of business organisation. Although 
there are many corporations that are not public companies, public companies are 
favourite subjects of theoretical studies (see, for example, Grossman and Hart 
(1980) on the free-rider problem in takeovers, La Porta et al (1998) on small 
investor protection issues). The investors are dispersed and unable to coordinate, 
and this is the perfect background within which theories related to corporate 
governance can be developed. 
e The second is the ease of obtaining data, and the possibility of being able to use 
economic measures of performance such as the market to book ratio (MBR) or 
I Tobin's Q, instead of having to rely on accounting measureS3 such as the return 
on equity (ROE) or the return on assets (ROA). The data for listed companies 
3 Such accounting measures are still used, where appropriate, in the study. 
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are also generally more accurate than for non-listed companies in all economies 
throughout the world, making listed corporations natural research subjects. 
* The third is the importance of listed companies in national economies, in terms 
of employment, GDP, technological innovation, tax revenues to the government 
etc. In the Chinese case, many of the listed companies are among the largest 
firms in their industries or among the first to have undergone corporatisation 
from the original SOEs, TVEs or foreign-owned firms. A comprehensive 
examination on their experience will increase our understanding of the 
effectiveness of the Chinese reforms. 
This study embraces multiple facets of the issue of corporate governance in China, but 
focuses on four major issues: 
0 The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPO) of equity. The IPO is the first 
stage when a company is going public. 'Traditional' theories see the IIPO as a 
process for the company to finance its growth, and the value of the stock is simply 
the present value of all future cash flows. But new theory and empirical findings 
suggest that going public is a complex process with distinct markets for dispersed 
shares and controlling blocks, and that the underpricing of IPOs, which is common 
throughout the world, is influenced by the ownership structure at the time of the 
IPO. 
0 How corporate performance depends upon the ownership structure. On the one 
hand, the size distribution of shareholders may affect performance because small 
shareholders may not be able to, or have the incentive to, monitor management to 
the same degree as large shareholders. On the other hand, large shareholders may 
monitor management, but more often they may pursue their own interests which do 
not necessarily correspond to those of other, smaller, shareholders. Furthermore, the 
nature of the large shareholders (e. g. State, or domestic institutions) may also have 
an effect. 
I 
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0 How corporate governance may affect the capital structure of a company. Ever 
since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), various explanations about 
why firms choose one financial instrument over the other have been offered, under 
different assumptions and in different economic systems. We look here at the 
effects upon the debt ratios of Chinese firms of a management shareholding and of 
a large major shareholder. 
The development of corporate governance in the wider context of the transition of 
the Chinese industrial structure and the move towards a market economy. 
These four issues are addressed in four separate chapters, but share a common approach 
based on a combination of agency theory and the theory of incomplete contracts. The 
issues are also linked within the whole system of corporate governance. The first issue 
studies the relationship between the large, initial shareholders and the small, outside 
shareholders from the perspective of the private gain of corporate control. From a 
temporal point of view, the IPO is also the stage when a corporation forms or re- 
establishes its corporate governance mechanism. The second issue looks at how 
corporate performance is affected by the mechanism of corporate governance after the 
firms' IPO. We focus on the relationship between the large shareholders as principals, 
and the management as agents. The third issue emphasises the role of debt as an 
instrument to mitigate agency costs. The basic argument is that debt, which is a pre- 
emptive financial instrument, will trigger financial distress when the management does 
not work well and does not generate sufficient cash flows to meet the payments required 
by debt contract. Thus the controlling shareholders may use their influence in deciding 
the choice of capital structure. We apply theories of debt to explore the possible role of 
debt as a complementary mechanism of corporate governance. The fourth issue is a 
study of the Chinese corporate groups, with the perspective at the governance structure 
since the era of industrial restructuring. The main theme of this chapter is that the 
division of the government into territorial jurisdictions, and of the division of economic 
administration by industrial branches, imposes a two-way grid on economic decision- 
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making that has had wide ramifications for the governance structure of large 
enterprises/corporate groups in China and their evolution. This grid is currently 
undergoing a radical change because of the abolition of many of the central industrial 
Ministries and also of industrial bureaux in territorial governments, that may in time 
have a profound influence on the organisational structure of corporate groups. But the 
territorial division of the government has been, and will continue to be, of special 
importance in China because of its geographical expanse and regional diversity. 
This thesis is certainly the first systematic study of corporate governance in China, and 
the results will provide insights into how well the system is functioning and suggestions 
as to possible improvements. However, it should be pointed out that the system of 
corporate governance in China is still in the process of evolution, and it would be 
premature to recommend the 'best' model of corporate governance for China. 
Furthermore, the thesis stresses only the micro, particularly finance, aspects of corporate 
governance rather than the macro aspects, and does not attempt to identify best practices 
or suggest codes of conduct as in the Cadbury Report (1992) or OECD (1999). 
1.3 The Data and Methodology 
1.3.1 Data 
The dataset used in chapter 4 covers 467 IPO issues between 1995 and 1999. The other 
two empirical studies use cross-section data for 1997.1997 data is used because of the 
lag in the publication of Annual Reports. Much of the 1997 data only became available 
in late 1998, or early 1999 for some companies. In 2000, when these studies were being 
undertaken, the most comprehensive dataset was that based upon 1997 data. But the 
findings should be fairly robust in that there have not been any fundamental institutional 
changes since 4. 
The following sources of data were used: 
We intend to replicate these studies with more recent data once the new data becomes available. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 22 
" 'A Guide for Investment in Shanghai and Shenzhen Securities Exchanges', 
published by Securities Times, based at Shenzhen. Securities Times is one of the 
major news agencies and publishers of financial and economic information in 
China. The 1996 volume provides information on the corporations listed on both 
Exchanges in the year 1995. The 1997,1998 and 1999 volumes do likewise for 
the years 1996,1997 and 1998. 
" The CD-ROM of Chinese Listed Corporations' Annual Reports (1997) (Abstract). 
This CD-ROM contains abstracts of annual reports of all listed companies ending 
at 27 May 1998. Securities Times is the publisher of the CD-ROM. 
" The data on stock prices were taken from the database on the central computer at 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Prices were available for all listed companies, 
beginning from the opening days of both Exchanges in December 1990 (SHSE) 
and July 1991 (SZSE), and ending on 29 March 1999. We extracted the share 
prices and trading volume of the first trading days of all stocks, which are used to 
study IPO underpricing in Chapter 4. 
The data for Chapter 7 were drawn mainly from various years of the China 
Statistical Yearbook. 
The data for many variables were only available in hard copy, and had to be entered into 
a computer database manually. All the data input into the database were checked twice 
to ensure accuracy. Furthermore, all the data were crosschecked in different sources to 
ensure consistency. When inconsistencies were found, a third data source was 
consulted. However, the accuracy of the information reported by the listed companies 
and audited by auditing companies relies on the companies themselves, subject to the 
legal restraints. Like researchers throughout the world, we can only take an "as it ie' 
attitude. The establishment of the dataset was thus a lengthy and exhausting task. The 
major variables used in this study include ownership structure (names, characteristics 
and shareholdings of the largest ten shareholders), accounting indicators (sales, gross 
profits, after-tax profits, total assets, total liabilities (long-term as well as current), 
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equity, tax, and earnings per share). Other information includes the industry of each 
company, the names and responsibilities of the Directors of the Board, major events in 
5 
the company's history, and major decisions made . 
1.3.2 Methodologies 
In deciding upon appropriate econometric methods, we considered the use of time series 
analysis and panel data analysis. However, there were several problems with the use of 
time series analysis. The first was the short histories of both the Shanghai (SHSE) and 
Shenzhen (SZSE) Stock Exchanges, established in 1990 and 1991 respectively, and the 
small numbers of listed companies during the early years (only fourteen by 1992). The 
second, and more important, problem was the leakage of insider information. This was a 
common practice, and the trading of shares between insiders and other interested parties 
before important announcements make it impossible to determine cause and effect. A 
third problem, as found by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), is the difficulty in 
distinguishing statistically between different models of capital structure. As regards 
panel data analysis, the main problem is its inability to deal with variables, such as 
ownership structure, which are relatively stable over time (Zhou 2001). Zhou shows that 
a combination of relatively stable ownership structure and more volatile corporate 
performance will give rise to misleading statistical conclusions. 
Thus three different cross-sectional regression techniques are employed. The first is 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). One potential problem with the use of OLS in cross- 
section models is the possible presence of heteroscedasticity, with the result that the 
' Much of this information will be useful in future studies such as the relationship between Board 
structure and corporate performance. 
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coefficient estimates are inefficient and the estimates of the standard errors are biased. 
Thus a second, robust, regression technique is also used 6: 




ks 2 (1 _h 1 
)2 
where 
hi = the diagonal elements of the hat matrix: hi = xi(X'X)-lxl'; in which x, is the 
vector of the ith observation and X the data matrix; 
ej = the residual of the ith observation; 
k= the number of independent variables including the intercept; 
S, = the mean square error of the regression; 
Any observations with Cook's D>I are discarded. The procedure then reruns the 
regression, calculates Huber (1964) case weights based on absolute residuals, and 
regresses again using these weights. 
The Huber case weights are computed by: 
Wi =I 
if lUil: 5 Ch 
ý 
ch Iluil otherwise 
where 
Ch 1.345 is the Huber tuning constant, defin6d by the STATA program 
Ui ej /s is the ith scaled residual 
SM 10.6745 stands for the residual scale estimate 
M med (lei - med (ei)l) is the median absolute deviation from the median 
residual 
6 More detailed descriptions Can be seen in STATA Reference Manual Release 5 Volume 3, pages 46-57, 171-172. 
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According to the Huber weighting, observations with small residuals receive weights of 
I and observations with absolute residuals larger than (1.345/0.6745)M =- 2M receive 
gradually smaller weights. This process repeats until convergence. 
Then the third step is to give all observations with non-zero residuals some 
downweighting according to the smoothly decreasing biweight function: 
Wi 
I'-(Ui'Cb )2 ]2 if lUiký Cb 
0 otherwise 
where 
Cb = 4.685 * biweight tuning constant /7 
This means that cases with absolute residuals of (4.685/0.6745)M =- 7M or more are 
given a weight of zero, and are thus effectively dropped. 
Setting Ch ý 1.345 and Cb = 4.685 enables the program to obtain about 95% of the 
efficiency of OLS when applied to data with normally distributed errors. The reasons 
that both Huber weighting and biweighting are used are that Huber weighting has a 
problem dealing with severe outliers, and biweighting sometimes fails to converge or 
have multiple solutions. Therefore, I perform Huber weighting first to improve the 
behaviour of the biweight estimator. The whole process works iteratively until the 
convergence criteria of 0.05 for both Huber weights and biweights are met. 
An additional method of correcting for heteroscedasticity, the White-Sandwich method, 
is used in Chapter 6 and is further discussed there 7. We used this second method as the 
study on capital structure was the first empirical study in the thesis, and we wanted to 
7 As Wallace and Silver (1988, p. 265) point out, "Generally speaking, it is probably a good idea to use the 
White option routinely, perhaps comparing the output with regular OLS output as a check to see whether 
heteroskcdasticity is a serious problem in a particular set of data. " Cited in Gujarati (2003, p. 418). 
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check on the robustness of our results. We found little variation in the results using 
different correction methods so we thereafter only used the one method in other 
chapters, and generally reported the results obtained from both the OLS and robust 
regressions. It is relevant to point out that the use of multiple methods is common in the 
8 study of corporate governance . 
1.4 The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters, including this chapter as an introduction. 
Chapter 2 outlines the various theoretical approaches to the study of corporate 
governance, and looks briefly at the distinctive features of the study on corporate 
governance system in China. The emergence and evolution of the joint stock system in 
China are detailed and analysed in Chapter 3. This includes a discussion of the history 
of financial system reform, and an investigation into the process of SOE reform and 
corporatisation. Those aspects of the corporate governance system which are pertinent 
to the decision to go public, ownership structure, and capital structure are highlighted. 
Chapter 4,5 and 6 are the main empirical chapters characterised with data set collection 
and econometric analysis. Chapter 4 carries out a study on the underpricing of Initial 
Public Offering, and hypothesises that ownership structure has an impact upon the 
degree of IPO underpricing. Chapter 5 follows up, and looks at the relationship between 
ownership structure and corporate performance, and argues that ownership structure 
matters. Chapter 6 investigates the determinants of capital structure. This chapter argues 
that debt finance is more than a source of capital, but is also a governance instrument 
with contingent control rights. Chapter 7 provides a political perspective on corporate 
groups in China during the era of economic transition, with emphasis on the governance 
structure of corporate groups. The insights of this chapter are helpful in that the 
corporate groups mainly control the headquarters of the listed companies. The last 
8 More discussion on the methods used in the study of corporate governance can be found in Demsctz and 
VilWonga (2001). 
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chapter, Chapter 8, summarises the conclusions, points out the implications, and 
suggests directions for future work. 
1.5 Concluding Remarks 
A final word of caution is in order. Agency theory, incomplete contracts theory, the 
theory of capital structure and the theory of corporate control are all in their infancy, 
and much theoretical work still remains to be done. Much of the literature emanates 
from developed countries, though some studies do cover developing countries. But there 
has been no comparable work on China. The study of corporate governance in the 
Chinese context has been carried out in a normative manner, mainly arguing what the 
structure of corporate governance should be. On the one hand, this presents an 
opportunity for original positive research. On the other hand, there are legitimate 
concerns that capital markets in China are immature, that investors are not as rational as 
those in developed markets, and that legal systems are weak. Basic institutional 
differences exist, which may weaken the applicability of the theories, the arguments and 
conclusions of the study. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Approaches to Corporate Governance 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance and the theory of the firm are two of the fastest growing topics in 
modern economic theory, after a long silence since the publication of the seminal works 
by Berle and Means (1932) and Coase (1937). Berle and Means argued that modem US 
corporations were so dependent upon professional managers that a managerial economy 
had emerged, characterised by the separation of ownership from control in corporations. 
The managers decided upon the running of the corporation whilst the shareholders, 
though they were the owners, were only entitled to receive cash flows. This leads to 
potential conflicts between the interests of the shareholders and those of the 
management. 
Following these two pioneering works, significant contributions have since been made 
in the areas of property rights theory (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Grossman and Hart, 
1986; and Hart and Moore, 1990), agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the 
theory of incomplete contracts (Williamson, 1975,1985; Grossman and Hart, 1986; 
Hart and Moore, 1990), and transactions cost theory (Williamson, 1975,1985). All 
these theories contribute from different angles to an understanding of the issues of 
corporate governance, and fundamentally affect our thinking about what is a firm, and 
in whose interests the firm is governed. 
It is interesting to note that recent studies of corporate governance, which is a topic 
within the increasingly broad area of corporate finance, have merged into the area of the 
theory of the firm. As Zingales (2000) notes: 
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"The interaction between the nature of the firm and corporate finance 
issues has become so intimate that answering the fundamental questions in 
the theory of the firm has become a precondition for any further 
advancement in corporate finance. " (p. 1624). 
"The link between theory of the firm and corporate governance is even 
more compelling, and I have already argued for it in Zingales (1998). The 
word "governance" implies the exercise of authority. But in a free-market 
economy, why do we need any form of authority? Isn't the market 
responsible for allocating all resources efficiently without the intervention 
of any authority? In fact, Coase (1937) taught us that using the market has 
its costs, and firms alleviate these costs by substituting the price 
mechanism with the exercise of authority. By and large, corporate 
governance is the study of how this authority is allocated and exercised. 
But in order to understand how this authority is allocated and exercised, 
we first need to know why it is needed in the first place. We need, thus, a 
theory of the firm. " (p. 1630) 
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The task of this chapter is to review and discuss the prevalent models and theories of 
corporate governance, both in the context of corporate finance and the theory of the 
firm, and in both developed and developing economies. The objective is to provide a 
broad theoretical foundation for the more specific topics, which were identified in 
chapter 1, and which will be considered in detail in subsequent chapters. More specific 
discussion of the literature on these particular topics will be provided in the respective 
chapters. 
The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. Section 2.2 provides an historical 
perspective on the theory of the firm. We introduce agency theory in addressing the 
issue of the separation of ownership and control in section 2.3; the theory of incomplete 
contracts in section 2.4; property rights theory in section 2.5; and transaction costs 
economics in Section 2.6. In section 2.7, we briefly compare and contrast these theories. 
Section 2.8 examines two stylised models of corporate governance systems. In Section 
2.9, we discuss the extant studies on corporate governance in China. Section 2.10 
concludes. 
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2.2 The Historical Perspective 
The study of corporate governance is about how authority originates in companies, and 
how it is allocated amongst the parties involved. It is thus natural to start this discussion 
with Coase (1937) who observed that some transactions were carried out through the 
market, whilst others were carried out within organisations called firms. He asked why a 
firm emerges at all in a specialised exchange economy - in a perfect market, all 
transactions can be carried out through the price mechanism. He wrote: 
'But in view of the fact that it is usually argued that co-ordination will be 
done by the price mechanism, why is such organisation necessary? Why are 
there these islands of conscious power"? Outside the firm, price movements 
direct production, which is co-ordinated through a series of exchange 
transactions on the market. Within a firm, these markets transactions are 
eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange 
transactions is substituted the entrepreneur - co-ordinator, who directs 
production. It is clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordinating 
production. ' (p. 19) 
He offered an initial explanation of the existence of the firm, which is that there are 
costs to using market mechanisms, which he defined as transactions costs'. As a result, 
the inputs, including labour, are organised into the firm. Meanwhile, there are also costs 
to using firm institutions, which he called management costs though he didn't explicitly 
define them. These two costs, according to his theory, are balanced to define the size of 
the firM2 - when the costs of using the market are too high, this leads to larger firms. 
But greater size makes management less efficient, which constrains the firm from 
becoming too big. The optimal size of the firm is determined by the trade-off between 
the costs of inefficient markets and of managerial inefficiency. This analysis has been 
criticised', because it does not answer the questions of when and why the costs of 
1 According to Williamson (1975), the transactions costs consist of the costs of searching for products, 
negotiation costs, the costs of writing contracts, and the costs of implementing the contracts. 
2 Coase (1937) defined the boundaries of the firm as that range of exchanges over which the market 
system was suppressed, and resource allocation was accomplished instead by authority and direction. 
3 See Hart (1995b) for more discussion of these arguments. 
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supervising the execution of instruction by central authorities, and the frictions internal 
to the firm, result in lower costs than bargaining over contracts in the markets. These 
criticisms of Coase (1937) have been fruitful, leading to the birth of the modem theory 
of the firm. 
Berle and Means (1932) investigated 'modem corporations': i. e. production 
organisations with multiple owners and multiple agents - see Figure 2.1 on the next 
page. An important difference between the modem corporation and other forms of 
production organisation was the dispersion of ownership, and the resultant separation of 
ownership and control. As Berle and Means pointed out, 65 percent of the 200 largest 
American non-financial corporations were controlled by management, who held only a 
small ownership stake. The governance structure of a typical corporation was that the 
shareholders each held only an insignificant proportion of the outstanding shares, which 
effectively excluded them from exercising power over strategic decisions. The share 
certificate simply provided proof of a claim to dividends. Thus Berle and Means defined 
the ownership of the firm in terms of the residual claim rights, and shareholders as the 
residual claimants. 
Berle & Means' classic analysis is now seen as having less relevance in a world in 
which widely-dispersed share ownership is the exception rather than the norm, and in 
which it is no longer apparent that widely-dispersed share ownership will necessarily 
lead to inferior monitoring of management by the shareholders (Blair, 1995). Recent 
studies suggest that the Berle and Means model of widely-dispersed corporate 
ownership is not common, even in developed countries. Rather, large shareholders 
control a significant number of firms in many countries, including developed ones. In 
Italy, 88 percent of manufacturing companies (accounting for 91 percent of the 
employed labour force) are controlled by one person or family (Barca et al, 1994, cited 
in Pagano et al, 1998), and shareholders own more than 50 percent of the voting rights 
in the majority of publicly-listed companies (Zingales, 1994). In Germany, 85 percent 
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Figure 2.1: The Berle and Means Model of the Modem Corporation 
Source: Blair (1995), p. 31 
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of public companies have a major shareholder, and in France the corresponding figure is 
79 percent. The comparable figure in the United Kingdom is 16 percent (Frank and 
Mayer, 1994)4 . Even 
in the United States, where ownership structures are claimed to be 
more dispersed than other industrial countries, concentrated shareholdings are 
commonly seen (Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan, 1999). 
4A more recent study on the ownership structures of Western European countries is reported in Faccio 
and Lang (2002). 
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Studies by La Porta et al (1999), with a sample of more than 3000 firms across 49 
countries, and Claessens et al (2000), covering 2980 firms in nine South East Asian 
countries5, all show that a significant fraction of shares rests in the hands of a small 
number of shareholders. All the evidence suggests that the distribution of shareholdings 
involves a mixture of large shareholders and small shareholders. The equity holdings of 
contemporary corporations are actually neither totally controlled by one investor, nor 



































Figure 2.2: The Modem Corporation with Concentrated Ownership 
Source: Blair (1995), p. 47 
5 The nine econornies included Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
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fully dispersed. Thus, the structure of the contemporary 'modern corporation' may 
perhaps be more accurately illustrated by Figure 2.2, which indicates the co-existence of 
a group of significant shareholders exercising their influence (not necessarily direct 
control rights) over the firms, and a large number of small investors effectively deprived 
of control rights except the rights of the 'Wall Street Walk'. 
As Blair (1995, p. 32) points out, the separation of equity holders from management 
through the financial markets raises four types of governance problems: 
For firms to operate efficiently, management must have enough leeway to take 
risks, make strategic decisions, and take advantage of investment opportunities as 
they arise. Management cannot submit every decision to a shareholder vote, and, 
even if it could, shareholders who are not close to the operations of the company 
probably would not be able to make informed decisions. Nonetheless, management 
must be prevented from abusing its power and position by spending resources or 
undertaking investments that benefit management at the expense of the 
shareholders. Hence, shareholders need mechanisms for effectively monitoring and 
restraining management. 
A small, close-knit group of shareholders with a large total share of equity might be 
quite effective at monitoring management-but, if they are given enhanced control 
rights, then their power must also be restrained to prevent them from taking unfair 
advantage of other shareholders. 
A major commitment of time and resources is necessary for investors (or anyone 
else) to act as effective monitors. But many investors prefer the advantages of 
liquidity and diversity in their portfolios - advantages that may not be consistent 
with the time and resource commitment involved in monitoring. 
Investors need reliable and accurate information, developed using consistent 
measuring and accounting procedures. But any measure of performance can 
provide misleading information or distorted incentives by encouraging management 
to focus attention on inappropriate or partial goals. Moreover, releasing certain 
kinds of information to the public can sometimes weaken a company's competitive 
position. 
Thus, to achieve sustained economic growth, a sound micro-mechanism must provide 
incentives to ensure that both investors and other stakeholders benefit from their 
'investments'. 
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2.3 Agency Theory 
Agency theory addresses the question of the separation of ownership and control, as 
identified by Berle and Means (1932). Alchian and Demsetz (1972) challenged Coase's 
explanation of the existence of the firm, arguing that there was no difference between 
market transactions by contracts, and operations in the firm characterised by authority. 
One vivid example was to contrast the manager in a firm who has the authority to sack 
an employee (stop the employee from providing his/her service to the firm), with a 
customer also has the right to "sack" a grocer by ceasing to make purchases at the shop 
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972, p. 778). Alchian and Demsetz maintain that the existence of 
the firm is due to the fact that production involves joint efforts by multiple workers. 
Since it is difficult to differentiate between the efforts of the individual workers, it 
becomes problematic to allocate ex post rewards for these efforts, and incentives in an 
organisation can be easily subdued. As a consequence, a monitor needs to be introduced 
to supervise the teamwork to avoid opportunism. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) are credited with the systematic use of principal-agent 
relations to characterise the problem of governing the relationship between shareholders 
and managers. Jensen and Meckling define an agency relationship as a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principals) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making 
authority to the agent (p. 308). Since the interest of the agent is not always in line with 
that of the principal, the agent may act for himself even though his actions will harm the 
interests of the principal. To ensure the agent works properly for the principal, the 
principal has to incur extra costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary) - these are called 
the agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (p. 308) listed the agency costs as the sum of "(1) 
the monitoring expenditures of the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, 
and (3) the residual loss". The residual loss is the reduction in the value of the firm that 
comes about when the entrepreneur dilutes his ownership. The shift out of profits and 
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into managerial discretion induced by the dilution of ownership is responsible for this 
loss. For example, in a large firm (e. g. a corporation) the manager usually owns only a 
fraction of the shares due to wealth constraints and/or risk aversion. When the manager 
owns, say, only 10 percent of the company, he pays for a dollar of perquisites with only 
10 cents of his own forgone profits, and hence will overconsume perquisites. Of course, 
there may be mechanisms for keeping down the consumption of perquisites, such as 
oversight by boards of directors, the managerial labour market, takeovers, and so on. 
But the basic problem remains namely that, as long as there are outside investors, 
managers will have a tendency to consume more when they have smaller shareholdings 
in the companies. 
According to Williamson (1988), the residual loss is the key feature, since the other two 
costs are incurred only to the degree to which they yield cost-effective reductions in the 
residual loss. That is, agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and 
bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests. Agency costs also 
include the value of output lost because the costs of full enforcement of contracts 
exceed the benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Monitoring expenditures and bonding 
expenditures can help to restore performance toward pre-dilution levels. The irreducible 
agency cost is the minimum of the sum of these three factors. 
There are two broad approaches to remedying agency problems. The first one is through 
an incentive scheme to tackle the unobservable managerial effort and the moral hazard 
problem arising from it. According to Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979), managers 
may slack off when shareholders do not know how hard they work. To elicit higher 
effort, shareholders should provide managers with incentives to work hard, in part 
through share ownership. If managers are risk-neutral, then in general it is optimal for 
them to own 100 percent of equity in the companies they run. However, if managers are 
risk-averse, then the optimal management ownership is below 100 percent and, in 
general, a fully-efficient effort cannot be extracted. In moral hazard models, excessive 
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risk-bearing by managers is one of the costs of a high management ownership of shares. 
Risk-aversion reduces the optimal ownership to below 100 percent, but in the process 
also reduces the effort that managers supply. While an incentive scheme may work well 
in motivating managers to exert effort, it is likely to be less effective in getting 
managers to cut back on empire-building or to relinquish control. The reason is that, if 
managers have strong interest in power, empire, and perks, a very large bribe may be 
required to persuade managers to give up these things. 
Thus a second approach (Hart, 1995b) is that it may be better for investors to force 
managers to curb their empire-building tendencies. Placing debt in the capital structure 
is one way to do this. Moreover, debt is more flexible than an incentive scheme in that it 
makes the set of choices available to the manager sensitive to the market's assessment 
of company prospects. (Hart 1995b, p. 128) 
Hence, the control of agency problems in the decision process is important when the 
managers who initiate and implement important decisions are not the major residual 
claimants, and therefore do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their 
decisions. Without effective control procedures, such managers are more likely to take 
actions that deviate from the interests of the residual claimants. An effective system for 
decision control implies, almost by definition, that the control (ratification and 
monitoring) of decisions is to some extent separate form the management (initiation and 
implementation) of decisions. 
The implication of both agency models is that, when management ownership is high, 
managers will take actions that are closer to maximising shareholder wealth than when 
management ownership is low. These actions include working hard, forgoing the 
consumption of perquisites, making positive rather than negative net present value 
investment decisions (such as diversification), and so forth. They also include quitting 
and agreeing to be replaced by another manager when the current manager is no longer 
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the best person for the job. When incentives are strong enough, managers will be 
prepared to do what is best for the shareholders even to the extent that inferior managers 
will be willing to yield their positions to superior managers. 
2.4 The Theory of Incomplete Contracts 
in the theory of incomplete contractsý, the firm is a vehicle for residual control, which 
gives one party or parties ex post control rights when there are events that are not 
explicitly covered in the incomplete contract7 (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart 1995a). 
According to this branch of the literature, a contract can be interpreted very broadly as 
any document regulating a quid pro quo: i. e. one thing in return for something else 
(Hart and Holmstrom, 1987). The importance of the contract in the theory of the firm 
and corporate governance was recognised explicitly by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), 
who characterised the relationship between employers and employees as a contractual 
relation. Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 312) went one step further by putting forward 
the view of the firm as a 'nexus of contracts, and arguing that the firm "is just a legal 
fiction which serves as a focus for the complex process in which the conflicting 
objectives of individuals ... are 
brought in equilibrium within a framework of a 
contractual relationship. " Contracts are particularly important in long-term 
relationships, when time elapses between the initial contracting and the actual 
performance, and between actions and payoffs (Berglof, 1990). 
In contrast with both the Alchian and Demsetz version of employer-employee contracts, 
and the Jensen and Meckling version of a nexus of contracts, the theory of incomplete 
contracts argues that every economic transaction is mediated by a contract, whether 
explicit or implicit. Whilst agency theory acknowledges that the separation between 
ownership and control will lead to agency problems, it assumes that it is feasible to 
' For a more detailed analysis of the theory of incomplete contracts, see the special issue (volume 66, 
1999) of the Review ofEconomic Studies. 
7 An alternative term for the 'complete' contract is the 'comprehensive' contract, which is one that will 
never need to be revised of complemented (Williamson, 1985). 
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identify the complete set of possible contingencies and to write contracts that are 
sensitive to even the most minute details of the events arising in the course of the 
transaction. Thus, the agency problem can be eliminated by a complete contract, which 
can forecast all future events and specify the actions that should be taken. In a world of 
complete contracts, there are actually no agency costs (Hart, 1995a). 
In contrast, the theory of incomplete contracts suggests that it is the impossibility of 
specifying complete contracts which provides the basis for the existence of firms. There 
are three reasons why it is not possible to have a complete contract8 . First, 
it is hard for 
people to think very far ahead in a complex and highly unpredictable world, and to plan 
for all the various contingencies that may arise. Second, even if individual plans can be 
made, it is hard for the contracting parties to negotiate about these plans, not least 
because they have to find a common language to describe states of the world and 
actions with respect to which prior experience may not provide much of a guide. Third, 
even if the parties can plan and negotiate about the future, it may be very difficult for 
them to write their plans down in such a way that, in the event of a dispute, an outside 
authority -a court, say - can establish what these plans mean and enforce them (i. e. 
there are enforcement costs). In other words, the parties must be able to communicate 
not only with each other, but also with outsiders who may have little knowledge about 
the environment in which the contracting parties operate (Hart 1995b, p. 23). It may be 
extremely costly to write a contract that specifies unambiguously the payments and 
actions of all parties in every observable state of nature (Grossman and Hart, 1986). 
Thus it is optimal for a contract to be incomplete, and ex post renegotiations are non- 
avoidable. 
A simple model is useful for illustrating the basic ideas of incomplete contract theory - 
see Figure 2.3. Let x be a measure of the completeness of a contract, and: 
Holstrom and Tirole (1989) list four similar factors making a contract incomplete: (i) contingencies not 
foreseen; (ii) too many contingencies to write into a contract (iii) monitoring costs; and (iv) legal costs. 
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0 CA(x) is the agency cost function, which is continuously decreasing in x. CA(x)<O 
and C "(x) 2- 0; 
0 Cc(x)is the cost function associated with writing a contract. Cc(x)>O and 
C (x) ý 0; 
0 B(x) is the total cost function: 
B(x) = C, (x) + Cc (x) 2: 0 
There will be a contract, with a level of completeness (x*), that minimises the total costs 





x Completeness of the 
contract 
Figure 2.3: 
The Optimal Contract with the Lowest Combined Agency and Contracting Costs 
Hence, according to incomplete contract theory, there are substantial costs associated 
with specifying a comprehensive contract. A more general contract, which only 
specifies trades and decisions for some events and which allocates the rights to make 
decisions for all other events in a summary way, will be more efficient than attempting 
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to formulate a comprehensive one. In a world of incomplete contracts, it is optimal 
(though not first-best) to leave room for future renegotiations on what actions should be 
taken, and who has the authority to approve them. 
The implications of incomplete contracts theory are rich and profound for corporate 
governance. First, the theory explains the origins of authority in firms, which lie in the 
hands of the capital-providers. The bond-holders have the rights to future financial 
claims that are clearly stated in the debt contracts, regardless of the financial health of 
the firm. They can sue the firm if it fails to pay the coupons required in the contract, and 
any default will trigger the possible takeover of the assets of the firm. The equity- 
holders accept the residual risks by providing equity capital. Second and consequently, 
the burden of monitoring the managers falls on the shareholders. But, if it is optimal for 
contracts to be incomplete and for the allocation of some control rights to be deferred to 
the future, then who should assume these residual control rights and why? We will 
attempt to answer this question in the next section. 
2.5 Property Rights Theory 
The objective of property rights theory is to identify the boundary of the firm, since the 
boundary of the firm draws a line within which all transactions are carried out through 
authority from the management, and outside which all transactions are carried out 
through market mechanisms (i. e. contracts). Here we refer again to Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) who argued that, because of the potential for opportunism, a monitor 
was required to ensure that team members could be properly supervised and rewarded. 
The problem then becomes one of who will be assigned the authority to monitor and 
judge the team. This monitoring function can only be fulfilled within the firm, and not 
by the market. They effectively argued that the firm manager has the authority because 
he has property rights, which include the rights to determine how assets are used 
(control rights) and the rights to the cash flows generated by these assets (return rights), 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Approaches to Corporate Govemance 42 
as well as the rights to sell these rights. But where do the property rights come from, 
and who ultimately should be entitled to them? 
Grossman and Hart (1986) categorised control into two components: 'contractual' 
control, which has been explicitly written in the (incomplete) contract, and 'residual' 
control, which is the right to decide what and when to do when an unexpected event 
take place. They defined property rights as the rights to return streams, and the rights to 
make strategic decisions in contingencies not explicitly contracted upon. A firm may 
thus be defined by its physical assets, and by the allocation of the property rights to 
these assets (Hart, 1989). 
But a further question is who is entitled to possess the residual control rights: the capital 
provider, or the labour provider? Grossman and Hart suggest that the capital owner 
should possess these rights, since the capital provider can refuse labour access to the 
non-human assets9, and can walk away with all the non-human assets. In other words, 
control over the non-human assets leads to control over the human assets (Hart, 1995b). 
In a Nash equilibrium, it is optimal for both parties to agree to allocate the rights to the 
capital owners. This is a very important development in the theory of the firm and 
corporate governance since it defines property rights within a framework of the theory 
of incomplete contracts, instead of the "traditional" property rights approach developed 
by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), whose view of the firm as a nexus of contracts ignores 
the problems of writing and enforcing complete contracts. Some researchers (e. g. 
Berglof, 1990) refer to this line of research as the "new" property rights theory. 
2.6 Transactions Cost Economics as an Alternative Approach 
The key question addressed by the property rights approach to the theory of the firm is 
what defines the boundaries of the firm? Transactions cost economics provides another 
--4- 
9 Physical, or non-human, assets include machines, buildings, inventories, lists of clients, patents, 
copyrights, etc. Human capital is excluded since, in the absence of slavery, the (ultimate) right to decide 
how human capital is used always resides with the possessor of the human capital. 
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perspective on the issue of corporate governance. Basically, transactions cost economics 
regards the firm as a governance structure (Williamson, 1988), and its contributions 
may be summarised in three points. 
First, it contributes to our understanding of the nature of contracts, particularly the costs 
of contracting. As pointed out by Hart and Moore (1999), the incomplete contracts 
literature can be seen as a development of the transactions cost literature. 
Second, transactions cost economics recognises the importance of asset specificity in 
explaining why there is the firm. Williamson (1975) identified relationship-specific 
investments as the main obstacle to the use of market. Suppose that a productive 
opportunity comes up which requires that at least one of the parties undertakes 
investments which are specific to this particular relationship (e. g. specific tools or 
machinery, or the location of a plant). This investment generates a significantly higher 
surplus in the relationship than outside. Joskow (1985) used the example of a coal- 
burning electricity generating plant situated next to a coal mine. The plant generates a 
higher economic value only if it is supplied by the particular mine next to which it is 
situated, because the boilers of the plant are particularly designed for the type of coal 
produced by the coal mine. Even though markets may be competitive so that there are 
many alternative parties (many different coal mines) with which to contract, there is 
only one party left after specific investments are sunk (after the electricity plant is built, 
only one mine supplies coal useable economically to the plant). Then the party which 
has not undertaken the investment has a lot of hold-up power and thereby the possibility 
of extracting some of the surplus generated by the investment. This leads to 
underinvestment, since some of the returns generated by relationship-specific 
investments are skimmed off in expost bargaining. In these situations it is advantageous 
to use "hierarchiee' instead of the market and place the parties to the contract into the 
same firm. Thus, transactions cost theory explains the firm by viewing it as a 
mechanism for dealing with hold-up problems. This is important to strengthen 
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incomplete contracts theory in that, if there is no specific investment by either side of 
the transaction, and when there are irresolvable disputes among the parties, one or both 
of the parties can stop doing business with each other and economically seek a third 
party to provide the business they need. 
Third, the application of transactions cost economics to corporate finance leads to the 
finding that the financing instruments (i. e. debt and equity) are more than financial 
alternatives, but also alternative governance structures (Williamson, 1988). More 
specifically, the theory argues that the choice between debt and equity depends on asset- 
specificity and the investment attributes of projects, and the governance structure 
features of debt and equity need to be aligned in a discriminating way. If a new project 
involves a highly redeployable asset (e. g. a general purpose factory), it should be 
financed by debt at the "going rate" for real estate using a mortgage as security. As 
asset-specificity becomes greater, however, the pre-emptive claims of the bondholders 
against the investment afford limited protection because the assets in question have 
limited redeployability. In this case, the preferred financial instrument for projects 
should be equity finance, which offers more intrusive oversight and involvement 
through the board of directors. 
Notwithstanding these contributions to the theory of the firm, transactions cost 
economics is not central to our understanding of corporate governance, as will be 
discussed in the next section. 
2.7 The Theories Compared 
The different branches of the modem theories of the firm and corporate governance 
display the firm from different perspectives, yet have been developed interactively 
(Williamson, 1988; Hart, 1988; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989; Hart and Moore, 1999). It 
is helpful to think of these theories as complementary, rather than contradictory and 
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mutually exclusive. Certainly, any attempt to differentiate and disentangle them fully 
will cause confusion instead of clarification. Thus, as stated in chapter 1, we stress that 
this is a study with an agency theory perspective within the framework of the theory of 
incomplete contracts. Agency problems cannot be properly understood in a world in 
which comprehensive contracts can be formulated. 
The property rights theory provides the fundamental instrument of analysis for this 
study. Property rights theory and agency theory differ, as Bolton and Scharftein (1998) 
point out, in that Berle and Means stressed the separation of ownership and control, and 
implicitly defined ownership as claims on the residual cash flows - what is available 
after paying other stakeholders. In contrast, Grossman and Hart defined ownership as 
the residual control rights - the right to make decisions about contingencies that are not 
specified in the contract. Thus the Grossman - Hart - Moore line of thought calls the 
shareholders "owners" because they have the voting power to determine how assets are 
deployed, whereas Berle and Means think of the shareholders as "owners" because they 
get the residual cash flows. 
A potential shortcoming of property rights theory is the identification of control with 
ownership. As Kay (1996, p. 111) puts it very effectively: "if we asked a visitor from 
another planet to guess who were the owners of a firm [on the basis of this definition] 
by observing behaviour rather than by reading text books in law or economics, there can 
be little doubt that he would point to the company's senior managers. " Not surprisingly, 
this line of research has found it extremely difficult to deal with the separation between 
ownership and control, because it equates the two concepts, and this has also impinged 
on its ability to deliver implications for corporate governance. Thus, property rights 
theory may be most applicable to small or privately-owned firms where the owners are 
also the managers, and there is no delegation of management to professionals who are 
not significant shareholders. But, when ownership and control are separated as is 
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usually the case in large listed companies, we need to broaden our perspective to agency 
theory. 
Although the transaction costs economics approach is regarded as a major step forward, 
the explanation of the existence of firms as a governance structure to solely protect 
relationship-specific investments has been criticised because it lacks a criterion for the 
boundaries of the firm (Hart, 1995b). If there are potential benefits to integrating 
different firms because their assets are relationship-specific, but no countervailing costs, 
it is not clear why it is not efficient to concentrate all economic activities in one large 
firm. As Holmstrom and Roberts (1998, p. 75) point out, firms have to deal with a much 
richer variety of problems than simply the provision of investment incentives and the 
resolution of hold-ups. Ownership patterns are not determined solely by the need to 
provide investment incentives, and incentives for investment are provided by a variety 
of means, of which ownership is but one. Table 2.1 provides a brief comparison of the 
essential features of transactions cost economics and agency theory. 
Table 2.1: A Comparison between Transactions Cost Economics and Agency Theory 
Transactions Cost Economics Agency Theory 
Origination Market structure Corporate finance 
What is the Firm? A governance structure Nexus of contracts 
Focal dimension Asset specification Not specified 
Minimum unit of Transaction Individual agent 
analysis 
Focal cost concern Maladaptation Residual loss 
Contractual focus Ex post governance Ex ante alignment 
Source: Adapted from Williamson (1988) 
The main conclusion to emerge from this discussion is that corporate governance issues 
arise due to agency problems, caused by the combination of the separation of ownership 
and control, and the incompleteness of contracts. Furthermore: 
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Property rights theory explains the sources of authority. 
Agency theory emphasises the separation of ownership and control, and points out 
that, in modem corporations, authority resides in the hands of management. 
Incomplete contracts theory argues that the issue of corporate governance cannot be 
understood in a world in which comprehensive contracts are infeasible, as agency 
problems can be easily resolved with complete contracts. 
2.8 Stylised Models of Corporate Governance 
It is accepted that there are two basic models of corporate governance, as defined in 
developed economies, but mostly applicable to the developing or transitional 
economies, though with a certain degree of variety. One is the Anglo-Saxon model, 
which is prevalent in the United States, the United Kingdom and other developed 
English-speaking countries such as Canada and Australia. And the other is the German- 
Japanese model, which is favoured in many Continental European countries and Japan. 
The former is also commonly referred to as an 'outsider system', whilst the latter is an 
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Figure 2A 
Insider-based and Outsider-based Systems of Ownership and Control 
Source: Mayer (1994) 
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The Anglo-Saxon model is characterised by dispersed shareholding, shareholder 
sovereignty, and the alignment of shareholders' and managers' interests. This model 
also stresses the importance of the enhancement of monitoring, information disclosure, 
and accountability mechanisms such as a competitive market for corporate control (i. e. 
takeovers, mergers and acquisitions). The largest shareholders play a passive role in the 
management of the corporation, and do not intervene directly in the day-to-day 
business. They protect their interests by voting with their feet: i. e. they sell their shares 
when they are not happy with the management. The protection of small (minority) 
shareholders is well-establ i shed by law and regulations. Another important 
characteristic of the system is the existence of an active market for corporate control, 
where shareholders exercise control over management discretion through exit, and this 
establishes the threat of hostile takeover (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). From this follows 
the Kay and Silberston (1995) assertions that the threat of hostile takeover has led to the 
increased importance of shareholder interests in the Anglo-American system through 
the 1980s, and that corporate control was seen as one of the principal goals of company 
law. 
The insider system of corporate governance is characterised by cross-shareholdings, 
cross-representation of directors, large investor involvement in corporate decision- 
making, and the concentration of share ownership. Much is made of the potential that 
this establishes for inter-firm co-operation and relationship-specific investments among 
companies and their employees, suppliers, purchasers, investors and consumer groups. 
There are virtually no markets for corporate control because only a small proportion of 
shares are circulated on the markets, and it is impossible to acquire sufficient shares to 
oust existing management teams. The safeguards for the interests of labour (through, for 
example, the German system of co-determination, and the Japanese system of lifetime 
employment) have received much attention from stakeholder-oriented commentaries. 
Long-term relationships between the larger shareholders and the corporations are 
common practice. The mutual monitoring and selective interventions by large equity- 
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owners are seen as a highly effective means of controlling the problems of corporate 
governance, provided that there is product market competition. Notwithstanding the 
many common points, the corporate governance structures in Germany and Japan still 
have some remarkable differences - see Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: The Importance of Different Corporate Control Mechanisms in Large Non- 
financial Firms in Four Economieslo 
Mechanism United States United Kingdom Japan Germany 
Board Little Little Little formally, Greatest 
Independence/Pow more influence 
er over informally via 
management President's Club 
meetings 
Importance of Small Unknown. Less Imi)ortant for 
pay/performance probably small those firms that 




Monitoring by Little Little Substantial Some 
financial institution 
stakeholders 
Monitoring by Little Little Some Substantial 
non-financial firm 
stakeholders 
Monitoring by Little Little Little Important for 
individual those firms that 
stakeholders are owner- 
managed 
Frequency of Frequent Frequent Virtually non- Virtually non- 
hostile takeovers existent exist 
Source: Prowse (1994), p52. 
Theoretically, the pros and cons of each type of governance structure are as follows. 
Corporate governance through large controlling blocs more or less guarantees the 
effective control of management, but reduces the liquidity of the firm's shares in the 
secondary market and also reduces managerial incentives in decision-making (Burkart 
et al, 1997). Alternatively corporate governance through takeover, which is assumed to 
be a mechanism that improves the allocation of resources, minimises the liquidity costs 
I ILO w 
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of larger stakes, but introduces some uncertainty as to whether takeovers succeed 
whenever they are needed. 
Empirically, there is considerable dispute about the effectiveness of the different 
corporate governance systems. Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), among many other 
researchers, make very optimistic assessments of the United States corporate 
governance system, whereas Jensen (1989,1993) believes that it is deeply flawed and 
that a major move from the current corporate form to a much more highly-leveraged 
organisation - similar to the leveraged buy-out (LBO) - is in order. There is also 
constant talk of replacing the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance systems with those 
patterned after German and Japan (see, for example, Roe, 1993 and Charkham, 1994). 
But a common feature of the corporate governance systems in the United States, 
Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom is that they work reasonably well. In contrast, 
Barca (1994, as cited in Pagano et al, 1998) and Pagano el al (1998) both maintain that 
Italian corporate governance mechanisms are so undeveloped as to substantially retard 
the flow of external capital to firms. " In less developed countries, including some 
transition economies, corporate governance mechanisms are practically non-existent. In 
Russia the weakness of the corporate governance mechanisms has led to the substantial 
diversion of assets by managers of many privatised firms, and the virtual non-existence 
of external capital supply to firms (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1995). 
As a result, theorists, practitioners, and government policy-makers are all now exploring 
how to establish or improve the system of corporate governance. In the United 
Kingdom, there was the Cadbury Report (1992) and the Greenbury Report (1995). At 
the international level, there was the OECD (1999) 'Report on Corporate Governance'. 
10 A more detailed comparison of corporate governance systems around the World can be found in the 
Appendix at the end of Us chapter. 
11 See La Porta et al (1998), La Porta et al (1997,2000,2002) and Berndt (2000) for a detailed discussion 
with emphasis on the differences in the Mstorical and legal enviromnents. 
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All these reports suggest some remedies, or recommend codes of behaviours for Board 
directors and CEOs. But none of them provides any empirical evidence about which 
system is most effective and should be adopted. The task of establishing the most 
efficient corporate governance system requires empirical studies on a country-by- 
country basis. 
2.9 Current Studies on Corporate Governance in China 
Studies of Chinese corporate governance issues are quite new, and very few have been 
published in English. But attention to these issues is increasing with SOE reform and 
corporatisation. It is commonly accepted that one of the main goals of China's market- 
oriented reforms has been to establish a corporate governance system that could provide 
incentives for investment, adequately restrain and monitor management, and promote 
the optimal use of resources for wealth creation. For example, in China, a prominent 
Chinese economist, Wu Jinglian introduced and promoted the concepts and importance 
of corporate governance in 1994 (Tam, 1999). Wu's definition of corporate governance 
is: 
'Because a company does not have its own mind and consciousness, only 
through and organisational system - namely managerial staff directed by its 
corporate governance - it can be governed. Corporate governance means the 
organisational structure consisting of owner, board of directors and senior 
managers. A check and balance relationship is formed within that structure, 
through which the owner entrusts its capital to the board of directors. The 
board of directors is the highest level of decision making of the company and 
has the power to appoint, reward and penalise, and dismiss senior managers. ' 
(Wu, 1994, p. 185 as cited by Tam, 1999, p. 19) 
As we can see from the definition, it mostly echoes those found in other economies but 
with more emphasis on the role of the board of directors. 
Two broad approaches may be identified to achieve the required system of corporate 
governance in transitional economies - the privatisation approach, and an approach 
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based upon the assertion that effective corporate governance may be best achieved 
under government control. The privatisation approach argues that a sound corporate 
governance system in China can be achieved only through the privatisation of the SOEs, 
and if the government relinquishes all control (Lin, 2000). An efficient corporate 
governance system can not be established without the exclusion of government 
ownership from, at least the majority of, SOEs as the Government has its own agenda 
which may or may not coincide with the public interest. For example, the government's 
first priority is maintaining political and social stability. And the Government is also 
interested in increasing the amount of revenue under its disposal (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1994; Shleifer, 1998). 
The second approach has been advocated by Qian (1995,2001) and Che and Qian 
(1998). They argue that a corporate governance system without private ownership may 
be the second-best solution, and that the circumstances do not allow the achievement of 
the first-best outcome. They assert that contracting is more likely to be incomplete in 
developing and transition economies because of imperfect States and market 
institutions. For example, in the absence of the rule of law and an independent judicial 
system, the enforcer of a contract (i. e. the Government) may be corrupt or be a party to 
the contract. It is therefore more likely that contracts may become unenforceable in 
developing and transitional economies (Che and Qian, 1998), and incomplete 
contracting is a more natural assumption (Schmidt, 1996). They modelled a situation in 
which the interests of local governments did not align with those of central government. 
The local governments wanted to promote economic efficiency rather than pursue other 
political goals. Thus the SOEs owned by local governments could report outstanding 
performance, since the local governments act as a buffer between the SOEs and the 
Central Government, and could hide information from the Central Government. 
Obviously, this is not the first-best outcome, and it is tempting to conclude that Che and 
Qian (1998) were trying to justify the economic performance of China since economic 
reform without the large-scale implementation of privatisation. 
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in summary, even though there is an increasing literature on corporate governance (Xu 
and Wang, 1997; Tam, 1999; Tenev, 2002), these provide little insight into China's 
predicament for four main reasons: 
0 The transition from a socialist to a market economy has demonstrated the old lesson 
that social transformation is driven by both economics and politics. The persistent 
influence of the State and its administration, of cultural values, and of social and 
political institutions influences the set of feasible evolutions of every transitional 
State 12 . The corporatisation of 
State-owned enterprises is an explicit goal of the 
micro-reconstruction of China's economy. But the objectives associated with 
establishing a corporate system are ambiguous and sometimes contradictory. For 
example, one stated objective for corporatisation is to improve the efficiency of the 
SOEs, which implies that the more efficient firms should be allocated more capital. 
But another objective is to keep alive poorly-performing firms in order to avoid 
social instability. These contradictory objectives make it more difficult both for 
policy-makers and for theorists to work out a clear, long-term strategy for more 
sound corporate governance (Tam 1999). 
0 History shows that the design of reform schemes varies according to political 
conditions across countries. China will need to find its own unique path of 
transition from a centrally-planned to a market economy. In China, the stock 
markets, large shareholders and small shareholders co-exist. The large shareholders, 
such as the State-owned agents and institutional investors, control the corporations, 
whilst the small shareholders are dispersed and are mainly engaged in obtaining 
short term capital gains. 
12 If there were a known best way to organise an economy, then the influence of politics and social values 
might be seen as a constraint. But capitalism is not limited to one single type, nor can an as yet untried but 
superior form of capitalist organisation be rule out. A desirable feature of any reform package is thus an 
allowance for an evolutionary path of trial, effort and adaptation (Frydman and Rapacynzshi 1994, Murrel 
1992). Political and social institutions play an important role in guiding the process of evolution and 
transformation. 
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0 As noted by Schiavo-Campo and Pannier (1996), 'internal' improvements in 
corporate governance are an essential part of the public enterprise reform process 
and an adjunct to the 'external' reform measures. In their opinion, the principal 
dimensions of corporate governance reform are the process of corporatisation, the 
selection of agents to represent the State, management improvements, the role of 
the Board of Directors, and performance and management contracts. 
0 The development of the financial sector is an external factor for fostering the 
formation of a sound corporate governance system, but this is a complex and 
multifaceted process. It involves the balanced development of three essential 
elements (La Porta et al 1998) which are missing or incomplete in China: 
institutions, instruments, and markets. This gives rise to a situation in which a well- 
functioning financial market and its constituent participants (including the listed 
companies) are mutually dependent on each other. A problem or imperfection in 
one element causes problems for the others. This can be commonly seen around the 
world - the prevalence of bad corporate governance practices typically 
accompanying poorly-functioning financial markets (La Porta et al 2000). 
There are also a number of particular features of the Chinese system that are relevant in 
the context of corporate governance reform: 
0 First the institutional and cultural setting in China is quite different to that in the 
West and in the countries of the former Soviet bloc. China has not, as was the case 
in the former Soviet-bloc countries, undergone a rapid transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy. Market-based reforms and the adoption of the 
corporate form for enterprises were adopted in China as a pragmatic solution to 
poor economic performance under State planning. They were grafted onto an 
ideological position that remained essentially collectivist and socialist in its 
outlook. 
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0 In setting up its joint stock system, China is forming a system with its own 
characteristics. One interesting feature of China's listed companies is that, for 
historical reasons (which will be discussed further below), much of the companies' 
total capital is made up of three types of shares: State-owned shares, legal person- 
owned shareS13 , and tradable shares. 
Neither the State-owned shares nor the legal 
person-owned shares can be traded on the Stock Markets. 
0 The State-owned shares may be held by the Central Government, by local 
government, or by wholly government-owned enterprises. It has been decreed that 
the ultimate owner of State-owned shares is the State Council of China. State shares 
may not be traded on the two main Exchanges, but are transferable to domestic 
institutions subject to the approval of the China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
The State is the largest shareholder in many of the publicly-traded corporations. 
0 The legal person-owned shares are those owned by the domestic institutions, and 
are much more complex and various. The domestic institutions include stock 
companies, non-bank financial institutions, and SOEs that have at least one non- 
State owner. 
0 The tradable shares may be divided into four types: tradable A-shares, B-shares, H- 
shares, and N-shares. The tradable A-shares are held mostly by individuals and 
some domestic institutions, and can be freely traded on the domestic stock markets. 
B-shares are designed for foreign investors, and may be traded only on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. H-shares are listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange. N-shares, actually American Depository Receipts (ADRs), are 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 
0 In aggregate terms, the State-owned shares and the legal person-owned shares 
account for most of the capital, and therefore determine control of the firms. 
Takeover, as a mechanism of monitoring management, is meaningless in this 
situation because the bidder cannot gather enough shares to take over the control of 
13 A legal person is defined in China as an institution, or a legal entity that is not a natural person, but 
with the rights to own assets, sign contracts and sue or be sued. 
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the company. But not all the listed companies' stocks are dominated by State- 
owned and legal person-owned shares. The shares of about one-third of the listed 
companies can be traded on the stock markets, and these companies provide the 
opportunity to study the relationship between governance structure and corporate 
performance. 
0 In the West, creditors who supply loan capital are entitled to initiate a process 
(either in a Bankruptcy Court or through an out-of-Court settlement) to restructure 
and reorganise the firm. In China in contrast, the role of debt as an incentive 
mechanism is either absent or weak. 
2.10 Concluding Remarks 
In the above sections, we have discussed theoretical approaches to the issue of corporate 
governance. Agency theory argues that the issue of corporate governance arises because 
of the separation of ownership and control, and points to possible conflicts between 
shareholders, bondholders and managers. But the theory of incomplete contracts points 
out that, in a world in which comprehensive contracts may be drawn, there are no 
agency problems since all agency problems can be anticipated, written in the contracts, 
and enforced by a third party (usually a court). The application of the theory of 
incomplete contracts to the firm leads to so-called new property rights theory, which 
argues that the firm is a vehicle to resolve the issue of residual control. Property rights 
are the residual rights that can not be explicitly written in the initial contract, and it is 
optimal for the parties to leave a contract incomplete and renegotiate later when future 
contingencies arise. The contribution of transactions costs theory is that the 
incompleteness of contracts is due to transactions costs. It treats the firm as a 
governance structure, with emphasis of the role of debt/equity in the corporate 
govemance. 
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Economists have used those ideas to model financial instruments not in terms of their 
cash flows, but in terms of the rights they allocate to their holders. In this framework, 
investors get cash only because they have power. This can be the power to change 
Directors, to force dividend payments, to stop a project or a scheme that benefits the 
insiders at the expense of outside investors, to sue Directors and get compensation, or to 
liquidate the firm and receive the proceeds. 
The Chinese corporate governance system and related theories are under development. 
In transition economies such as China, contracts are more likely to be incomplete, due 
to the immature legal framework, the uncertain future, and the weak enforcement of the 
law. Agency problems are likely to be more serious - particularly in the public sector - 
and it is reasonable to assume that the theories reviewed are pertinent in the Chinese 
case. 
The following chapters now utilise this general framework to examine the issues of the 
underpricing of IPOs, the ownership structure, and the capital structure in Chinese listed 
companies. As Zingales (2000) points out, these issues are inextricably linked to each 
other. These empirical studies will help our understanding of the mechanisms of 
corporate governance in China, and provide a fresh perspective on how these 
mechanisms impact upon the performance of corporations. 
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Chapter 3 
The Evolution of Corporate Governance in China 
3.1 Introduction 
In 1990, China became the first communist nation in the world to have a Stock 
Exchange with the formal establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE). Five 
Chinese companies became the first batch of firms listed on the official Exchange. This 
was a result of China's determination to establish a market-oriented economic system 
through economic reform and openness to the world, though doing so in a gradual 
evolutionary manner. The general principle guiding this gradualist approach to reform 
in China is that every new institutional change should be first implemented in one 
geographical area or industry sector, before being later put into wider application when 
the paramount leaders believe it is good for the rest of the economy. This top-down 
approach has been criticised by many but, at least until now, the Chinese economy 
appears to be performing well in comparison to other transitional economies, many of 
which have experienced serious difficulties and which look likely to experience further 
difficulties in the future. 
As part of the overall programme of Chinese economic reform, the reform of the 
financial system had four main objectives: 
(1) To provide additional finance channels through which the Government might raise 
capital for investment projects. 
(2) To address the bad loans/banking problem inherited from the central planning era. 
To address the issues of control and ownership as the Chinese authorities hoped to 
establish a "modern enterprise system", which 'clarified property rights, designated 
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authorities and responsibilities, separated government and enterprise functions, and 
established scientific management' (State Economic Reform Commission 1994). 
The authorities believed that the introduction of a joint stock system, and more 
specifically the corporatisation of the SOEs, was the main vehicle to achieve this 
objective. 
(4) To build an institution that can undertake the role of financial intermediation, which 
is essential to a market economy. 
In this Chapter, we detail and analyse the emergence and evolution of the joint stock 
system in China. This involves a consideration both of the development of capital 
markets at the macro-level, and of the corporatisation of firms at the micro-level, with 
an emphasis on the formation of corporate governance mechanisms. The general reform 
experience of China will not be reviewed in any detail, as this has been already done by 
many other researchers. Instead, our objectives in this Chapter are twofold. First, we 
argue that the emergence and evolution of the joint stock system is the result of 
fundamental economic forces. As long as a system has the potential for generating an 
improved economic performance, it will sooner or later replace an older, less efficient 
system (North, 1992). Second, we give a snapshot of current corporate governance in 
China, and thus provide a general background for the rest of the thesis. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 3.2, we discuss the history of Chinese 
financial system reform. In section 3.3, we go deeper into the micro level, to investigate 
the process of State-owned enterprise reform and corporatisation. The formation of a 
new corporate governance structure is then considered in terms of the decision to go 
public and the initial public offering (section 3.4), the relationship between ownership 
structure and corporate performance (section 3.5), and capital structure (section 3.6). In 
section 3.7, we discuss other corporate governance mechanisms. Section 3.8 concludes. 
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3.2 Financial Reform and the Establishment of Capital Markets 
3.2.1 Fiscal Constraints and Financial Reform 
The revitalisation and evolution of the financial markets in China can be regarded as a 
microcosm of the overall picture of economic reform in China. With the introduction of 
economic reform, the planners of the Chinese economy felt that the fostering and 
development of competitive commodity markets were constrained by the fact that 
economic resources were limited due to the lack of capital markets. All resources were 
allocated by the planners through a State investment mechanism. To satisfy the new 
demands for goods and services, the State had to finance new investment projects either 
through administratively-guided bank loans, or through funds directly from the public 
reserves. But the State found that it was increasingly difficult to do the latter as fiscal 
revenues were declining as a result of decentralisation. New sources of capital needed to 
be found to finance the capital-thirsty sectors, as was common in many developing 
economies. 
Table 3.1 presents data on government fiscal revenues, fiscal deficits, and household 
savings, from 1978, on the eve of reform, to 1999. It is evident from the Table that 
Central Government's fiscal revenues declined steadily as a proportion of GDP through 
the 22-year period. Meanwhile, the net fiscal revenues decreased from a surplus of 1.0 
bn RMB in 1978, to a huge deficit of 174.4 bn RN1EB in 1999. As a result, the 
Government's role in investment became steadily weaker, and new capital expenditure 
had to be concentrated on major infrastructure projects rather than being spread through 
every sector of the economy. The Government thus relinquished control over 
investment in many industries, some of which had previously been closed to private 
investment. 
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Table 3.1: Central Government Fiscal Revenues and Fiscal Deficits, and Household 
Savings 1978-99 
Year Central Government Fiscal Deficit Household Savings 
Fiscal Revenues 
RMB bn as % of GDP RMB bn as % of GDP RMB bn As % of GDP 
1978 113.2 31.2 1.0 0.28 21 5.8 
1980 116.0 25.7 -6.9 -1.53 40 8.9 
1985 200.5 22.4 0.1 0.01 162.3 18.1 
1990 293.7 15.8 -14.6 -0.79 712.0 38.4 
1995 624.2 10.7 -58.2 -0.99 2966.0 50.7 
1996 740.8 10.9 -53.0 -0.78 3852.0 56.7 
1997 865.1 11.6 -58.2 -0.78 4628.0 62.2 
1998 987.6 12.6 -92.2 -1.18 5340.8 68.2 
1999 1144.4 14.0 -174.4 -2.13 5962.2 72.8 
Note: The figures are in nominal terms. 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2000 
One feasible alternative source of finance is household savings. A tendency for high 
savings is a common phenomenon in South East Asia, and has been cited as one of the 
factors that enabled these economies to grow so fast (Miller, 1997,1998; Schmidt- 
Hebbel et al, 1992). Household savings increased dramatically between 1978 and 1999, 
both in absolute quantity and as a proportion of GDP (Table 3.1). In 1999, savings 
amounted to 72.8% of GDP. But a high savings rate means that the banks are the main 
channels through which individuals invest. The banks thus bear all the investment risks, 
and they have to pay the individual savers interest. This causes two problems. The first 
problem is the size of the interest payments, which were estimated to be at least 300bn 
RMB in 1995, or almost half of the Government's annual fiscal revenue (China 
Statistical Yearbook, 1995). The second and more severe problem is that, because direct 
stock shareholdings are forbidden by commercial banks according to the Chinese law, 
all savings in the banks have to be channelled to enterprises in the form of bank loans. 
As there are only limited sources of equity capital, the capital structure of enterprises, 
and particularly the SOEs, is thus predominantly made up of debt. As a consequence, a 
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debt chain is formed between enterprises, banks, and individual savers. The creditors of 
this debt have no means to monitor the performance of the enterprises, unless the 
enterprises are in financial distress. This leads to the equity-owners, whose investment 
only accounts for a small proportion of total assets, tending to abuse their rights by 
overinvestment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A consequence is that default of debt 
becomes inevitable when business is bad, and may lead to national financial crises, as 
happened in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and in Japan's ailing economy (Miller, 
1998). 
When fiscal revenue decreases, the Government finds that it is infeasible to provide all 
the capital needed by the rapidly growing economy from the State budget. The 
establishment of a joint-stock system requires not only the transformation of the SOEs 
at the firm level, but also a capital market where investment may be financed from non- 
State financial resources and where the risks and returns of firm projects may be 
efficiently priced. In a survey of 59 countries around the world, Jones et al (1999) report 
that the resolution of fiscal problems is the principal motivation for the implementation 
of privatisation schemes. 
3.2.2 The Establishment and Development of Stock Markets 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) suggest that, although economic growth in 
developing countries initially relies on banking finance, stock markets play a more and 
more important role in corporate finance as the economies grow. Stock Exchanges did 
exist in China before the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, though on a 
very small scale. The emergence of a joint-stock system and Stock Exchanges in 'Old 
China' was in part due to the introduction of Western management technology, and in 
part due to the natural need for broad financial channels. Capitalists favour the pooling 
of capital so that a larger scale of production can be financed. But soon after the 
establishment of the People's Republic, the Stock Exchange in Shanghai, and others in 
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smaller cities, were abolished on the grounds that the joint-stock system was 
intrinsically contradictory to socialist ideas. Thereafter, anyone advocating the idea of a 
Stock Exchange was liable to serious punishment. 
With the advent of greater freedom in decision-making since reform, some pioneering 
non-State firms, such as the collectively-owned firms, began to seek equity from 
"private" investors, usually the firm's employees. Beijing Tiaoqiao Department Store 
was the first one in China to issue "equity" to its employees. The motivation for this 
was to finance business expansion, and to link the performance of the firm with that of 
its employees (World Bank, 1995). But the "shares" may be better understood as a 
bond-type security - the firm promised a guaranteed rate of return over five years and 
redemption of the initial investment at the five-year "maturity" date. The shares were 
also not transferable before the maturity date. More importantly, there was no voting 
right associated with each share, and the firm did not set up a Board of Directors. 
Notwithstanding the simplicity of the 'shares, and their variation from the accepted 
definition, the issue was still significant in that it was an attempt to raise capital from 
private sources in the name of "shares" and to introduce an incentive scheme other than 
the then prevalent bonus scheme. A more standard share issue was made by Shanghai 
Feile Co. Though not transferable, the Feile shares had all the other usual features of 
shares - residual claim rights, infinite maturity, and voting rights. The importance of 
these two pioneering firms was that they made people tolerate, then accept, the concepts 
of the shareholding system. The policy-makers silently watched everything without 
significant obstruction. 
Increasingly other firms followed suit to issue equity or bond-type securities. But the 
lack of transferability increased the liquidity risk, thus higher returns were required by 
the investors, with consequently higher capital costs to the issuing firms. To tackle the 
problem, some local non-banking financial institutions in Shanghai set up a trading 
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room to facilitate the trading of shares. This was the embryo of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange. 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange was formally organised on 19 December 1990. There 
were just simple rules to guide the transactions of shares issued by the five companies 
listed initially, a number which rose to eight by the end of the year. All the transactions 
were dealt with by manual bookkeeping. On July 3 of the following year, Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange was established, initially for the trading of the stocks of only two 
companies. 
The operations of the two Stock Exchanges are now carried out independently and 
separately - listing and trading of shares are exclusively for shares listed on each 
Exchange. Once a company has chosen to list and trade its shares on one Exchange, it 
must stay listed on that Exchange and no cross-listing and trading are allowed: a 
different practice from that in many major Stock Exchanges around the world. Up until 
1998, the two Exchanges belonged to their respective municipalities (i. e. Shanghai and 
Shenzhen), though they were national Stock Exchanges in that they provided listing and 
trading services to companies from all over the country. However, in 1997, the State 
Council, under Premier Zhou Rongji, decided to take control over the two Exchanges 
from the municipalities, and placed them directly under the control of the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), making them truly national exchanges. The 
official explanation for the takeover was that it would make the Exchanges serve better 
the needs of the nation (CSRC, 1997), but it was rumoured that the real reason was the 
perceived collusion between the Exchanges and some institutions (including listed 
companies and investment houses) which, with the connivance of the municipal 
authorities, violated official regulations by manipulating shares prices. Currently, the 
two Exchanges trade not only shares, but also treasury bills or bonds, corporate bonds 
and funds. All transactions are carried out by a continuous auction mechanism, and 
information regarding all the deals is scriptless and stored in central computers in the 
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Exchanges. In term of the efficiency of making transactions, they are as modem as any 
other major Exchange around the world, though there is much room for improvement in 
the observation of regulations by the market participants. Advanced financial products, 
such as stock options and stock market index options, are not yet allowed to be traded. 
Table 3.2 gives a summary of the development of the Chinese stock markets in terms of 
the number of listed companies, and the total capital raised. 
Table 3.2: The Development of the Chinese Stock Markets 










Capital No. of Total 
raised listed market 









1990 10 3.1 0.18 0.43 8 1.2 2 1.9 
1991 14 10.9 0.54 0.50 8 2.9 6 8.0 
1992 54 104.8 3.93 9.41 30 55.8 24 49.0 
1993 183 353.1 10.20 37.55 106 220.6 77 133.5 
1994 291 369.1 7.92 32.68 171 260.0 120 109.1 
1995 323 347.4 5.96 15.03 188 252.6 135 94.9 
1996 530 984.2 14.52 42.51 293 547.8 237 436.5 
1997 745 1752.9 23.54 129.38 383 921.8 362 831.1 
1998 851 1950.6 24.90 84.15 438 1062.6 413 888.0 
1999 972 2647.1 32.32 94.46 495 1458.0 477 1189.1 
2000 1121 4809.0 55.28 207.10 606 2693.0 515 2116.0 
Notes: (1) Listed companies including those with A, Band H shares. 
(2) Total market value = total outstanding shares x share price 
Source: China Securities Statistical Yearbook 2000. 
From 1990 to 2000, the number of Chinese listed companies increased from 10 to 1121: 
i. e. an annual rate of growth of 53.2%. Total capital raised from the various investors 
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summed to RMB 749.91bn by the end of August 20011. The largest initial public 
offering (IPO) was that of China Petroleum Chemical Corporation (SinoPetroChem), 
which raised US$ 6bn from international capital markets. The market capitalisation of 
the listed companies amounted to 55% of China's GDP at the end of 2000. Currently, 
there are 45 million investors in the stock markets. All the above figures show that the 
establishment of the modem corporation system and capital market has evolved from an 
experiment to an essential part of China's path towards a "socialist market economy', 
and that the process has become non-reversible. 
3.2.3 Foreign Investment in the Chinese Stock Markets 
China has been among the largest recipient countries of foreign investment since the 
implementation of its open-door policy. But nearly all the investments have been in the 
form of foreign direct investment (State Statistical Bureau 2000). There has been 
comparatively little indirect investment via the stock markets, yet this provides greater 
liquidity for potential investors. B shares fulfil two needs: they enable firms to raise 
foreign capital, and they allow foreign investors to make alternative investments with 
higher liquidity. To facilitate the inflow of foreign capital in the Stock Market, an issuer 
of B shares must, besides satisfying the requirements stated in the securities regulations, 
meet the following conditions: 
0 It must have obtained approval from the relevant authorities for its use of foreign 
investment, or for its conversion into a foreign-funded enterprise. 
0 It must have a stable source of adequate foreign exchange income, and the total 
amount of its annual foreign exchange income must be sufficient to pay the annual 
dividends. 
0 The proportion of B shares to the total number of shares must not exceed the ceiling 
determined by the relevant authority. The aggregate amount of shares to be issued 
1 See the wcbsite (www. csrc. gov. cn) of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
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is fixed in each year, and the total number of firms allowed to issue foreign shares 
is also limited. 
Currently, there are 102 companies with B shares listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges, which have raised total capital amounting to US$ 4.93bn (41.16 
billion RMB, or 5.5 percent of the total equity capital raised since the establishment of 
stock markets) by September 2001. The capitalisation and turnover of the B share 
markets are only 2.2% and 3.2% respectively of the corresponding figures for the stock 
markets in aggregate. The B share markets thus play an insignificant role in capital- 
raising compared with the more important A share markets2, and the intended liquidity 
benefits are limited by the fact that trading can only take place on the B share markets, 
and is limited to foreign investorsý. 
3.2.4 Remarks 
Notwithstanding the fast speed of development of the Chinese stock markets since their 
establishment in terms of the number of listed companies, the markets, in common with 
those in other immature economies, still have a long way to go in terms of 
sophistication. The main focus of this thesis is corporate governance, so here we merely 
highlight some macroeconomic issues which are relevant to the reform of the Chinese 
financial system reform: 
The function of the Chinese stock markets is mainly to raise capital, either through Q7-- 
an TO or a subsequent seasoned equity offering (SEO). Other possible functions 
such as the efficient allocation of resources, or the pricing of risk and returns, are 
carried out by the markets in mature economies, but have not yet been fully 
' The data are taken from the CSRC daily market report on 31 October 2001. This is available at the 
website www. csrc. gov. cn. 
3 In Nby 200 1, the financial authorities relaxed the restriction on the sale of B shares so that they could be 
bought not just by foreign investors, but by anyone with foreign currencies (particularly US dollars). This 
was designed to help the recovery of the nearly-dead B-shares market. 
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developed in China. This issue was pointed out by the World Bank in 1995, but is 
still pertinent ten years after the formal establishment of both the major Exchanges. 
0 Whilst the Chinese Government has enthusiastically boosted the equity-raising 
function of the capital markets, additional sources of finance should also be 
pursued. For instance, the underdevelopment of the corporate bond market has 
restrained the flexibility of choice of finance by firms. The only source of debt 
capital is from the banks. Bank debt can involve additional monitoring over the 
firm, and an over-reliance on bank lending will reduce the efficiency of debt capital 
pricing (Yafeh and Yosha, 1995; Houston and James, 1996). As Miller (1998, p. 14) 
points out, relying on bank loans instead of public debt markets is a disaster-prone 
strategy requiring enormous amounts of direct government supervision to reduce 
the frequency of crises. 
0 More fundamentally, during the process of establishment of a market economy, the 
Chinese policy-makers have been seeking a mechanism that improves the corporate 
governance from the external market, but they appear to be constrained by the 
limitations of the Anglo-American and German-Japanese models. On the one hand, 
dominant State shareholdings have to be retained so as to ensure control over the 
firm by the State, thus giving rise to an insider-based governance structure as 
stylised in the German-Japanese model. On the other hand, the over-dispersed 
outside shareholdings and the active markets for shares resemble the Anglo- 
American model, but with the lack of a market for corporate control to correct for 
the failure of corporate governance in poorly-performing firms. Certainly it takes 
time to develop a good market mechanism, and the final Chinese model will 
inevitably have its own distinctive features, but the potential costs in the meanwhile 
are massive and careful planning is essential. 
3.3 SOE Reform and Corporatisation 
A more important motivation for the authorities to implement financial reform was to 
resolve the problem of a lack of incentives in manufacturing production. This had been 
easily resolved in the agricultural sector, by simply allocating farmland to individual 
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households, though this policy did entail some costs particularly linked to the loss of 
scale economies. But it did ease, in just a couple of years, the problem of food shortages 
that had troubled China for decades. Such a solution was not feasible in the industrial 
sectors, as dividing the means of production was not a sensible way of linking the 
output to individual workers. This is a problem which has taxed practitioners and 
theorists not only in centrally-planned economies, but also in the West (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972). The problem is understandably more severe in centrally-planned 
economies, in that there are no clearly-defined ultimate owners who can monitor the 
performance of the firms, nor are there competitive capital and commodity markets to 
punish poorly-performed firms through bankruptcy or takeover. 
The economic performance of the SOEs was improved during early 1980s by the 
introduction of the bonus system (Xu and Zhuang, 1998). This was based on the belief 
by the authorities that the poor performance was caused by the lack of an appropriate 
incentive mechanism to individual employees, including top management. But soon the 
authorities found that the bonus system produced a ratchet effect - all decisions to 
increase the bonus were welcomed, but to punish firms or individual workers for poor 
performance by reducing or removing bonuses was simply not politically possible. 
Contract responsibility systems were introduced in most large and medium-sized State 
industrial enterprises during 1986-1997. The system was officially intended to place 
(governmental) ownership at arm's length to enterprise management, so allowing more 
decision-making space to the latter (Child, 1994). In the contract, the firm hands over an 
agreed amount of annual profit and tax for which they have contracted. It was permitted 
to retain a proportion of any surplus it achieved above the contracted level. Also, the 
firm guaranteed to invest to increase asset values and to develop technology by an 
agreed amount, using retained profits during the period of the contract. But substantial 
collusion soon emerged between the Directors of the companies, and the Heads of the 
supervising government departments, leading to widespread corruption (Hay et al, 
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1994). The Directors found that it was easier and quicker to reward themselves by 
simply transferring the firms' assets to their own firms. The lesson was that it is not 
feasible for the authorities simply to relinquish control to the firms' managers in an 
attempt to improve performance. Rather a new relationship between the State, as owner, 
and the firm needed to be developed. Consequently, in 1993, the National People's 
Congress passed a resolution to establish a Modem Enterprise System, indicating a 
commitment to long-lasting progress towards a market economy. 
It was evident that the policy-makers in China clearly understood that a clear-cut system 
of property rights was required as a prerequisite for widening the finance channels and 
permitting the introduction of non-State capital into the SOEs This, in turn, required the 
new institutional arrangement of a joint-stock system. 
With the endorsement by the Fourteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party in 1993, the corporatisation of the SOEs and their listing on the Stock Markets 
was carried out very quickly (see Table 3.2), only three years after small-scale 
experiments had been carried out on COEs and selected SOEs. The key features of this 
initiative were the approval of diversified forms of ownership by State, private and 
foreign investors, which would compete on equal terms in the marketplace, and the 
introduction of a framework for the modem corporate governance of State-owned firms. 
The resolution was broadened and accelerated after the Fifteen National Congress in the 
autumn of 1997, when it was announced that smaller State-owned enterprises would be 
effectively privatised by converting them into various forms of non-State and non- 
collective ownership, especially stock co-operative companies owned by their 
employees. 
For the large and medium-sized SOEs, the favoured organisational structure was the 
corporation (Hussain and Chen, 1999). "Corporatisation" involves the setting up of an 
independent legal entity, with the State as owner. Corporatisation usually involves 
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commercial isation of activities so that public enterprise operations are governed by 
commercial law like private enterprises. The original capital must be audited and 
registered, and the owners of the capital must be identified. In cases where all the assets 
belong to different State agencies, the assets still need to be attributed accordingly. For 
example, if the assets of a firm are invested jointly by the Provincial Government and 
the Municipal Government, then the assets must be so recorded, and representatives 
must be assigned from the respective owners, even though both are State agencies. A 
typical process of corporatisation may be summarised as follows: 
0 Asset assessment and verification. This work is carried out by chartered accounting 
firms. 
0 Identification of owners and allocation of ownership. For historical reasons, firms 
may have received finance from different State investors, through different 
channels, and for different objectives. There may be disputes about the 
classification of some capital. For example, some debt capital previously issued by 
State banks might be classified more properly as equity capital4. 
0 Choice of company form. According to the 1994 Company Law, the enterprise may 
choose to be either a limited liability company, or a joint stock company. 
0 Establishment of the Board of Directors. If the enterprise does choose to become a 
joint stock company, then the first general shareholder meeting will be required to 
approve the company charter and the appointment of the Directors. 
0 Appointrnetýt of Senior Managers. The Board of Directors appoints the Chief 
Executive Office (CEO)', and approves the CEO's nominations for deputy CEO 
and other senior managers. 
0 The new company begins business. 
The corporatisation of firms which had previously been solely-owned leads to a new 
corporate structure, as well as to the formation of a new financing vehicle as many firms 
The nature of debt and equity in SOEs will be discussed further below. 
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choose to get listed and raise new capital from the stock market. Further, the 
corporatisation of SOEs and other firms introduces a governance structure within which 
multiple owners jointly share finance and control, a phenomenon never seen before in 
China's planned economy. Each owner needs to both cooperate and compete with the 
other owners to ensure both the protection of their investment, and a good financial 
return. The separation of ownership and control renders the situation more complex, 
especially in the case of an economy in continuous transition, where old practices and 
laws are being abolished and new ones established. Experience shows that constructing 
a workable system of ownership rights is a complex problem, even in mature and 
developed markets, and has been the subject of heated debate in many countries. 
3.4 Going Public and the Initial Public Offering 
The primary aim of corporatisation for a firm is to raise funds for their business by 
going public (World Bank, 1995). In China, the policy-makers have an additional 
objective, namely the transformation of the governance structure of the firm by 
introducing monitoring by the capital markets. Furthermore, an implicit motive of the 
policy-makers is to privatise at least some of the previously State-owned enterprises. 
This section will consider the development and current conditions of equity issue in 
China, by focusing on the various changes in the system for the approval of equity 
issues, in the issue procedures and methods, and in the rules for setting offer prices. 
Finally, a brief analysis is provided of the implications for corporate governance of 
going public. 
3.4.1 The Approval System for an Equity Issue 
The system of approval for equity issue in China shows traces of its origins in a planned 
economic system, but has also been marked by the continual adjustment of regulations 
5 In China, the CEOs are more often called the General Managers. 
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and the adoption of new laws. The approval of a share issue to the public involves a 
two-stage quota system. At the first stage, the aggregate amount of new shares to be 
issued each year is determined by a quota set by the State Planning Committee, the 
Central Bank and the CSRC. The quotas are then distributed to individual Provinces or 
Ministries that own key State-owned enterprises. In the years 1993-1997, the quotas 
were 5 billion, 5.5 billion, 15 billion, and 30 billion RMB shares respectively. At the 
second stage, each Province or Ministry chooses the firms in the light of certain stated 
criteria. These criteria reflect the central Security Regulatory Authorities' perceived 
regional development needs, and provincial differences in production structure and 
industrial base. Within each regional quota, the local Security Regulatory Authorities 
invite enterprises to request a listing, and make a selection based on criteria which 
combine good performance as well as sector development objectives. Infrastructure 
enterprises, especially those specialising in electricity and water supply, have often been 
given priority for approval (Su and Fleisher, 1999). The local Securities Regulatory 
body then forwards the applications of the chosen firms to the CSRC for final approval, 
though this is usually a routine matter. 
To ensure the quality of the firms to be listed, the CSRC introduced a series of new 
directives in 1995, which put forth several additional requirements that firms would 
need to meet before a formal listing, even though their applications might already have 
been approved. 
0 The first directive required that all issuing firms operate for one year before 
formally issuing shares to the public, so that their performance might be monitored 
during this "probationary period". 
0 The second was that, during this period, all directors, senior managers and 
supervisors needed to pass examinations organised by the CSRC in order to test 
their capability and knowledge of management, and their understanding of relevant 
laws, regulations and policies. 
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0 The third was that the issuing firms should provide their supervising department 
with profitability forecasts for all the projects which were to be financed by the 
capital raised. 
0 The fourth was that the underwriters should coach the issuing firms for one year on 
the matter of issue procedure, to ensure a successful issue 6. 
The approval system has been widely criticised for the intrinsic drawbacks in the 
selection and application process of issuing firms. Firstly, the requirement that IPO 
reports be verified by local governments is likely to promote interventions from 
governments, and to blur the relationship between the administration and the 
enterprises. Secondly, the whole process of approval takes a long time to conclude. As a 
result, firms that have obtained approval usually hurried to a formal listing regardless of 
market conditions. Finally and most seriously, the exclusive and non-transparent policy 
implemented by the CSRC and its associated administrative organisations was the 
source of widespread corruption as firms pursued approval to raise much-needed 
capital. The firms were either forced to offer bribes to secure the success of their 
applications, or to construct fraudulent profitability figures, or both. The system was 
also biased toward the SOEs, and good firms with other ownership structures found it 
difficult to compete on an equal basis. This undermined one of the basic functions of 
capital markets as a means of resource allocation. 
In March 1999, the issue quota system was abolished, though any unfulfilled quotas set 
earlier remained valid until they were used up. A new approval procedure was 
introduced which was based on a "verification system". According to the new 
regulations, any firm that is able to achieve certain pre-determined standards can apply 
for listing on the Stock Exchanges. These standards relate to the applying firm's 
business line, its financial strength, quality and prospects, the minimum number of 
shares to be issued, and the offer price. Listing is authorised by a scrutiny committee 
See CSRC (1995), at the website www. csrc. gov. cn 
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consisting of professionals and experts. The transition from an administrative approval 
system with annual quotas, to a verification system reflects progress towards a market 
economy system. However, there is still a strong element of administrative intervention, 
and much still needs to be done before the system is similar to that in the West, where 
the financial authorities only ensure that the disclosed information is genuine and the 
offer price is set by the firm itself according to market conditions. 
3.4.2 The Procedure and Methods for an Equity Issue 
On the more technical aspects of issue, there are a number of steps a firm must take 
after it has been selected for an initial public offering, but before market trading begins. 
Some typical steps include: 
9 The setting of offer prices by the lead underwriter, according to the regulations of 
the CSRC. 
0 The publication of a prospectus in newspapers, and the selection of underwriters. 
0 The purchase of application forms by prospective investors. 
0 The choice of application method. The firm needs to choose one of three major 
application methods, as will be discussed in more detail below. 
0 The delivery of shares to the lottery winners, after payment has been made. 
The choice of application method is central, in that it affects the chances of success of 
individual investors and hence the eventual distribution of share ownership. All three 
methods involve a lottery mechanism as the primary means of share allocation, but the 
mechanism has undergone several substantial changes over the years. 
Before October 1992, the Security Regulatory Authorities designed a lottery system 
based on a pre-announced fixed number of application forms. Each retail investor was 
allowed to purchase a limited number of lottery forms from the Central Bank or its 
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subsidiaries. The lottery winners were entitled to a certain number of shares per winning 
form. With the number of lottery forms pre-determined, the odds of winning the lottery 
was known to investors. But the frantic demand for shares by investors made the forms 
the passport to an instant gain, and this led, not surprisingly, to the corruption of people 
who had easy access to the forms. In recognition of the problem, the CSRC introduced, 
in December 1992 and August 1993, two new lottery mechanisms to replace the old 
one. One mechanism was based on an unlimited number of application forms. The issue 
agency sold as many lottery forms at a low cost as investors were willing to buy. The 
other lottery mechanism was based on savings deposit certificates. Investors were 
required to deposit a certain quantity of funds into a special saving account when 
submitting an application for shares, and these funds could not be withdrawn until the 
lottery was completed. Deposits in these special savings accounts earned relatively low 
interest. Both new methods imposed a cost on speculative applications by investors. 
Under all the lottery mechanisms, the IPO price is determined before the publication of 
the prospectus. 
In April 1994, two new auction mechanisms were introduced. Under the first auction 
mechanism, an issuer set an initial price and investors were required to bid for the price 
and quantity. The final offer price was set at the level where the accumulated quantities 
demanded by investors equalled the total number of new shares available. But soon the 
authorities found the new methods problematic. The former method, when 
oversubscribed, would give rise to a high offer price and subsequently to a negative 
return during the first trading days. Resentful investors put pressure on the authorities to 
abolish the methods after the IPOs of a mere three firms. Under the second auction 
mechanism, the 1PO price was fixed and investors were invited to bid for the quantity of 
shares. In case of oversubscription, all investors were guaranteed a certain amount of 
shares and the remaining shares were distributed in proportion to investors' bids. The 
latter method led to a widely-dispersed distribution of shareholdings - in several cases, 
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investors were offered only tens of shares. This increased transaction costs for the small 
investors - they had to pay a minimum commission for the transfer of a mere ten shares. 
Since then, and based on past experience, the CSRC has introduced three new methods, 
all with pre-determined and announced offer prices. All three methods require investors 
to set aside full deposits according to the number of shares for which they are bidding, 
and the offer price. Each investor is then given a series number, and waits for the results 
of the lottery. The winners receive their shares, whilst the unsuccessful investors are 
refunded their money within eight days of the lottery. The proceeds raised in the IPO 
are then transferred to the account of the issuing firm. Each investor can bid for a 
maximum of 1% of the total number of shares. 
The differences between the three methods mainly concern the agency through which 
the bidding takes place. In the first method, the bidding is effected through the national 
securities trading network. This is very sophisticated, even in comparison with 
developed markets, and this method has become increasingly popular as it is highly 
efficient in both cost and security terms. The second method is carried out through local 
issue agencies, which both take the deposit and issue certificates with series numbers to 
investors. The lottery is carried out in a local public place, with official notaries as 
witnesses. The agencies keep the deposits, and distribute the share certificates to the 
successful shareholders. The advantage of the second method is that it can attract new 
local investors to join share-trading activities. The third method is similar to the second 
one in that the IPO is effected though local agencies but the difference is that, after the 
lottery, the unsuccessful bidders have to leave their funds in the banks for three/six 
months. 
In this and the following chapters, we categorise for simplicity the issue methods as 
either bidding through the national trading network, or bidding through a local issue 
agency - see Figure 3.1. 
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3.4.3 The Pricing of the Initial Public Offering 
The pricing of an IPO is critical step as it directly affects both the wealth distribution 
between the initial and the outside owners, and also the success of the equity issue. Thus 
IPO pricing is a matter which not only involves the issuing firm and the underwriters, 
but also regulatory bodies around the world. Prior to the establishment of the Chinese 
Stock Markets, most equity was issued at face value. From the early 1990s to March 
1999, the offer price was set under the strict regulation of the CSRC. If the price was set 
too low, then the State-owned assets were depleted. If too high, then there was a crash 
of the post-issue stock markets. The benchmark for pricing was the price-earnings (P/E) 
ratio, though with some adjustment and variation. 
In the early 1990s, the CSRC required that all offer prices should be determined solely 
by a P/E ratio of 13 (SHSE, 2001). But earnings could be calculated arbitrarily by the 
issuing firms, hence they could justify a range of offer prices using the set P/E ratio. 
From 1994 onwards, the CSRC maintained the P/E ratio as a benchmark, but insisted 
that earnings per share should be calculated on the basis of past accounting profit 
figures together with a prediction of future profitability. And the CSRC permitted a 
range of P/E ratios between 15 and 20. This rigid offer pricing thus ignored other 
important aspects of asset pricing, such as industrial characteristics, firm size, and the 
potential for future growth. We leave this issue and its implications to be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter. 
In March 1999, the CSRC amended the regulations on 1PO pricing to a more market- 
oriented approach7. Thereafter, the issuing company and the underwriter had to submit 
an TO pricing report to the CSRC, and the offer price had to be agreed by the CSRC. 
But the firm was allowed to consider factors other than the P/E ratio in setting the offer 
price. The pricing reports of new 1POs should thus include industry analysis, company 
7 See CSRC (1999) 'A Guideline on the Offer Price Settings in IPO'. 
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analysis, and an analysis of current market conditions such as the share prices of 
comparable companies. The offer price should reflect these factors, and be agreed 
initially by the issuing firm and the lead underwriter. After reviewing the report, the 
CSRC sets a narrow price range within which the issuing firm can make adjustments 
according to market conditions. The effect of the new rules is that the average P/E ratio 
of companies listed after March 1999 has increased substantially, from the previous 
range of 15-20 to around 3 08. Once an offer price has been set, it is announced in the 
prospectus, together with the numbers of shares available to the public, and cannot then 
be changed. 
It is noteworthy to point out that an 1PO price ceiling is not unique to China. In the 
United States, the SEC regulations specify that new offer prices should reflect a 
maximum P/E ratio of 200, and prices are usually filed two weeks in advance of the 
actual offering, although they can be adjusted in some cases. This point is important, as 
it will be argued in subsequent chapters that both the theories and empirical findings on 
IPO underpricing in developed economies are applicable to developing countries such 
as China. 
3.4.4 The Role of the Underwriters and the Costs of an Equity Issue 
The underwriters play a key role in the success of an IPO (Rock, 1986). There are 
broadly two possible arrangements which can be made between the issuing company 
and the underwriters: one based on a 'firm commitment' and the other on "Oest effort'. 
Under the former, the underwriter guarantees a minimum level of proceeds from the 
IPO, based on an agreed offer price and number of shares, and regardless of how many 
shares are sold. If not all the shares are sold, then the underwriter will take over the 
remaining shares at a price a little lower than the market price. But if demand is higher 
than anticipated, the underwriter can issue a further 15% of shares and earn extra 
The highest P/E ratio was 84 (SHSE 200 1). 
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commission. The alternative is the 'best effort' arrangement, under which the 
underwriter helps the issuing firm to issue the shares, but does not guarantee a full sale. 
The issuing firms may then find that some shares cannot be sold to the public, and that 
the proceeds raised may be smaller than anticipated9. Clearly the 'firm commitment! 
arrangement is safer for the issuing firm, but riskier for the underwriter. 
In China, there are a number of features related to the role of underwriters in the IPO 
process which should be stressed. First, all IPOs are made under a 'firm commitment' 
arrangement. This is not a problem for the underwriters, as almost all IPOs have been 
oversubscribed and the shares have performed well afterwards. But the underwriters are 
not permitted to issue additional shares, even when there is substantial demand. Second, 
there is little competition for underwriting business, unlike in the West, since all 
Provinces and major cities in China have set up their own securities companies, which 
are owned either by the Provincial or the Municipal Government and which undertake 
both IPOs and any subsequent seasoned equity offering (SEO) by local firms. As a 
consequence, the choice of underwriter in China is usually made according to the 
issuing firm's geographic location - the issuing firm will only employ the local 
securities company, either because of their relationship or because of pressure from the 
local government. 
According to the CSRC, the underwriting costs include the commissions paid to the 
underwriters, to the accounting firms for auditing, asset assessment and verification, and 
profit forecasting, and to the lawyers for legal consultations. The costs of document 
preparation, printing, dissemination, prospectus publication, and advertisement are not 
listed as issue fees. The underwriting fees, which constitute the largest part of the total 
direct costs of IPOs, are strictly regulated by the CSRC. The standard charge is linked to 
the issuing method. For an IPO through the national trading network, the fee is: 
9 In some countries (e. g. the United States), the TO will be cancelled if the proportion of shares 
successfully sold to the public does not reach a certain level. 
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e 1.5 - 3% of proceeds, when the proceeds are smaller than 200 million RMB. 
e 1.5 - 2.5% of proceeds, when the proceeds are between 200 million and 300 million 
RMB. 
1.5 - 2% of proceeds, when the proceeds are between 300 million and 400 million 
RMB. 
And a maximum fee of 9m RMB for an IPO with proceeds of more than 400 
million RMB. 
For an issue through a local agency, the maximum commission per share is limited to 
0.1 RMB, and the total commission to RNM 5m (CSRC, 2000). 
Interestingly, the underwriters in China also are responsible for some duties both during 
the 1PO and after the issue, which are not common in the West. One of them is to 
provide a one-year training programme to the issuing firm prior to formal listing. This 
is to ensure, according to the CSRC, that the company to be listed is well prepared for 
the requirements upon publicly listed companies (e. g. information disclosure, 
accounting standards, general meetings, and Boards of Directors). The effects of such 
an arrangement are uncertain, since there is not much for the underwriters to do when 
everything has already been arranged by the local government. 
3.4.5 The Implications for Corporate Governance of Going Public 
The 1PO and the process of going public are not merely means of raising finance, but 
also entail a change of governance structure and mechanism. In particular, management 
is exposed to new discipline from the market, as intended by the decision-makers, and 
listed companies are subject to regulations on information disclosure, to public 
criticism, and to fluctuations of stock prices. 
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A further implication, which will be explored in depth in Chapter 4, is the impact of the 
initial ownership structure upon the underpricing of the initial public offering. The 
underpricing of the IPO may be used to achieve multiple objectives. It may be used to 
signal the quality of the firm (Welch, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989), to increase 
liquidity (Booth and Chua, 1996), or to maintain control over the firm as a dispersed 
outside shareholding makes takeover harder (Brennan and Franck, 1997). 
Notwithstanding the requirement that the fraction of shares offered to the public during 
an IPO should be at least 25 percent, the Chinese Government still maintains control 
over many previously State-owned firms. The Government has introduced a variety of 
share categories, so that ownership of the State-owned enterprises is dispersed between 
the Government itself, other State-owned enterprises, the firms' own employees, the 
domestic public and foreign investors. 
Table 3.3: The Listing Requirements on Various Stock Exchanges 
Exchange Minimum number of Minimum number of 
shares in public float ' public shareholders 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 10,000,000 1000 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 10,000,000 1000 
NYSE 1,100,000 2000 
AMEX and NASDAQ NMS 1,000,000 400 
Or 500,000 806b 
NASDAQ (small cap market) 100,000 300 
Notes: " Exclusive of the holdings of officers, directors, controlling shareholders, and oth; r 
concentrated or family holdings. 
b If a firm has 500,000 shares and maintains a constant daily trading volume of 2,000 
shares. The minimum number of public shareholders is 400. 
Sources: For flotation on the SHSE and the SZSE, see CSRC: The Provisional Regulations on 
Stock Issuance (1996); for floatation on the US market, see the ATSE Fact Book 1988, 
AMEX Fact Book 1993, and NASDAQ Fact Book 1989 as cited in Booth and Chua 
(1996). 
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Whereas in the United States, the financial authorities impose Exchange listing 
requirements to increase liquidity (Booth and Chua, 1996), the regulations in China 
should be interpreted as an attempt to keep control. A scrutiny of the dataset used in the 
empirical chapters reveals that the initial ownership structures of the Chinese listed 
companies are dominated by State or institutional shareholders - see Table 4.6 in 
Chapter 4. Among the 467 firms, the Bureau of State Asset Management is the largest 
shareholder in about 5% of the sample, and State-owned institutions control 40%. 
Domestic institutions are the largest shareholder in only 7% of the firms, and there are 
no individual shareholders among the top five positions. The three main groups 
dominated the control of the listed companies with 52% of the total shares. We 
investigate the link between the ownership structure and IPO underpricing, an area of 
research which has been neglected in previous work in Chapter 4. 
3.5 The Post-Issue Ownership Structure 
The ownership structure of a firm raises issues of corporate governance, in that it gives 
rise to a distinct structure of profit-risk sharing in the business, and to a distinct 
monitoring role for the shareholders over the management. An uneven distribution of 
shares leads to the existence of large shareholders, which may play a direct role in 
monitoring management. In contrast, a more evenly distributed ownership structure, 
with many small shareholders, implies a greater delegation of the policing role to the 
market, with the shareholders signalling their opinions by buying or selling their shares. 
Chapter 5 investigates the link between the ownership structure and corporate 
performance, to assess the effectiveness of the monitoring role of large shareholders. 
3.5.1 The Distribution of Shareholdings 
Three stylised models of the governance structure of listed companies after 
corporatisation and TO are illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2: Models of Governance Structure in Chinese Listed Companies 
Bureau of State Asset 
Management 
State solely owned Other 
institutional investor institutional 
investors 
Non-tradable shares 
Tradable A shares Individual A shares 
by institutions 
I Tradable A shares I 
I Board of Directors I 
I Management I 
(a) Model I: State dominating indirectly 






Tradable A shares Individual A shares 
by institutions 
I Tradable A shares I 
I Board of Directors I 
I Management I 
(b) Model II: State dominating directly 






institutional institutional investor 
investors 
Non-tradable shares 
Tradable A shares Individual A shares 
by institutions 
I Tradable A shares I 
I Board of Directors I 
I Management I 
86 
(c) Model III: Domestic investors dominating directly 
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Model I is depicted in Figure 3.2(a) and is the most common in listed companies. It is 
characterised by the fact that the State-owned institutions and other institutions jointly 
hold the non-tradable shares, and thus have control over the firms. The State-owned 
institutions are in turn owned by the Bureau of State Asset Management. Model II - see 
Figure 3.2(b) - involves the direct ownership of shares by the Bureau of State Asset 
Management, at different administrative levels, and this can be regarded as direct State 
shareholding. Model III - see Figure 3.2(c) - has some domestic institutional 
shareholders. Domestic institutions are those with the greatest variety of shareholders: 
State agencies, private shareholders, collectively-owned enterprises (COEs), or firms 
with foreign investors in non-financial industries. In all three models, there are both 
tradable shares and non-tradable shares. The non-tradable shares are more numerous: 






ghai Stock Exchange 
Top 5 Top 10 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Top I Top 5 Top 10 
(0-10%) 3 1 1 5 0 0 
[10%-20%) 22 3 2 24 3 1 
[20% - 30%) 62 6 6 68 10 3 
[30% - 40%) 60 30 12 66 28 24 
[40% - 501/6) 69 55 52 47 55 41 
[50% - 60%) 64 85 81 55 73 73 
[60% - 70%) 55 103 100 45 96 96 
[70% - 801/6) 31 70 94 34 70 93 
[80% - 90%) 6 19 24 3 12 16 
Total listed 
companies 372 347 
Means (%) 45.54 59.11 62.07 43.91 58.41 61.56 
Source: Listed Companies Annual Report 1997 
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Table 3.4 provides an analysis of the dominant shareholders in 372 companies listed on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and 347 companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. For each Exchange, the Table provides data on the numbers of companies 
where the largest, the top five, and the top ten shareholders hold shareholdings in the 
designated ranges. On the Shanghai Stock Exchange, for instance, the single largest 
shareholder controls, on average, over 45% of the outstanding shares, whilst the top five 
and the top ten shareholders control 59% and 62% respectively. There are 156 firms 
(42% of the total) where the largest single shareholder holds 50 per cent or more of the 
outstanding shares. 
A careful study of the Table reveals that the smaller shareholders hold substantially 
smaller shareholdings. Whereas the single largest shareholder accounts for 45% of 
shares on average, the top five hold 59% and the top ten only hold 62%. These figures 
indicate clearly the dominant role of the single largest shareholder in many companies. 
The uneven distribution originates in the initial ownership structure after the IPO, and 
from the fact that the non-tradable shares can not change hands on the open market 
(though they can be privately transferred between institutional entities, though this is 
quite difficult in practice). Nearly all the largest shareholders are institutional 
shareholders, which may be controlled by the State. This may be important as domestic 
institutions may have economic objectives, but State-owned institutions need to take 
into account other social responsibilities such as employment generation and local 
development. The data for companies listed on the Shenzhen Exchange reveal similar 
patterns. 
3.5.2 The Institutional Shareholders 
Many domestic institutions hold significant numbers of the shares traded on the Stock 
Exchanges. According to China Securities Newslo, the numbers of shares held by 
10 See Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao (Chinese Securities News), August 16,2000 at 
http: //www. chinaonline. com/features/m_gWde/media/Publications/china_secuzitics/china_securities. htiW. 
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domestic institutional investors in China's two A-share markets had risen 26.5% from 
282,000 at the end of 1999, to 356,700 by the end of July 2001. Of this total, the shares 
owned by the institutional investors on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange grew from 
107,200 to 129,100, an increase of 20.4%. Those on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
surged 30.2% from 174,800 to 227,600. The increased number of institutional investors 
in China has been accompanied by a rise in shareholder activism. 
In developed economies, institutional shareholdings predominate. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, institutional shareholdings increased steadily from less than 
one-third of the total in 1963, to two-thirds in 1993. It has been suggested that the active 
participation of institutional investors in the corporate governance mechanism can 
improve corporate performance, both due to the significant investment of funds and the 
input of professional knowledge (Cadbury, 1992). Whilst the appropriate role of 
institutional shareholders is still under debate in China, many regard institutional 
shareholdings as a way of establishing sound corporate governance. One role is to 
stabilise the highly volatile stock markets, as institutional investors are hoped to be 
strategic investors pursuing long-term returns rather than short-term profits, thus 
reducing short-term trading activities and mitigating substantial fluctuations in stock 
prices. A second role is that a large shareholding and the possession of investment 
expertise enable the institutions to play an active part in corporate governance. 
But the role of institutional investors is questionable if they themselves are State-owned 
or State holding companies: by what mechanism can they monitor the managers of 
companies that they don't own? As Coffee (199 1, p. 133 1) pointed out: 
'The problem of who will guard the guardian is a timeless one, but it is 
particularly complicated when the proposed guardian is the institutional 
investor. Not only do the same problems of agency cost arise at the 
institutional investors level, but there are persuasive reasons for believing 
that some institutional investors are less accountable to their "ownere' 
than are corporate managements to their shareholders. Put simply, the 
usual mechanisms of corporate accountability are either unavailable or 
largely compromised at the institutional level. ' 
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The question of which of the three models is best for corporate performance will be 
considered further in chapter 5. 
3.6 Capital Structure 
The traditional view of debt is that it serves as an alternative form of capital financing to 
equity. However, the development of debt theory sheds light on this understanding of 
debt. The first financial reforms of China involved the adjustment of firms' capital 
structure. Indeed, it can be argued that the path of economic reform in China can be 
viewed in terms of the adjustment of laws and policies with regard to debt and equity, 
both in the aggregate economy and in firms. On one hand, the pressure to make interest 
and principal repayments on debt forced the decision-makers to seek equity investment 
from non-State investors when facing fiscal constraints. On the other hand, the 
relinquishment of control over the firms to the non-State equity investors raised 
concerns about the socialist characteristics of the Chinese economy. 
Concern about the debt burden was justifiable. As Miller (1998) has pointed out, the 
importance of capital structure can be observed directly from the South Korean and 
Japanese experience. Both economies are still struggling to solve the problems of debt 
accumulated from their over-dependence on debt during their periods of economic 
takeoff. The huge debts of the banks as a result of State policy towards the non- 
performing corporate groups constitute serious threats to their success. Given similar 
policy in China towards the market economy, it is natural to be concerned about the 
capital structure of listed companies in China. 
3.6.1 Financial Reform and the Capital Structure of Chinese Firms 
In a centrally planned economy, the distinction between debt and equity in a State- 
owned firm is not significant - since the State provides all the capital that the firm 
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needs. At the macro level, the State borrows debt from households in the form of family 
savings, to complement other important sources of capital including fiscal revenue. The 
economy is organised like one huge company. The function of the firm is as a 
production unit, rather than as a self-sustained entity, and the cost of capital is not a 
matter of concern. Investment thirst and soft budget constraints are common (Kornai, 
1980). 
The dynamic of capital structure development in Chinese firms is illustrated 
schematically in Figure 3.3. In the pre-reform period, the capital structure of firms 
involved zero debt and 100% State equity - Point A in Figure 3.3. The State took all the 
profits (if any) earned by the firms, and compensated all the losses. The profits and 
losses were merely symbolic because of the lack of any measure of capital cost. Point B 




A Pre-reform unified income and expenditure system. 
B 1978-80: enterprise autonomy was expanded. 
C 1981-83: experimentation with some forms of contract responsibility system. 
D= 1984-85: introduction of li-gai-shui (tax substituting for profit remission). 
E= 1987 -9 1: nationwide adoption of contract responsibility systems. 
F= 1986: local experiments with shareholding systems. 
G= 1992 - present: corporatisation of SOEs, shareholding regulations, proclamation 
of Company Law, national experiment in setting up modem corporations. 
Figure 3.3: The Experience of Financial Reform, Debt Level, and 
Governance Structure in China 
Source: Tam (1999), p. 42 
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certain degree of autonomy to firms with regard to production quotas and bonuses. All 
working capital was still supplied by the State banks according loan credits. 
Whilst providing SOEs with more autonomy, the State also introduced more constraints. 
In 1981, the provision of free working capital by the banks was replaced by loans with 
interest charges at rates determined by the Central Bank. The capital structure then 
shifted from point B to point C: all new capital was injected in the form of debt 
accumulating since point B. The objective was to curb excessive demand for working 
capital when it was free of charge. For the first time, firms felt the pressure of interest 
payments, though loan defaults did not necessary lead to bankruptcy. Since then, a 
series of financial reforms have been introduced and new capital, either working capital 
or fixed capital, must be sought from the banks within the national credit plan (Tarn, 
1999), except in the case of some key projects. From 1987, the contract responsibility 
system was adopted nationwide. One part of the contract requires that new capital 
should be either raised either through retained profits or bank loans, and this gave rise to 
the highest national aggregate debt ratio - point E. 
Before the introduction of shareholding, the 'equity' provided by the State should be 
more accurately described as a grant. Equity requires a return according to the risk it 
faces. In contrast, the State grants were used to achieve certain objectives required by 
the State, some economic but others social or political. The introduction of shareholding 
systems in some regions opened up new sources of capital, and effectively reduced the 
aggregate debt level to point F. Since 1992, the large-scale corporatisation of the SOEs 
has further reduced the debt level for two reasons. The first is that most of the new 
capital injected into SOEs has taken the form of equity, instead of debt or grants. The 
State is the provider of some of this new capital, but the ownership is clearly registered 
and traced. The second reason is the participation of investors other than the State, 
including individuals, foreign investors, COEs, and township and village enterprises 
(TVEs). 
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These new investment sources have not only provided equity capital for the firms, but 
have also reduced the debt level. According to the SHSE Annual Report (2000), many 
firms repay a part of their previous debt with the proceeds raised during their IPO. Our 
data show that the debt level, measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets, of 711 
listed companies in all industries was 43% in 1997, compared to a figure of 62% for all 
other firms (SSB, 2000). Although the two percentages are not strictly comparable due 
to the different numbers of firms in different industries and of different sizes, the 
magnitude of the difference is both striking and suggestive. 
3.6.2 The Monitoring Role of Banks 
A stylised fact about the capital structure of Chinese firms is that the vast majority of 
corporate debt is privately-placed debt in the form of bank loans. The total amount was 
9773 billion RMB in 1999, and priority was given to State-owned or State-controlled 
firms who received over 70% of total bank loans (SSB, 2000). Public corporate debt 
markets are not well-developed in China. Publicly-placed debt, with a mere twelve 
corporate bonds, only amounted to 17.9 billion RMIB with a market value of 15.3 billion 
RMB. This accounts for just 6% of the stock market in terms of total capital raised, and 
0.6% in terms of stock market capitalisation. " 
The theory of corporate governance regards debt as a governance mechanism in that it 
provides additional monitoring over management. Furthermore, the placement structure 
of debt has implications for governance. Privately-placed debt, usually bank loans, 
enables the debt-holders (the banks) to monitor the corporations more directly and 
collectively than in the case of publicly-placed debt, where the scattered debt-holders do 
not have the same power over their loans (Lehn and Toft, 1996). 
11 See the CSRC daily market report on 2 November 2001 at www. csrc. gov. cn 
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The Chinese Government has been trying to adopt the Anglo-American model of 
corporate governance, which is characterised by the protection of minority shareholders 
and the prohibition of shareholding by banks. Yet the Government also introduced a 
'main bank system', based on the idealised Japanese model, in its financial reform 
package of 1996. This system is supposed to provide the participating main bank with a 
more comprehensive capability to monitor the performance of the enterprise. According 
to the Interim Regulationsfor the Administration of the Main Bank, 12 the firm is obliged 
to disclose information to the banks about the firm's major business and financial 
activities, and to accept monitoring from the main bank. The bank has the right to audit 
all the dealings between the firm and other banking institutions, and to punish the firm if 
there are any activities by the firm breaching the terms of establishment of main 
banking relations. For its part, the bank is supposed to give priority to the firm with 
regard to the provision of reasonable loans as well as other financial services. Officially, 
the idea was to promote a major monitoring role for the designated main banks to 
restrain the "inside control" behaviour within large SOEs, and to develop a stable bank- 
centred financial environment for the enterprises to become modern corporations and to 
show better performance (Tam, 2000). 
However, the realisation of the above objectives for the 'main bank system' was 
hampered by the fact that the choice of main bank is made by the firm's supervising 
Government department. The direct monitoring effect of the main bank is thus 
weakened by the intervention of the supervising department. It would be premature to 
conclude that the'main bank system'will not function effectively in China, and there are 
obvious differences between the Chinese and Japanese realities. However, the Japanese 
model has been the subject of criticism on the grounds that banks have provided loans 
to their related firms for low-return projects, which this has led to a decade-long 
recession which shows no prospect of an end in near future (Nfiller, 1997). 
12 Issued by the People's Bank of China in 1996 - see Tam (1999) for more details 
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3.7 Other Governance Mechanisms 
A system of corporate governance exists in both an exogenous environment such as the 
political, legal and cultural framework, and an endogenous one defined by the Board of 
Directors, the incentive scheme for senior managers, and the structures of 
compensation, supervision and union membership. In the Chinese case, there is also the 
role of the Communist Party committee. Here we highlight some aspects of corporate 
governance that might form the basis for future research. 
3.7.1 The Role of the Board of Directors in Listed Companies 
According to Williamson (1988), the Board of Directors should be regarded primarily 
as a safeguard between the firm and the owners of equity capital, and secondly as a way 
to safeguard the contractual relation between the firm and its management. In most 
listed companies, due to dispersed ownership, the Directors only own a proportion of 
the total shares but, by law, they should act in the interests of all shareholders, not just 
themselves. According to the 1994 Company Law, the fiduciary duties of Directors 
include the following (Tam, 1999): 
Implementing the resolutions adopted by the shareholders' general meeting. 
Making decisions on the business and investment plans of the company. 
Drawing up company budgets and profit allocation plans 
Formulating corporate merger, division and dissolution plans. 
Appointing or dismissing the General Manager (that is, the Chief Executive 
Officer) and appointing or dismissing the deputy general manager and financial 
controller on the nomination of the General Manager. 
0 Determining the basic management system of the company. 
A comparison between these fiduciary duties of Boards of Directors in China, and those 
in Western countries (e. g. the United States and the United Kingdom), suggests that 
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there are no significant differences. Indeed, the decision-makers in the Chinese 
Government have been introducing the UKAJS version of Board structure. But a more 
careful scrutiny of the appointments and the roles of the Directors does reveal some real 
differences. 
The 1994 Company Law mandates that the numbers of Directors on the Board should 
be between 5 and 19 persons. Table 3.5 provides data from a sample of 1892 Directors 
of listed companies. 
Table 3.5: The Provenance of the Directors of Companies listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Provenance of Directors TO 1996 1997 1998 1999 
From shareholding 7.07 6.6 6.49 6.81 6.92 
institutions (69%) (65%) (65%) (69%) (70%) 
From the largest 5.1 4.51 4.66 4.97 5.33 
shareholding institution (50%) (45%) (47%) (50%) (54%) 
From the second largest 1.5 1.37 1.38 1.42 1.56 
shareholding institution (15%) (14%) (14%) (14%) (16%) 
From the third largest 1.02 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.99 
shareholding institution (10%) (10%) (9%) (10%) (10%) 
From Government 1.37 1.26 0.97 0.74 0.64 
Departments (13%) (12%) (10%) (7%) (6%) 
From banks 1.08 1.28 1.16 1.06 0.84 
(10%) (13%) (12%) (11%) (9%) 
From non-banking 2.21 2.32 1.98 2.06 2.04 
financial institutions (21%) (23%) (20%) (21%) (21%) 
From related institutions 4.45 3.78 4.38 4.59 4.81 
(43%) (37%) (44%) (46%) (49%) 
From non-related 2.92 3.39 3.09 3.17 3.09 
institutions (28%) (34%) (31%) (32%) (31%) 
From higher 0.85 0.67 0.77 0.81 0.70 
administrative Department (8%) (7%) (8%) (8%) (7%) 
Executive Directors 6 6.4 5.9 5.48 5.31 
(as % of the board) (58.25) (63.37) (59.23) (55.35) (53.74) 
_Number 
of board member 10.3 10.1 9.96 9.9 9.9 8 
Notes: The data are based on a sample of 1892 Directors of companies which had IPOs in 
1995. Some of the totals do not correspond to the sum of the individual headings 
because of inconsistencies in the data and overlap between the categories. 
Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange (2000), Listed Companies. 
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Table 3.5 shows that, at the IPO stage, the average size of the Board was 10.3 Directors, 
with 69% of the Directors representing shareholding institutions and 50% appointed by 
the single largest shareholder. The implications of this are interesting. The average 
Board size is roughly in the middle of the range permitted by the Company Law. Does 
this suggest that there is an optimal size for the Boards of listed companies, which 
ensures an efficient monitoring and strategic decision structure? Some research in other 
economies (e. g. the United States) reveals that there is a link between the size of the 
Board and corporate performance, but no such study has yet been undertaken for China 
It is also noticeable that 50% of the Directors are from the largest shareholders, most of 
which are institutions. Given such a representation, it is doubtful whether the interests 
of the other shareholders can be effectively protected, and how balanced decision- 
making can be achieved. The survey also found that nearly half of the Directors came 
from related organisations, including other shareholding institutions, business partners, 
and the debt-lending institutions. This raises the question of whether these Directors 
play an active and independent role in corporate governance. 
The Table also reveals that Executive Directors have a dominant position on the Boards 
of many Chinese listed companies. The average proportion of Executive Directors is 
consistently above 50%, both in the year of the TO and over the period 1996-99. 
Tam (1999) has analysed the administrative positions held by Executive Directors, and 
his results are summarised in Table 3.6. It is interesting to note the proportion of 
Directors who combine the roles of Chairman and General Manager, and this raises an 
issue which is under debate both in China and in the West. In China, it has been argued 
that a high proportion of Executive Directors held the position even before the 
corporatisation of their firms, and that their professional expertise and knowledge of the 
business have a positive impact upon the firm's performance. But critics maintain that 
such insider control weakens the function of Directors as monitors of the management, 
and harms the long-term interests of shareholders - as many scandals in the news media 
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testify. They argue that Boards should be staffed by non-Executive Directors, at least in 
the long-term. 
Table 3.6: The Administrative Positions held by Executive Directors in Chinese Listed 
Companies 
None General Head of Chief Division manager Communist 
Manager office of accountant managers of party 
/deputy general general finance subsidiary secretaries 
manager manager manager companies union chiefs 
34 19 6 6 22 13 
Source: Twn (1999) p. 73. 
The Cadbury Report (1992) suggested a greater role for independent non-Executive 
Directors in the United Kingdom, as is the case in the United States and many other 
market economies. The objective of this recommendation is to avoid the insider control 
which, it was argued in the case of Japan (Aoki, 1995), had been harmful to sound 
corporate governance. There is substantial evidence (Mace, 1971) that, when Directors 
have close ties with management, they are unlikely to be critical about inadequate 
performance. The independence of the Directors should thus involve both incentives to 
exert supervisory effort, and safeguards against collusion with management and the 
diversion of funds for joint benefit. It thus appears that both the size and the 
composition of the Board of Directors may have an impact upon the performance of 
listed companies. 
3.7.2 The Decision-Making Behaviour of Senior Management 
The same survey reported by Listed Companies (2000) also contained questions about 
the factors that constrained the decision-making behaviour of senior managers. Table 
3.7 presents the analysis of the replies to the questionnaires received from 3000 senior 
managers of listed companies during the survey. According to the survey, the most 
important internal constraint was considered to be the Board of Directors, with self- 
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imposed restraint (i. e. the professional and fiduciary conscience of managers) cited as 
the second most important factor. Together these two factors were cited by 55% of the 
respondents. 
Table 3.7: The Internal and External Constraints on the Decision-Making of Managers 
in Listed Companies 
Internal constraints External constraints 
Factors Percentage Factors Percentage 
Board of Directors 29.2 Product markets 79.1 
Self-restraint of 25.8 Stock markets 4.8 
managers 
General meeting 19.9 Managerial job 4.4 
markets 
Higher Government 13.2 Labour markets 4.0 
departments 
Local Government 5.4 Consumers 3.2 
Supervisory Board 3.4 Banks 2.7 
Company 1.7 Key suppliers 1.3 
employees 
Party committee 1.3 News media 0.3 
Trade union 0.1 
Total 100 Total 100 
Note: The figures in the Table summarise the answers to 3000 responses to a questionnaire 
survey undertaken in 2000. 
Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2000, Listed Companies. 
As regards the external constraints upon management, the nature of the product market 
dominates and was cited by almost four-fifths (79.1%) of the respondents. Similar 
findings have been reported in the West (Harris and Raviv, 1988; Allen, 2001). Stock 
markets were considered to be the second most important factor, but were only 
mentioned in 4.8% of the responses, suggesting that the managers were not particularly 
concerned about shareholders' interests as reflected in the stock prices. This may be 
because there is virtually no market for corporate control, due to the high concentration 
of non-tradable shareholdings. The managers thus do not have to worry about falling 
stock prices, and becoming a target for takeover, as is the case in the West. An 
alternative explanation might be that the managers believe that they can control stock 
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prices. Although this over-simplifies the situation, a casual scrutiny of the news reports 
in China reveals many instances of insider manipulations and collusion. 
3.7.3 Legal Aspects of Corporate Governance 
The legal environment is the most important external influence over corpprate 
governance, and provides the framework to the formation of companies, corporatisation, 
the IPO, and subsequently the raising of finance, investment, and information 
disclosure. These laws, and the quality of their enforcement by the regulators and 
courts, are essential elements of corporate governance and finance (La Porta et al, 
2002). 
Currently, there are two major Laws passed by the National People's Congress of 
China, which set the legal framework in line with the needs of the socialist market 
economy. The first major law, the Company Law, was promulgated in 1994 and, 
together with later implementing rules, provides the foundation for the establishment of 
companies. The Law specifies two types of companies. The first is the limited liability 
company, which is established with the capital of a limited number of shareholders and 
where equity cannot be transferred. The second is the joint stock company, which is 
allowed to raise capital from the public and to be listed on the stock exchanges. The 
second major law, the Securities Law, was only recently promulgated in July 1999, and 
its objective is to regulate the trading of securities in both primary and secondary 
financial markets. 
The two major Laws are supplemented by various regulations and notices issued by the 
authorities. Those regulations cover issues such as accounting standards, information 
disclosure, State asset management in listed companies, and the conditions for seasoned 
equity offerings. For instance, in 1997, the CSRC issued a regulation on "Guidelines on 
Articles of Association for Listed Companiee', whose purpose was to improve the 
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accountability of management to the shareholders, and to ensure a fair, open, lawful 
relationship between the shareholders, the Board of Directors, and the company. 
A comprehensive discussion of the legal system in so far as it relates to corporations 
and financial markets is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is useful to draw 
attention to two issues which influence the corporate governance mechanism. The first 
issue is that the laws and regulations are quite immature, and sometimes not in 
conformity with other relevant laws or regulations. For instance, there are 
inconsistencies between the 1999 Securities Law and the 1997 Criminal Law with 
regard to who is responsible for serious breaches of the fiduciary duties of large 
shareholders: the Directors or the senior managers. 
The second issue, and one which has generated widespread public concern in China, is 
the protection of small, outside shareholders. Too often, these shareholders have simply 
been sources of 'free cash'. The controlling shareholders either waste the capital raised 
from outside shareholders on inefficient projects, or simply transfer the funds to their 
own projects, or both. Financial reports are window-dressed to attract outside investors' 
funds during both the IPO and subsequent SEOs, and in many cases even compliant 
auditing offices have refused to verify the unrealistic figures. The listed companies thus 
become 'cash machines' for the large shareholders, until they become 'empty shells' 
without any capital. This is a serious problem when the major sources of finance are 
individual investors. The Chinese regulatory authorities have recently made attempts to 
protect minority shareholders in response to complaints of exploitation by the large 
shareholders 13 . However, a satisfactory level of protection for small shareholders still 
seems beyond reach in the foreseeable future. 
A sound legal system is important for the healthy development and functioning of 
corporate governance and capital markets, yet it is not enough on its own. Effective 
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legal protection involves both the content of the laws, and the quality of their 
enforcement. The willingness of all parties to observe laws is crucial for their successful 
implementation, and this requires a compatible, harmonised, social, cultural and broader 
legal system 14 . We 
finish this discussion on the legal aspects of corporate governance by 
citing La Porta et al (2000, p. 6): 
'One way to think about legal protection of outside investors is that it 
makes the expropriation technology less efficient. At the extreme of no 
investor protection, the insiders can steal a firm's profits perfectly 
efficiently. Without a strong reputation, no rational outsider would 
finance such a firm. As investor protection improves, the insiders must 
engage in more distorted and wasteful diversion practices such as setting 
up intermediary companies into which they channel profits. Yet these 
mechanisms are still efficient enough for the insiders to choose to divert 
extensively. When investor protection is very good, the most the insiders 
can do is overpay themselves, put relatives in management, and 
undertake some wasteful projects. After a point, it may be better just to 
pay dividends. As the diversion technology becomes less efficient, the 
insiders expropriate less, and their private benefits of control diminish. 
Firms then obtain outside finance on better terms. By shaping the 
expropriation technology, the law also shapes the opportunities for 
external finance. ' 
3.8 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has provided an introduction to the institutional framework of Chinese 
corporate governance. Various aspects, including the IPO, ownership structure, and 
capital structure, have been highlighted as they will be considered in detail in 
subsequent chapters. The main findings of this chapter may be summarised as follows: 
0 Financial reform in China and the corporatisation of the SOEs has been motivated 
by the expansion of their economic activities, and their need for capital beyond the 
capacity of public fiscal revenues. As local government has taken a greater and 
13 See various issues of the Securities Times (China) in July 2001 at www. securitiestimes. com. cn 
14 La Porta ct al (1998) point out that the extent of legal protection of outside investors differs enormously 
across countries. 
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greater share of fiscal income, Central Government has found it increasingly 
difficult to finance projects through the State budget. Given the high levels of 
personal savings in the State bank, the Chinese Government first decided to reform 
the financing of the SOEs by funding new State projects, except some key projects, 
with debt instead of equity. The underlying motive was to make the project 
managers accountable for the repayment of debt, that is to make the capital invested 
by the government a'hard constraint'. 
0 But the corporatisation of the SOEs is not just about the search for new sources of 
capital, and can only be properly understood in the context of the reallocation of 
resources. This is also true for the formation of the new governance structures, 
where there has been a shift from monopoly State control to shared control, even 
though control is still dominated by various State authorities. 
0 In choosing a model of corporate governance, the policymakers have favoured a 
stylised Anglo-American model in principle, but the reality has been a mixture of 
the Anglo-American and German-Japanese models. Furthermore, although the 
stated objective is an open, fair, multiple and competitive shareholding system, and 
the policy-makers have been trying to reduce over-concentrated State 
shareholdings, progress in moving from the current situation of insider-dominated 
shareholdings and a main bank system has been a gradual process and the end is not 
yet in sight. 
Notwithstanding the fact that there is no perfect corporate governance mechanism, and 
that the development of an appropriate mechanism for China is a gradual and path- 
dependent process, there is still an imperative to move forward as quickly as possible in 
order to minimise the associated costs. However, the maturity of a sound corporate 
governance system that sustains longer-term development is inextricably linked to the 
success of economic, legal and cultural development in Chinese society as a whole. 
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Chapter 4 
The Effect of Ownership Structure on the 
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings 
4.1 Introduction 
The Initial Public Offering (IPO) is an important step when a firm is in the process of 
going public, and is often the largest equity issue that a company ever makes. 
Furthermore, it is also an important event in the transformation of the governance 
structure. As new outside capital is taken into the company, the new owners obtain both 
residual claimant rights as well as residual control rights. During this process, the 
underpricing of the IPO of common stock has been a well-documented 'anomaly', and 
there exists a substantial body of empirical work documenting the underpricing 
phenomenon in many countries. In the United States, for example, Ibbotson and Ritter 
(1995) found that the amount of short-run NO underpricing was 15.3% over the 1960- 
92 period. Are the issuers of the stock deliberately underpricing the new stock offer to 
outsiders? Is it rational for secondary market investors to buy stocks at higher prices 
than the primary market investors? 
The objective of this chapter is to extend existing theories and to investigate the impact 
of governance structure on the pricing of IPOs. It is argued that the IPO is not merely a 
process by which the firm finds new capital, but that it involves conflicts of interest 
between the different shareholders, especially between the large, controlling shareholder 
and small, outside shareholders. It will be argued that the pattern of corporate control 
plays an important role in the determination of the underpricing of IPOs, and that the 
initial owners of a firm going public are concerned to retain control over the corporation 
because control brings private gains. 
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The basic argument is that corporate control brings private benefits for the controlling 
shareholders, and that the market recognises the potential transfer of wealth from the 
minority or outside shareholders and reduces the returns of the IPOs. We try to combine 
various theories based on the idea of asymmetric information with theories of corporate 
control. Whilst we agree that the theories of asymmetric information can explain why an 
IPO is commonly underpriced, they cannot explain the full extent of the underpricing 
and thus other theories are also needed. Therefore, our main objective is not to justify 
why the 1POs are underpriced, but to investigate the role of ownership structure in 
influencing the degree of IPO underpricing. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the theories which 
attempt to explain the anomaly of IPO underpricing, and highlights the conditions under 
which the predictions of these theories hold. Section 4.3 describes the data used in the 
analysis, and section 4.4 outlines the variables and the model employed to calculate IPO 
returns. The extent of IPO underpricing in China is assessed in this section and 
contrasted with the results of analogous studies in other countries. The regression results 
are presented and discussed in section 4.5. Section 4.6 summarises the main 
conclusions, and suggests how the analysis could be usefully extended. 
4.2 Literature Review 
All economic activities involve benefits and costs. In the decision to go public, the 
benefits include diversification, the possibility of equity financing beyond the limited 
wealth of the initial entrepreneur, less costly access to the capital market, increased 
liquidity of the company's shares, and some outside monitoring (Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1993). Ritter (1987) classifies the total costs into 'direct costs' and 'indirect costs'. The 
direct costs include the registration and underwriting costs, which he estimated for the 
United States to account for, on average, 14% of the funds raised. The indirect costs 
refer to those associated with the underpricing of IPOs, and were estimated for the 
Chapter 4: Ownership Structure and Initial Public Offering 106 
United States to account for, on average, 15% of the funds raised. Other researchers 
have argued that going public also involves annual disclosure costs, and the agency 
problems generated by the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Table 4.1, which is drawn from Pagano and Roell (1998), gives a partial 
summary of the benefits and costs of going public. 
During the IPO process, the underpricing of IPOs is one of the major, and most studied, 
phenomena. Early studies by McDonald and Fisher (1972) and Logue (1973) noted the 
underpricing of IPOs, but their findings were based on casual observations and no 
explanations were offered. Ibboston (1975) adopted a more sophisticated and systematic 
method. He formed portfolios of new issues with identical seasoning, then matched the 
returns of the portfolios with the month's market return, resulting in one pair of returns 
for a portfolio of two months seasoning. He then randomly selected one new issue for 
each of the 120 calendar months from the 2650 new issues between 1960 and 1969. He 
concluded that the IPOs were systematically underpriced, and that the abnormal return 
was estimated to be 11.4% after controlling for the risk and transactions costs and was 
statistically significant. He subsequently classified the IPO underpricing as a 'market 
anomaly', but did not offer any explanation. 
Subsequent studies have shown that IPO underpricings may be observed not only 
during different time periods in one market, but also in different economies. Ibboston, 
Sindelar, and Ritter (1988) reported an average initial return of 16.4% for IPOs during 
1960-87 in the United States. Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) reviewed more than 
thirty studies of IPOs in 25 countries (including the United States) and showed that 
IPOs provided, on average, large initial returns to investors who were able to buy shares 
at the offer price. The findings were robust throughout all 25 economies, though the 
average premium ranged from 4% in the French study to 80% in the Malaysian study - 
see Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Evidence of IPO Underpricing in Selected Developed and Emerging 
Markets' 
Country Average Initial 
Return (percent) 
Period Studied Sample Size 
Malaysia 80 1980-1991 132 
Brazil 79 1979-1990 62 
Korea 78 1980-1990 347 
Thailand 58 1983-1987 62 
Portugal 54 1986-1987 62 
Taiwan 45 1971-1990 168 
Sweden 39 1970-1991 213 
Switzerland 36 1983-1989 42 
Spain 35 1985-1990 71 
Mexico 33 1987-1990 37 
Japan 33 1970-1991 472 
New Zealand 29 1979-1991 149 
Italy 27 1985-1991 75 
Singapore 27 1973-1987 66 
Hong Kong 18 1980-1990 80 
Chile 16 1982-1990 19 
United States 15 1960-1992 10626 
United Kingdom 12 1959-1990 2133 
Australia 12 1976-1989 266 
Germany 11 1978-1992 170 
Belgium 10 1984-1990 28 
Finland 10 1984-1992 85 
Netherlands 7 1982-1991 72 
Canada 5 1971-1992 258 
France 4 1983-1992 187 
Source: Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) 
1 See Jones et al (1999) for good accounts of the differences in IPO underpricing in different countries. 
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The obvious 'windfall' to the outside investor over such a short period constitutes an 
anomaly both in financial theory, and for the financial industry. Many theories have 
been offered to explain the phenomenon, and these may be classified as either theories 
of information signalling or as theories of corporate control. 
The key foundation for the information signalling theories is that there is an information 
asymmetry between the initial owners (issuers) and the outside investors. The issuers 
have more information about the firm going public, whilst the outside investors can not 
tell the good firms from the bad ones. The issuers of shares in a good firm thus choose 
to underprice the shares at the IPO stage so as to ensure a successful IPO. And when the 
true information about the quality of firm is revealed after the IPO, the good firm can 
recover the costs of IPO underpricing. But the ways of recovering the costs of the IPO 
underpricing are conceived differently in different signalling theories. 
The theories of corporate control take a different view of why 1POs are underpriced. 
They split the value of shares into two components: the rights to the residual cash flow 
and the rights to residual control. One section of the literature then studies the value 
premium of voting shares, when there are both voting shares and non-voting shares. A 
second, and more important in the Chinese context, section focuses on the ownership 
structure of the firms, and argues that concentrated shareholdings effectively provide 
large shareholders with control rights and deprive small, dispersed investors of voting 
rights. 
4.2.1 Signalling Theoryý IPO Underpricing and Ownership Structure 
The basic argument of the signalling theories is that there exists an -information 
asymmetry about the quality of issuing firms between the different parties involved. The 
relevant parties are usually the issuers (initial owners), the outside investors, and the 
underwriters. The signals that convey information of firm quality are either the 
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underpricing of the IPOs, or the fraction of the equity retained by the initial owners. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) focus on the issue of why the initial owner might retain a certain 
fraction of equity when they decide to go public. They argue that the initial owners 
possess a better understanding of the likely future cash flows of the firm, but this 
information is not verifiable to the outside investor. However, the outside investors can 
find clues about the quality of the firm by observing the equity retention ratio. A higher 
ratio would indicate a higher quality firm, because the owners are reluctant to release a 
high proportion of the future cash flows to the outside investors. This is a single-stage 
model, which is based the assumption that the initial owners have only one chance to 
sell their equity to outside investors. This assumption certainly limits its theoretical 
power and applicability to reality. More problematically, the model does not exclude the 
possibility that a bad firm might imitate a good firm by holding a large proportion of 
equity. Thus retained equity is a fallible signal of the quality of the firm, whilst IPO 
underpricing is not included in their model. 
In 1989, two major papers on IPO underpricing, based on signalling theory, were 
published (Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989). Both models assume that there 
are both good firms and bad firms that want to issue equity to finance their projects. But 
only the issuer knows the quality of the firm, which is measured by the future cash 
flows and the variance associated with them. The information about the quality of the 
firm is not directly observable, nor is it verifiable by the outside investors. How then 
can the issuers of the shares in the good firm convey the message of quality to the 
outside investors? 
Grinblatt and Hwang's model formalised the notion that the initial owner of high- 
quality firms might use both underpricing and retained shares as signals at an IPO in 
order to convey their private information about the firm value (in terms of future cash 
flows) to uninformed investors. The cost of the underpricing could then be recovered in 
the aftermarket by selling the shares retained at the IPO, or by issuing further shares 
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through seasoned equity offers (SEOs). The testable implication of their model was that 
there is a positive relationship between the TO underpricing and the later SEO, as well 
as a positive relationship between the TO underpricing and the divestment of the initial 
owners. 
In Welch's model, the issuing firms are classified into high-quality firms and low- 
quality firms, and the quality of the firms can be distinguished after the IPOs by the 
market with a certain probability. The underpricing of IPOs is a cost for both types of 
firms, but high-quality firms can recover the cost at a later stage by SEOs with a higher 
price after the true value of the firm has been verified. However, it is too risky for the 
poor firm to pretend to be good firm by underpricing the 1PO. The cost of underpricing 
may never be recouped when the market obtains a better idea of the real quality of the 
firm, and is unenthusiastic about the firm's SEO. 
The common conclusions from these two models were that bad firms could not afford to 
underprice their shares at the IPO stage, because they themselves doubted the chances 
of issuing new shares at a higher price when their true (bad) quality was revealed. Thus, 
in equilibrium, only good quality firms would underprice their shares at the IPO stage, 
in the expectation of being able later to recoup the IPO cost. In contrast, the bad firms 
could not afford to mimic the good firms and underprice at the IPO stage, because the 
true information would later be revealed and their share price would deteriorate, making 
it impossible subsequently to issue new shares. A testable hypothesis is that underpriced 
IPOs should be followed by SEOs. 
Rock (1986) divides the total investors bidding for IPOs into two groups: the informed 
investors who know the true value of the firm, and the uninformed investors who have 
inferior information. The informed investors wisely choose not to bid for the IPO when 
it is overvalued, therefore the uninformed investors get all the shares of such projects. 
Rock argues that the bidding for the IPO by outside investors is risky because of this 
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twinner's curse2 and that, to avoid the situation, the IPOs must be underpriced to induce 
uninformed investors to join the bid. This explanation for IPO underpricing is 
problematic in that it has been typically applied to situations where there is no market 
consensus on the value of the project being auctioned (for example, Barclay and 
Holderness, 1989 on oil or mineral rights for previously unexplored territories). 
Furthermore, the oversubscription of IPOs by informed investors is more common than 
undersubscription. The IPOs should thus be correctly priced according to the 'winner's 
curse' theory, yet this is not the case in reality. 
4.2.2 Corporate Control Theory and IPO Underpricing 
The literature in the previous section focused on the information aspects of equity 
issues, whether it was the use of underpricing or retained equity as the signal to show 
the quality of the firm. But such theories have been subject to a number of criticisms. 
The first problem is that, supposing the issuer opts to underprice the 1PO and then tries 
to recoup the loss of market value through SEOs, then clever outside investors may 
choose not to subscribe to the SEOs or simply to sell shares held prior to the SEOs. 
Indeed a powerful criticism of the signalling theories is that there are no empirical 
findings to support them. Michaely and Shaw (1994) used a sample of 947 firms to test 
the 'sweet mouth taste theory' and found that there were no substantial SEO issues 
following underpriced IPOs. The implication is that the initial owners lost out at the 
IPOs stage and either did not want to, or were not able to, make SEOs at a later stage. 
Signalling theories can not explain why the initial owners were willing to give up SEOs 
which would help them recoup the losses incurred during the IPO. 
The second and more fundamental problem is that the theories reviewed above all 
ignore the value of voting rights, and assume that the shares held by the controlling 
' The term 'winner's curse' comes from the auction literature. In a scaled bid auction with bidders who 
have some independent private information on the blue of the item being auctioned, the highest bidder at 
the auction finds out ex post that their valuation was probably too high. Thus, the person who wins the 
auction may be cursed by learning that s/he overpaid. 
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shareholder and by the other investors are identical. But the holding of a share not only 
gives the shareholder the right to a claim on the residual cash flow, but also the right to 
vote. The various signalling theories have not addressed the benefits of corporate 
control in addition of residual claim rights. 
Since the early 1990s, the development of theories of corporate control has helped to 
increase our understanding of the valuation of stocks with, and of stocks without, voting 
powers. Control rights may be allocated either explicitly, or through some de facto 
control mechanism. In the former case, the control rights might be guaranteed in the 
corporate charte?. Zingales (1995) suggests that the total value of the company can be 
divided into two parts: the public value (enjoyed by all shareholders) and the private 
value (enjoyed by the management team or controlling shareholders). It is clear that 
capital markets should value stock issued without voting rights lower than stock issues 
with voting rights. The voting rights are options that investors can exercise when they 
believe it is worthwhile to do so. And any option will be positively priced before it 
expires, and when there is a possibility that the stock price will go above the exercise 
price. 
The second way to obtain a control right is by holding a sufficiently large proportion of 
the total outstanding shares, either by keeping the dominant holding at the IPO or by 
assembling such a holding through a series of small open-market purchases. A large 
enough shareholding, even if of the same class of stock and entitled to equal rights 
according to the law and to the charter of the company, effectively endows the large 
shareholder with control rights and deprives the minority shareholders of an effective 
voice. Small shareholders have the same cash flow claims in proportion to their 
shareholdings as do larger or controlling shareholders, but the value of the controlling 
stake should theoretically be valued higher. 
3 For example, the shares of Ford are issued in two classes: those with voting rights, and those without. 
The shares with voting rights are held by the Ford family, and are never traded on the stock exchange. 
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Empirically, Lease, McConnell and Mikkelson (1983,1984) found for the United States 
that, when a firm has two classes of common stock outstanding with exactly the same 
terms except for voting rights, the shares with voting rights generally traded at a small 
premium (5.4%) above their inferior non-voting counterparts. Zingales (1994) found 
that the premium on voting shares in Italy was as much as 80%. Other studies, though 
not directly concerned with the private benefits of corporate control, have also found 
that voting shares have high premiums relative to non-voting shares in dual class 
companies. Bergstrom and Rydqqvist (1992) found a premium of voting relative to non- 
voting shares of 6.5% in Sweden; Levy (1983) found a premium of 45.5% for Israel; 
Homer (1988) found a premium of 20% for Switzerland; Megginson (1990) estimated a 
premium of 13.3% for the United Kingdom; and Robinson and White (1990) calculated 
a figure of 23.3% for Canada. These premiums can only be explained by the private 
benefits of control. 
Empirical evidence on the private benefits of corporate control in firms with universal 
shares is much harder to collect, as unevenly distributed corporate control is less easy to 
detect and test, though it has been the subject of much theoretical study. Barclay and 
Holderness (1989) examined the pricing of 63 block trades and found them traded at 
substantial premiums to the exchange price. They attributed the premiums to the 
corporate benefits accrued by the blockholder - the private benefits from control. Slovin 
and Sushka (1993) found a two-day abnormal stock price reaction of 3.01% when the 
deaths of insider blockholders were announced. This is consistent with the conjecture 
that some blockholders represent the interests of insiders rather than those of 
shareholders-at-large 4. 
Chandler (1980), among others, argues that founders and founding families may be 
more concerned with maintaining control of a business and its associated private income 
4 See also Barclay, Holderness and Pontiff (1993) on the private benefits of control in closed-end mutual 
funds, and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) for a study of the concentration of managerial ownership and 
control in dual-class share corporations in the United States. 
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stream, than with maximising the value of the firm. Brennan and Franks (1997) suggest 
that initial owners underprice their IPOs to attract more applications for the primary 
shares. The resultant oversubscription means that the shares are rationed by the initial 
owners and they will discriminate between applicants so as to reduce the size of new 
shareholdings. The consequences will be a single founder (or several co-founders) 
dominating other small investors, thus suggesting that IPO underpricing, and the 
resultant dispersed ownership, may be used as a corporate control mechanism. They 
examined changes in ownership between the time of the IPO and seven years later, 
using data from a sample of 69 IPOs in the United Kingdom. They concluded that the 
insiders only reduced their ownership slowly over time, and interpreted this behaviour 
as being consistent with an attempt to retain control after the IPO. 
4.2.3 The IIPO as a Means of Privatisation around the World 
A related literature addresses the issue of IPOs in privatisation schemes around the 
world, including in developed economies, emerging markets, and transitional 
economies. 
Perotti (1995) presents a theoretical model of IPO underpricing and the privatisation of 
State-owned enterprises under government policy uncertainty. In the model, the 
government maximises the sum of expected revenues from IPOs and SEOs, plus the 
dividends on the retained shares during the privatisation process. Under policy 
uncertainty, the government may choose to retain a large stake in the State-owned 
enterprises, and to underprice a partial sale to signal its commitment to future pro- 
market privatisation policies. The model implies that IPO underpricing is positively 
related to the uncertainty of government policies, negatively related to the size of 1POs, 
and positively related to the size of government ownership and the length of time the 
government is expected to retain significant ownership. 
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Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) reported a much greater degree of IPO underpricing for 
government privatisations in emerging markets than in well-developed economies. In 
their survey of 109 government privatisation IPOs across eight countries, they estimated 
the following average IPO returns: Canada 2.5%, France 11.4%, Hungary 14.9%, Japan 
16.0%, United Kingdom 18.0%, Malaysia 52.2%, Poland 50.0%, and Thailand 46.6%. 
Their explanation was that privatising governments may pursue objectives that are 
political, rather than maximising the firm's value in the privatisation process. For 
example, the government may allocate underpriced shares to the employees who might 
otherwise have misgivings about privatisation. Underpricing may thus be related to the 
size of the employee shares in an offering. 
Jones et al (1999) investigated a sample of 639 privatisations in 59 nations, including 
developed economies (United Kingdom, France, Canada) and developing or transitional 
economies (Hungary, Poland, China). The evidence presented in all these studies 
indicated that IPOs of State-owned companies, like those of privately-owned 
companies, tended to be underpriced. Further, they found that ceteris paribus the 
privatisations of SOEs were more underpriced than private firm IPOs. 
The Chinese joint stock system is under the control of various levels of government, 
with the aims being to establish a new enterprise management mechanism and to relieve 
the financing problems of the SOEs. This process leads to a defacto privatisation of the 
SOEs. Clearly shares are not retained as a signal for the quality of the firm as it is the 
authorities, not the firms, who decide how many shares can be issued to the public. Su 
and Fleisher (1999) investigated the underpricing of Chinese 1POs using data compiled 
for 308 'firm commitment' A-share IPOs and 57 B-share 1POs between 1988 and 1996. 
They found that the mean 1PO initial return6 was 948.59%1 In other words, the first-day 
market closing price was on average almost eleven times as high as the initial price 
5 The focus of the Jones et al paper was on governmental behaviour in privatisation programmes around 
the world, and was thus more macro-oriented than the current study. 
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offered to the domestic investors. They identified some of the causes of cross-sectional 
differences in the underpricing of Chinese IPOs, and their conclusions were threefold. 
First, the extraordinarily large IPO underpricing was at least partially due to a relatively 
small aggregate supply of shares. Second, the A-share underpricing was better 
explained by a signalling model that related IPO underpricing to SEOs, rather than by 
one linking government or employee ownership to equilibrium 1PO underpricing. 
Issuers with larger IPO underpricing were more likely to raise larger amounts of capital 
through SEOs more quickly. Third, there was no evidence that lottery mechanisms had 
contributed to the high 1PO underpricing in China. Their framework was based on 
signalling theory, whereas this study focuses more on fundamental factors (including 
corporate control) at the firm level. 
4.2.4 Summary of the Literature Review 
The main argument put forward in this review is that companies controlled by a 
majority shareholder have a significantly smaller IPO premium because the market 
correctly understands the value of control rights, and this information will be reflected 
in the market price. The underpricing becomes even smaller if the control of a company 
is not expected to change hands and there is no market for corporate control. This is 
exactly the case of Chinese stock markets where the fraction of shares held by the 
largest shareholder is pre-determined by the government, leading to a rigid ownership 
structure. Our argument is that a higher retained shareholding signals (more accurately, 
ensures) the private benefits of corporate control, and should thus be associated with 
smaller NO returns. This is contrary to the prediction of signalling theory that IPO 
underpricing signals the quality of the firm, and that a higher retained fraction of 
ownership should be related to higher IPO returns. 
6 Defined as the difference between the first-day market closing price minus the IPO price divided by the 
TO price. 
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4.3 The Data 
All the data used in this study were obtained from the database on the central computer 
of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which provided stock prices and stock market indexes 
for both the Shanghai Stock Exchange and for the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The 
computers also provided summary information for each company, including their 
history, financial indicators, IPO terms, and ownership structure. A supplementary 
source was An Essential Guide to Inveshnent in the Chinese Capital Market (1996, 
1997,1998,1999,2000f. 
The data used in this study relate to all 539 companies listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between January 1995 and February 1999. 
Seventy two companies, whose IPOs were made before both Exchanges were officially 
established, were excluded. The shares in these companies were offered initially to the 
public through the over-the-counter (OTC) market and then, after many years' 
applications, were given formal approval to be listed on one of the two national and 
official Exchanges. These companies were excluded for two reasons. The first reason is 
that, at the time when the companies first offered shares to the public, there were no 
official stock exchanges and thus it was not possible to calculate market-adjusted 
returns. The second reason is the long time span between the companies first offering 
shares on the OTC market and formal listing on the stock markets: some companies had 
to wait for seven years to have a successful listing. The risk and time values were thus 
hard to value for these companies. The dates for the remaining 467 IPOs included in the 
dataset are shown in Table 4.3. The information collected for each IIPO was the name of 
the firm, its industry classification, issue size (in 100 million yuan), the offer price, the 
first-day closing price, the first-day trading volume, the percentage of the issue offered 
at a fixed price, the percentage of the firm's capital in the offer, and the names, and type 
of organisation, of the largest (several) shareholders. 
7 Published in Chinese by Securities Times (China), one of the leading financial newspapers in China. 
Chapter 4: Ownership Structure and Initial ]Public Offering 119 
Table 4.3: The Numbers of IPOs on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges, 
January 1995- February 1999 
Month 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
January 2 6 16 42 
February 0 3 4 61 
March 0 5 15 6 
April 0 7 25 16 
May 0 15 38 15 
June 0 24 38 16 
July 0 16 11 1 
August 0 18 11 6 
September 0 20 8 8 
October 1 19 10 7 
November 1 20 9 8 
December 0 20 3 6 
4 173 188 99 3 
Samr)le size 467 
Source: CSRC (2000), China Securities Market Yearbook 2000. 
4.3.1 Stock Price Indexes 
There are two stock price indexes on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. One is a composite 
index which includes all the stocks listed on the Shanghai Exchange, and which is 
weighted according to the companies' market values. If a company's shares split or are 
suspended for a certain period due to a news announcement, the index is adjusted so that 
its value is unaffected by the split or the change of the company. The other price index 
is a component index which only includes the share prices of thirty large listed 
companies. Similarly, there are also two share price indexes on the Shenzhen Exchange. 
One is a composite index which includes all the listed companies on the Exchange, 
weighted by market value. The other is a 30 leading company index similar to that for 
Shanghai. According to the rules of two Exchanges, the share prices from the first day 
of the 1PO to one month afterwards are not included in the price indexes, so as to avoid 
any impacts from big gains or volatile share fluctuations during the first trading months. 
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The same-day Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite daily closing indexes were used as 
benchmarks to obtain comparable returns for individual stocks. For instance, suppose 
that a stocles offer day and the first trading day were on I April 1996 and 19 April 1996 
respectively. We use the I April 1996 and 19 April 1996 daily closing composite share 
price indexes to obtain the comparable return to the company's share return. The 
specific formulae used to calculate the returns will be discussed below. 
No inflation adjustments were made to the prices for two reasons. The first was that 
inflation in China was not severe between 1995 and 1999. The second was that it is hard 
to deflate the stock market indexes when we use market-adjusted returns. 
4.3.2 The Measurement of IPO Returns 
It is important to consider the measurement and distribution of 1PO returns. Returns 
may be expressed either as simple returns or as market-adjusted returns, and both may 
also be expressed as natural logarithms. Different researchers have used different 
measures. For example, both Jones et al (1999) in their international study on share 
issue privatisations (SIP), and Su and Fleisher (1998) on the IpOs of Chinese listed 
companies, used simple returns as defined below: 
p -P il io SRi -' Pi 0, 
- 
Where 
SRj = the simple IPO return of the iý company; 
Pio = the initial offer price for the iý company 
Pil = the closing price for the ýh company on the first trading day 
(4.1) 
The simple return for an individual stock is a measure of the stock's performance during 
the IPO, and may fluctuate in response to factors which affect either the particular stock 
or the general market. We require a measure of the market-adjusted return in order to 
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separate the impact of those factors related to the stock from those affecting the general 
market. The market-adjusted returns are generally expressed in the form of the return on 
a particular stock minus the return on the general stock market as below: 
A14A. = 
P" - P'o - 
I" - I'o 
P, 0 10 
where 
AýMRi = the market-adjusted return of the ýh company. 
(4.2) 
1,0 = the opening stock market index for the i"' company on the date the offer price 
is set. 
In the closing stock market index for the ith company on the date the offer price 
is set. 
Although the simple return (SR) and the market-adjusted return (AMi) are useful 
statistical measures for descriptive purposes, their use in regression analysis is 
problematic. A basic assumption underpinning the use of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
and its hybrid regression methods is that the variables are normally distributed. 
However, the returns calculated above are not normally distributed, and we thus need to 
estimate the distribution of returns and their variances. One alternative is to assume that 
the natural logarithm of the single-period returns (rit) are 11D normal, which implies that 
the single-period gross raw returns are distributed as 11D lognormal variates, since rt 
In (1+ Ri, ). We may then express the lognormal model as: 
r, t _ 
N(ýUi, Cri2 ) (4.3) 
Under the lognormal model, if the mean and variance of rit are p, and 0712 respectively, 
then the mean and variance of the simple returns are given by: 
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2 
. "i +- 
i 
E[Ri, e2 -1 (4.4) 
2/ii+a2 0,2 Var[R,, ei [e i (4.5) 
Alternatively, if we assume that the mean and variance of the simple returns (SRit) are 
mi and si respectively, then under the lognormal model the mean and variance of rit are 
given by: 





S' )2 (4.7) 
mi +1 
We thus use two further measures of return in our econometric work (Campbell, Lo and 
Mackinlay 1997, p. 15) so as to generate more accurate results. The first measure is the 
natural logarithm of the simple return. The second measure is the natural logarithm of 
the market-adjusted return. Following Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), we define the 
natural logarithm of the simple return as below: 




InSRj = natural logarithm of the ith company's simple return; 
and A, and Pio are defined as above. 
(4.8) 
The natural logarithm of the market-adjusted return is: 
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In AMR In( -In( [In(Pil) - ln(Pio)] - [ln(I,, ) - ln(I,, )] (4.9) Pio iio 
where 
InAVRi = natural logarithm of the ýh company's market-adjusted return; 
and Pil, Po, Ii, and Ijo are defined as above. 
The applications of these various measures of return are summarised below: 
Definition Simple return Market-adjusted Natural log of Natural log of 
return simple return market-adjusted 
return 
Symbol SRj MARj InSRj LnMARj 
Application Description of IPO underpricing Regression of TO underpricing 
The lognormal model has the added advantage of not violating limited liability, since 
limited liability yields a lower bound of zero on (I+Rit), which is satisfied by (1+Rit) 
= erif when rit is assumed to be normally distributed. 
4.3.3 Descriptive Statistics on IPO Underpricing 
Table 4.4 reports the NO returns of the 467 firms, both in terms of the simple return and 
in terms of the market-adjusted return. The mean simple return is 130.01%, and the 
median simple return 115.58%. The returns adjusted by the stock market indexes are 
roughly the same, with a mean return of 129.77% and a median return of 115.58%. The 
closeness of the simple returns and the market-adjusted returns implies that market 
movements cannot explain the abnormal returns on the IPOs. Other factors clearly 
contribute to the underpricing of the IPOs. 
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Number Frequency Cumulative 
frequency 
(-40%, 0] 2 0.43% 0.43% 2 0.43% 0.43% 
(0,20%] 16 3.43% 3.85% 16 3.43% 3.85% 
(20%, 40%] 21 4.50% 8.35% 23 4.93% 8.78% 
(40%, 60%] 37 7.92% 16.27% 32 6.85% 15.63% 
(60%, 80%] 45 9.64% 25.91% 51 10.92% 26.55% 
(80%, 100%] 59 12.63% 38.54% 57 12.21% 38.76% 
(100%, 120%] 67 14.35% 52.89% 67 14.35% 53.10% 
(120%, 140%] 51 10.92% 63.81% 50 10.71% 63.81% 
(140%, 160%] 40 8.57% 72.38% 41 8.78% 72.59% 
(160%, 180%] 32 6.85% 79.23% 32 6.85% 79.44% 
(180%, 200%] 28 6.00% 85.22% 27 5.78% 85.22% 
(200%, 220%] 14 3.00% 88.22% 14 3.00% 88.22% 
(220%, 240%] 13 2.78% 91.01% 9 1.93% 90.15% 
(240%, 260%] 17 3.64% 94.65% 16 3.43% 93.58% 
(260%, 280%] 4 0.86% 95.50% 7 1.50% 95.07% 
(280%, 300%] 3 0.64% 96.15% 4 0.86% 95.93% 
(300%, 320%] 3 0.64% 96.79% 1 0.21% 96.15% 
(320%, 340%] 7 1.50% 98.29% 6 1.28% 97.43% 
(340%, 360%] 3 0.64% 98.93% 6 1.28% 98.72% 
(360%, 380%] 3 0.64% 99.57% 1 0.21% 98.93% 
(380%, 400%] 0 0.00% 99.57% 3 0.64% 99.57% 
(420%, 430%] 1 0.21% 99.79% 1 0.21% 99.79% 
(460%, 470%] 1 0.21% 100.00% 1 0.21% 100.00% 
Sample size 467 467 
Mean 130.01 129.77 
Median 115.58 115.58 
Standard 78.35 78.12 
deviation 
Min return -15.31 -14.36 
Max return 469.09 468.28 
Notes: 
(1) See the text for details of the calculation of the simple and market- adjusted returns. 
(2) The IPOs are grouped according to the size of the return: the ranges are specified from - 
40% to 470%. 
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There are two firms with negative returns8. The largest simple return is 469.09%. Over 
half the firms provide returns between 60% and 160%, but there are many firms with 
much smaller or much larger returns. The mean simple return of 130% is markedly 
higher than those that have been reported in all the other country studies - see Table 4.2. 
One point to which attention should be paid is whether the pattern of returns in 
emerging markets is the same as that in developed economies. This concern was 
addressed by Rouwenhorst (1999), who showed that cross-sectional differences in 
expected stock returns in emerging equity markets were qualitatively similar to those 
that have been documented for developed markets, viz: the stocks exhibited momentum, 
small stocks outperformed large stocks, and value stocks outperformed growth stocks. 
4.3.4 Administered Offer Prices and IPO Returns 
One question that naturally arises is whether high IPO returns are caused by low offer 
pricing, or by closing prices on the first trading day. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
setting of the initial offer price (Pio) is not solely the result of bargaining between the 
issuing firms and the underwriting firms. The China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) has a rule that the offer price for an IPO should be set around fifteen times the 
earnings per share prior to the IPO issue, regardless of the industry, the prospects of the 
firm, and other characteristics which have been shown to have an impact on IPO price- 
setting in other economies. Table 4.5 on the next page provides a detailed breakdown of 
the price-earnings ratios for the 467 firms in our sample. The table shows that 147 IPOs 
out of the total sample of 467 (31.48%) had price-earnings ratios between 14% and 
15%; 97 1POs (20.77%) had price-earnings ratios between 15% and 16%. Thus over 
50% of the sample had price-earnings ratios between 14% and 16%. The mean price- 
8 In comparison, Krigman et al (1999) report that 25% of a sample of 1232 US IPOs during 1988-95 were 
overpriced and suffered first-day trading losses. 
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earnings ratio was 15.04%, whilst the standard deviation was a mere 2.37, so the 
coefficient of variation was only 15.8%. 









<10 2 0.43 0.43 
[10,11) 5 1.07 1.50 
[11,12) 12 2.57 4.07 
[12,13) 26 5.57 9.64 
[13,14) 69 14.78 24.41 
[14,15) 147 31.48 55.89 
[15,16) 97 20.77 76.66 
[16,17) 41 8.78 85.44 
[17,18) 27 5.78 91.22 
[18,19) 15 3.21 94.43 
[19,20) 11 2.36 96.79 
[20+) 15 3.21 100.00 
Sample size 467 
Mean 15.04 
Median 14.80 
Standard deviation 2.37 
Minimum 8.8 
Maximum 37 
It is instructive to compare these figures with those obtained by Kim and Ritter (1999) 
in their sample of 190 1POs in the United States. The mean price-earnings ratio for their 
sample was 33.5, with a minimum value of 3.3 and a maximum value of 200. More 
interestingly, the standard deviation of the price-earnings ratio in their sample was 26.9, 
and thus the coefficient of variation was 80.26%. It is evident that, in China, the setting 
of the IPO offer price is more influenced by government agencies than in the United 
States. This rigid policy reveals the intention of the government agencies as the 
controlling shareholder to maximise their proceeds by setting offer prices as high as 
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possible, regardless of the firm's prospects and industry featureS9. With this special 
regulatory requirement in mind, we can assume that the low IPO underpricing is either 
caused by the relative low closing price on the first trading day, or by the high offer 
prices set by the largest shareholder to accumulate larger proceeds, or both. The two 
assumptions are not necessary exclusive and actually mutually supportive. Both indicate 
the private benefits of corporate control by the largest shareholders. 
4.4 The Regression Model 
The dependent variable in our model is the IPO premium (PRENIUJM) as measured (a) 
by the logarithm of the simple return (InSR), as in Ruud (1993) and Asquith, Jones, 
Kieschnick (1999); and (b) by the logarithm of the market-adjusted return (InNMR), as 
in Booth and Chua (1996) and Dewenter and Malatesta (1997). The explanatory 
variables are as follows. 
Two different bidding mechanisms for the IPO offers have been used to allocate A- 
shares in China: bidding on the nationwide stock trading network, and bidding for the 
offer at a local issuing agency operating on behalf of the IPO firm. Further details were 
provided in Chapter 3. A report from the World Bank (1995) argued that the choice of 
offering mechanism adopted for the new share issue affected the degree of underpricing. 
We include a dummy variable (Methods) in the model to capture this effect, with the 
variable taking a value of unity if the shares were allocated by network bidding and zero 
if by a local issuing agency. We wish to test which of the mechanisms is more 
informationally efficient, and no prediction is made about the sign of the coefficient. 
The size of the firm is included in various types of financial studies as a control 
variable. The common findings are that the return on stock is negatively related to the 
9 We tested the relationship between the price-earnings ratio and industry dummies, and found that it was 
not significant 
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size of the issuing firm (Fama and French, 1992). One explanation offered by Booth and 
Chua (1996) is that larger IPOs are generally easier to value. We use the gross amount 
of outside capital raised (PROCEEDS) as a proxy for firm size, as suggested by Ritter 
(1987) and by Michaely and Shaw (1994) in their studies of the US marketlo. We expect 
the TO return to be negatively related to PROCEEDS. 
The earnings per share (EPS) prior to the IPO issue is a measure of market value, as 
suggested by Kim and Ritter (1999). We expect a positive relationship between EPS and 
the TO retum. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) report that IPOs which are oversubscribed to a greater degree 
are associated with higher underpricing. Chemmanur (1993) confirms their empirical 
findings with an IPO underpricing model. We use the ratio of shares offered to those 
demanded (LOTTERY) as an indication of oversubscription to the IPO offer. A small 
value of LOTTERY signifies that the outside shares are more dispersed and are 
allocated more evenly. We include the natural logarithm of LOTTERY as an 
explanatory variable, and expect it to have a negative relationship with the degree of 
IPO underpricingil. 
Chowdhry and Sherman (1996) show that IPO underpricing is positively related to the 
time period between the IPO date and the first day of trading. These are calendar day 
intervals, not trading days. Some literature uses the time period between the date for the 
close of applications and the first trading day (Koh and Walter, 1989); others (e. g. 
Booth and Chua, 1996) use the longer period between the first application date and the 
10 Both studies report a negative relation between IPO return and firm size. Similar results are also 
reported by Su (1998) for China. 
11 The World Bank (1995) argued that the non-discretionary allocation of shares, by mechanisms such as 
a lottery, exacerbated the underpricing tendency. The participants at the 12th Annual Conference of the 
CEA (UK) also pointed out the potential multicollinearity between the explanatory variables, Lottery and 
Methods. We checked this by (1) running an ANOVA on the two variables and found only small t-2 
between the two, and (2) dropping Methods from the list of explanatory variables in later regressions and 
found that R2 decreased markedly. These results suggest there is not a serious multicollinearity problem, 
especially given the large sample size. See Maddala (1977) for finiher details. 
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first trading day. We follow Booth and Chua (1996) and include the variable IPODAYS 
as the time elapsed between the IPO offer day and the first trading day, and expect a 
positive effect upon TO underpricing. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986), Mauer and Senbet (1992) and Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) 
all testify that TO initial returns are a decreasing function of the offer value. In other 
words, the TO return will be lower when the offer price is set higher. We therefore 
include the reciprocal of the offer price (RCIPIPO) as a control variable, and expect it to 
have a positive impact upon TO underpricing. 
One aspect of IPOs often highlighted by the financial press is the heavy first-day 
trading, which results in many IPO firms appearing on the list of the largest volume 
stocks for the day. These huge trading volumes are usually accompanied by 
considerable stock price volatility. This phenomenon has been verified in many studies 
in many financial markets, and is robust to various time intervals (hourly, daily, and 
weekly) and types of financial markets (equity, currency, and futures). Karpoff (1987) 
cites many studies that document a positive relationship between price volatility and 
trading volume. Recent evidence (Schwert, 1989; Gallant et al, 1992; Daigler and 
Wiley, 1999; Chan and Fong, 2000) all confirms the volume-volatility relationship. We 
use the total number of shares traded on the first day as a percentage of the number of 
traded shares offered in the IPO (TURNOVER) to control for the effect of trading 
volume on price, and expect a positive relationship between TURNOVER and IPO 
underpricing. 
Last, but most importantly, we consider the effects of ownership structure. As noted 
above, signalling theory suggests that high-quality firms tend to retain higher 
proportions of shares at the TO and that there should thus be a positive relationship 
between the retained fraction of shares and the TO return. We would argue, however, 
that the largest shareholder intends to maximise the proceeds by setting offer price high 
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and the market will value the stocks of companies with dominant shareholders lower, as 
there is a higher private benefit of corporate control and thus a lower TO return. We 
therefore include the fraction of shares held by the largest single shareholder 
(TOPOWNER) as an explanatory variable, and expect it to have a negative impact upon 
the TO return. 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables are provided in Table 
4.6. The average IPO proceeds are 274 million yuan (L28.33 million), with minimum 
proceeds of 31 million yuan (L 2.58 million) and maximum proceeds of 2590 million 
yuan (L 215.83 million). The average earnings per share at the IPO are 0.41 yuan, with a 
range from 0.1361 to 1.1655. The mean value of Lottery is 2.38%, implying that the 
TPOs in the sample were oversubscribed 41 times on average, and suggesting that 
informed investors would easily exhaust the supply of shares. The average time for an 
IPO to be listed on the stock exchanges is 27 business days, with a range from 5 days to 
149 days. The Table also reveals that, on average, the largest single shareholder 
possesses 51.89% of the equity, with a minimum shareholding of 9.9% and a maximum 
84.98%. All were non-tradable shares. This provides direct evidence of the non- 
existence of a market of corporate control. 
The model to be estimated was thus: 
PREN11UM =a+ j6j METHODS +, 62 PROCEEDS + fl3 EPS +, 64 In LOTTERY 
j6j IPODAYS +, 
86RCIPIPO +, fl7 TURNOVER +, 68TOPOWNER. +, q (4.10) 
e, is random disturbance term with zero mean and variance o2. 
We estimate equation 4.10 using both the logarithm of the simple returns, and the 
logarithm of the market-adjusted returns, as the measure of the dependent variable 
(PREMIUM). Furthermore, both regressions are estimated by OLS, and by a robust 
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version which addresses the problem of potential heteroskedasticity. Table 4.7 thus 
presents the results of four regressions on the full sample of 467 IPOs. 
In addition, we divide the sample into four sub-samples according to the nature of the 
largest shareholder. These sub-samples comprise those IPOs where the largest single 
shareholder was the Bureau of State Asset Management (STFRA - 56 firms), a State 
solely-owned institution (SIFRA - 344 firms), a firm owned by private shareholders 
(DIFRA - 67 firms), or either BSAM or State-owned institutions (STATETOP - 400 
firms). These regressions are reported in Tables 4.8 to 4.11, and help to explain the 
effects of ownership on IPO underpricing. 
4.5 Discussion of the Empirical Results 
We first consider the results of the regressions using the data on all 467 IPOs - see 
Table 4.7. Most importantly, these all show a significant 12 negative relationship between 
the IPO market return and the single largest shareholding. In other words, the greater the 
proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder, the lower will be the IPO return 
ceterisparibus. This finding is consistent with our prediction that the market will value 
the stocks of companies with more dominant shareholders lower, because the potential 
benefits will be acquired by the controlling shareholders at the IPO stage either by the 
setting of high offer prices to accumulate proceeds or by the accrual of other future 
benefits. One potential future benefit is that larger shareholders can 're-privatise' more 
easily: markets perceive this and consequently value the shares lower. A second 
possible private benefit is that a higher shareholding held by one shareholder makes it 
more difficult to launch a takeover war. This finding contradicts the predictions of 
Leland and Pyle (1977) and Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), who maintained that a higher 
retained shareholding signalled higher firm quality of the firm, and should be associated 
with greater IPO underpricing. 
12 TOPOWNER is sigaificant, at least at the 15% level, in all four regessions. 
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Table 4.7: The Regression Results explaining the IPO Premium for the Full Sample of 





Log Market-adjusted Return 
OLS Robust 
Methods 0.2103 a 0.2169a 0.2076 a 0.211 a 
(6.14) (6.12) (5.92) (5.81) 
Proceeds -0.0089c -0.0069 -0.0065 -0.0051 
(-1.68) (-1.27) (-1.21) (-0.91) 
EPS 0.0741 0.0560 0.0109 0.0081 
(0.46) (0.34) (0.07) (0.05) 
LnLottery -0.1 175a -0.1 168a -0.1257' -0.1253 
a 
(-8.98) (-8.63) (-9.39) (-9.04) 
IPODAYS -0.0026 a -0.0029a -0.0017 
b 
-0.002 a 
(-3.77) (4.12) (-2.44) (-2.88) 
RCIPIP0 0.9422 b 0.8445c 0.7155 d 0.726 Id 
(1.98) (1.71) (1.47) (1.44) 
Turnover 0.0050a 0.0057' 0.0043a 0.0044 a 
(6.62) (7.28) (5.53) (5.46) 
TOPOWNER -0.0012 
d 
-0.00140 -0.00140 -0.0018 
b 
(-1.50) (-1.81) (-1.83) (-2.19) 
Constant 0.3665 b 0.3577 b 0.4509a 0.4603 a 
(2.38) (2.24) (2.86) (2.82) 
Sample size 467 467 467 467 
R2 0.3021 0.2576 
AdjustedR 2 0.2893 0.2578 
F value 24.77 25.02 21.24 20.36 
P>O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: 
(1) The dependent variable is the IPO return, measured either by the natural logarithm of the 
simple return or the natural logarithm of the market-adjusted return. 
(2) Two estimation methods are used: OLS and robust regression, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
(3) Ile figures in parentheses are t-values. 
(4) The levels of significance are as follows: 1% significance is denoted by the letter a, 5% 
significance is denoted by b, 10% significance is denoted by c, and 15% significance is 
denoted by d. 
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Corporate law in China requires that key decisions should be made with the agreement 
of no less than two-thirds of the shareholders, but a high concentration of share 
ownership may sometimes enable one single shareholder to take or re*ect important 
proposals. There is ample anecdotal evidence that the attendants at Annual General 
Meetings are usually the delegates of the largest shareholders, and documented cases 
where decisions on the appointment of chairmen and top management are made by less 
than ten shareholders even when the total number of shareholders in the listed 
companies exceeds 10,00013 . Another example of the private 
benefits of control rights is 
provided by the case of Hengtong Co. Ltd. Hengtong Co. Ltd. was the largest 
shareholder in Lengguang Communications p1c, listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
and used its controlling holding to require Lengguang to guarantee a bank loan to the 
total asset value of Lengguang. It is also very common for controlling State companies, 
as the largest shareholder, to 'borrome capital from listed companies at very low cost. 
The second interesting finding is that the bidding mechanism for the IPO offer has a 
highly significant effect upon IPO underpricing. The 1PO return will be higher when 
firms issue shares through local issuing agencies. One explanation is that local investors 
are less knowledgeable in valuing the shares, and thus require higher returns. In 
addition, a national issuing network is likely to be more cost-effective and 
informationally efficient, thus reducing investors' requirements for higher IPO returns. 
This evidence is consistent with the presence of information asymmetries. 
The LOTTERY variable is negatively related to the IPO return, and is highly 
significant. This finding means that investors' rewards are higher when the chances of 
share allocation are smaller, and is consistent with the results of Brennan and Franks 
(1997) and Booth and Chua (1996). It suggests that the initial owners use IPO 
underpricing to attract oversubscription, with the intention of promoting a dispersed 
outside ownership and of retaining control after the 1PO. 
13 See the China Securities Times (17th April 2000). 
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The time between the offer day and the first trading day has a very significant negative 
effect on the IPO return, contrary to our prediction. A possible explanation is that, 
whilst (too) long a time gap imposes more risk and thus merits a higher IPO return, too 
short an interval gives investors no time to collect information for the valuation of the 
IPO. The relationship between the time and the IPO return would thus be non-linear, 
and the optimal interval is a potential topic for future study. 
The regression results also show that IPO underpricing is negatively linked with firm 
size, though none of the coefficients were significant. This finding is consistent with the 
findings of the IPO studies by Booth and Chua (1996) and by Brennan and Frank 
(1997). The coefficients of the other control variables (RCIPIPO, TURNOVER, EPS) 
were all significant, though at different levels, and consistent with our predictions. The 
reciprocal of the offer price (RCIPIPO) was significantly positively related to the IPO 
return, confirming that a higher offer price leads to lower IPO returns. The highly 
significant positive coefficient of trading volume (TURNOVER) supports the similar 
findings in other economies. EPS had the correct sign, but was not statistically 
significant. We thus only have weak and inconclusive evidence that better firms are 
priced higher. 
The results of the regressions on the sub-samples provided very similar results to those 
obtained for the full sample, though there are some interesting differences with regard to 
the ownership variables. The coefficients for STATETOP (see Table 4.8) and for 
SIFRA (see Table 4.9), estimated for the different measures of IPO return and using the 
different regression techniques, were again significantly negative, though the levels of 
significance were slightly different. But the coefficients for STFRA (see Table 4.10) 
were not significant, though they were negative. A possible explanation for this is that 
State-owned institutions are able to exact private benefits whereas the Bureau of State 
Asset Management, being both an administrative agency and a controlling body 
ensuring the value and securities of State assets, has no incentive to pursue private. 
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Table 4.8: The Regression Results explaining the IPO Premium for the Sample of 400 
1POs in China where either the Bureau of State Asset Management or State solely- 
owned Institutions are the Largest Single Shareholder 
Log Simple Return Log Market Adjusted Return 
OLS Robust OLS Robust 
Methods 0.1997 a 0.2098 a 0.1942 a 0.204 a 
(5.44) (5.48) (5.20) (5.22) 
Proceeds -0.0070 -0.0060 -0.0047 -0.0042 
(4.29) (4.06) (-0.85) (-0.73) 
EPS 0.0970 0.0917 0.0420 0.0615 
(0.54) (0.49) (0.23) (0.32) 
LnLottery -0.1214 a -0.1224 a -0.128 a -0.1289a 
(-8.79) (-8.50) (-9.13) (-8.76) 
IPODAYS -0.0028 a -0.0029a -0.0019a -0.0019a 
(-3.93) (-3.80) (-2.59) (-2.47) 
RCIPIPO 0.7707 d 0.7176 0.5042 0.5742 
(1.50) (1.34) (0.96) (1.05) 
Turnover 0.0055a 0.006 a 0.0048 a 0.0048 a 







(-1.65) (-1.84) (-2.10) (-2.33) 
Constant 0.3687 b 0.3423 b 0.460 a 0.4425 a 
(2.20) (1.96) (2.70) (2.48) 
Sample size 400 400 400 400 
R20.3277 0.2942 
AdjustedR 2 0.3139 0.2797 
F 23.82 23.68 20.37 19.20 
P>O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: 
(1) The dependent variable is the IPO return, measured either by the natu ral logarithm of the 
simple return or the natural logarithm of the market-adjusted return. 
(2) Two estimation methods are used: OLS and robust regression, as discus sed in Chapter 1. 
(3) The figures in parentheses are t-values. 
(4) The levels of significance are as follows: 1% significance is denoted by the letter a, 5% 
significance is denoted by b, 10% significance is d enoted by c, and 15% significance is 
denoted by d. 
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Table 4.9: The Regression Results explaining the IPO Premium for the Sample of 344 





Log Market Adjusted Return 
OLS Robust 
Methods 0.1639' 0.1757 a 0.1520a 0.1655 a 
(4.01) (4.08) (3.65) (3.77) 





(-1.75) (-1.50) (-1.45) (-1.37) 
EPS -0.0223 0.0179 -0.0664 -0.0168 
(-0.11) (0.08) (-0.32) (-0.08) 
LnLottery -0.1027" -0.1043' _0.1119a -0.1131" 
(-6.24) (-6.03) (-6.69) (-6.40) 






(-3.73) (-3.29) (-2.66) (-2.20) 
RCIPIPO 0.4891 0.4683 0.1963 0.2699 
(0.85) (0.78) (0.34) (0.44) 
Turnover 0.0054 a 0.0062 a 0.0046' 0.0046 a 






(-1.52) (-1.63) (-2.25) (-2.43) 
Constant 0.4898 a 0.4253 b 0.6208 a 0.5845" 
(2.58) (2.13) (3.22) (2.87) 
Sample size 344 344 344 344 
R2 0.31 0.2737 
AdjustedR 2 0.2935 0.2564 
F 18.81 18.42 16.78 14.49 
P>O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: 
(1) The dependent variable is the TO return, measured either by the natural logarithm of the 
simple return or the natural logarithm of the market-adjusted return. 
(2) Two estimation methods are used: OLS and robust regression, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
(3) The figures in parentheses are t-values. 
(4) The levels of significance are as follows: 1% significance is denoted by the letter a, 5% 
significance is denoted by b, 10% significance is denoted by c, and 15% significance is 
denoted by d. 
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Table 4.10: The Regression Results explaining the IPO Premium for the Sample of 56 
IPOs in China where the Bureau of State Asset Management is the Largest Single 
Shareholder 
Log Simple Return Log Market Adjusted Return 
OLS Robust OLS Robust 
Methods 0.2929a 0.2396 b 0.3378 a 0.2647 a 
(2.93) (2.46) (3.42) (2.74) 
Proceeds 0.0463 d 0.0681 b 0.0600b 0.0886 a 
(1.54) (2.31) (2.01) (3.02) 
EPS 0.1097 0.0827 0.0213 -0.0816 
(0.25) (0.20) (0.05) (-0.20) 
LnLottery -0.1690a -0.1745 a -0.1600a -0.162 a 
(-6.13) (-6.54) (-5.88) (-6.11) 
IPODAYS -0.0015 _0.0080a 0.0005 -0.0062 
b 
(-0.74) (-2.88) (0.24) (-2.26) 
RCIPIP0 1.3090 1.6264 1.1452 1.5587 
(1.01) (1.30) (0.90) (1.26) 
Turnover 0.0066b 0.0059ý 0.0061b 0.0054b 
(2.14) (2.16) (2.17) (1.99) 
STFRA -0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0020 -0.0015 
(-0.69) (-0.40) (-0.86) (-0.63) 
Constant 0.1136 0.1591 0.0557 0.1619 
(0.30) (0.43) (0.15) (0.44) 
Sample size 56 55 56 55 
R2 0.5176 0.5238 
AdjustedR 2 0.4355 0.4428 
F 6.30 7.68 6.46 7.22 
P>O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: 
(1) The dependent variable is the TO return, measured either by the natural logarithm of the 
simple return or the natural logarithm of the market-adjusted return. 
(2) Two estimation methods are used: OLS and robust regression, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
(3) The figures in parentheses are t-values. 
(4) The levels of significance are as follows: 1% significance is denoted by the letter a, 5% 
significance is denoted by b, 10% significance is denoted by c, and 15% significance is 
denoted by d. 
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benefits (through, for example, setting up their own projects by transferring capital from 
the IPO proceeds) as it does not have the rights to the proceeds. 
The impact of domestic institutional shareholders is interesting, though the coefficients 
of DIFRA are not significant (see Table 4.11). The IPO returns are higher for larger 
domestic institutional shareholders. We believe that the market reacts positively to the 
presence of larger domestic shareholders, suggesting that outside investors on the 
secondary market have some confidence in the domestic institutions. This is an 
encouraging sign, which is consistent with the conclusions in chapter 5 below. 
We tried to model the effects of different industries on IPO returns. Two industry 
classifications were available from the Exchanges. The first was a rough classification 
separately identifying manufacturing, commercial, utility, real estate, and 
conglomerates. The second was a more detailed classification with twenty industries. 
The model was estimated by both OLS and robust regression using dummy variables to 
capture the industry effects, but found few of them to be significant. Notwithstanding 
the vague definitions used by the Stock Exchanges, these results suggest that industry 
had no influence on IPO pricing. The regression results incorporating the dummy 
variables are thus not reported here. 
Two other matters merit attention. First, the values of the intercept coefficients, which 
in the full sample regressions vary between 0.3665 to 0.4603, are always significantly 
different from zero. This may be the result of a mis-specification of the entire model, or 
of a failure by the proxy variables to capture the value of the control allocated to the 
outside shareholders. Second, we need to stress the small coefficients of determination. 
However, small values of R2 are common in similar studies: Kim and Ritter (1999) 
report values of R2 around 0.08, even though they include many accepted determinants 
in their models. Similar results can be found in Brennan and Franks (1997) whilst, in the 
Chinese case, Mok and Hui (1998) report values of A2 with a range from 0.05 to 0.247. 
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Table 4.11: The Regression Results explaining the IPO Premium for the Sample of 67 
1POs in China where a Domestic Institution is the Largest Single Shareholder 
Log Simple Return Log Market Adjusted Return 
OLS Robust OLS Robust 
Methods 0.1654' 0.2023 b 0.1956b 0.2187 b 
(1.77) (2.09) (1.98) (2.18) 
Proceeds -0.0183 0.0431 -0.0159 0.0517 
(-0.53) (1.06) (-0.43) (1.23) 
EPS 0.1538 0.0358 0.1161 -0.0376 
(0.45) (0.10) (0.32) (-0.10) 
Ln(Lottery) -0.0623d -0.083 1' -0.0921 
b -0.1057 
b 
(-1.53) (-1.96) (-2.15) (-2.40) 
IPODAYS 0.0008 -0.0060d 0.0010 -0.007Cý 
(0.44) (-1.82) (0.49) (-2.04) 
RCIPIPO 3.6653 a 3.2883 a 4.063 Oa 3.5414 a 
(2.93) (2.55) (3.09) (2.65) 
Turnover -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0014 
(-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.42) (-0.64) 
DIFRA 0.0018 0.0002 0.0025 0.0010 
(0.95) (0.09) (1.26) (0.50) 
Constant 0.0639 0.2716 -0.0228 0.2776 
(0.16) (0.67) (-0.06) (0.66) 
Sample size 67 66 67 66 
R2 0.3277 0.3719 
AdjustedR 2 0.2350 0.2853 
F 3.53 3.34 4.29 3.91 
P>O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: 
(1) Ile dependent variable is the TO return, measured either by the natural logarithm of the 
simple return or the natural logarithm of the market-adjusted return. 
(2) Two estimation methods are used: OLS and robust regression, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
(3) The figures in parentheses are t-values. 
(4) The levels of significance are as follows: 1% significance is denoted by the letter a, 5% 
significance is denoted by b, 10% significance is denoted by c, and 15% significance is 
denoted by d. 
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As pointed out by Roll (1988, p. 541), 'even with hindsight, the ability to explain stock 
price changes is modest... The average adjusted R2 is only about 0.35 with monthly data 
and 0.20 with daily data. ' 
4.6 ConcInding Remarks 
The underpricing of IPOs is a mysterious phenomenon in both theoretical and practical 
circles. This chapter has investigated the underpricing of IPOs in the context of 
corporate control and its private benefits, in the particular case of China. We found 
evidence of high IPO premiums in a sample of 467 listed companies that had publicly 
issued equity to outside investors. We then linked the IPO underpricing to the corporate 
control mechanism, and found that the underpricing was negatively related to the 
proportion of shares held by the largest single shareholder, after controlling for other 
well-known factors. This finding confirms our argument that, when the regulatory 
environment is poor, the controlling shareholders are able to pursue their private 
benefits more easily and without penalty. The outside investors perceive this, and take a 
more cautious strategy to IPOs, leading to lower IPO pricing. 
This study further examined the impact of the ownership of the largest single 
shareholders on IPO underpricing. We found that the IPO returns of firms where the 
largest shareholders are State-owned are lower. On the contrary, the IPO returns for 
firms with larger domestic shareholdings are higher, which implies the potential for a 
good corporate governance mechanism. 
Our findings support the predictions of the extant literature, but add to it by highlighting 
the importance of corporate control in providing private benefits. Whilst the asymmetric 
information theory provides a powerful explanation of why IpOs should be underpriced, 
the theory cannot explain why there are different returns across the 1POs. But this can 
be explained by a consideration of the corporate control mechanism. 
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Given China's determination to move towards a market economy and to effect the 
transformation of the SOEs, this study provides important insights into the construction 
of a good corporate governance system. It can be used to aid the design of an initial 
ownership structure which benefits not just the largest shareholders but all the 
shareholders. The analysis is the most comprehensive yet on the subject of IpOs in 
China, yet much further work remains to be done. In particular: 
e It would be sensible to consider more fully situations where the largest single 
shareholder is holding only a few more shares than the second largest shareholder. 
The current model ignores the second largest shareholder, yet it might be relatively 
easy for the second largest shareholder to become the largest by simply purchasing a 
small proportion of the outstanding shares. In short, a more comprehensive analysis 
should take account of the relative sizes of the large shareholders. 
* There is a substantial literature which confirms that stock prices decline over the 
long-term after an rPO. How do stock prices perform in the Chinese situation? Why 
should the investors in the secondary markets be willing to pay the investors who 
were lucky enough to be allocated primary shares during the 1POs? What are the 
implications for corporate governance? 
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Chapter 5 
Ownership Structure as a 
Corporate Governance Mechanism 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4, we studied the relationship between large, controlling shareholders and 
small, outside shareholders, based on the theory of corporate control rights and 
associated private benefits. A related corporate governance issue is the 'agency 
problem' arising from the conflict of interests between the firm's management, as the 
agent, and its shareholders as the principals. This is caused by the separation of 
ownership by the investors, and effective control by the management, in publicly listed 
corporations. Furthermore, the agency problem is exacerbated when ownership is 
widely dispersed, due to the inability and/or the unwillingness of relatively small 
shareholders to police the behaviour of the management. The monitoring of 
management is also weakened by the 'free-rider problem' - the monitoring shareholders 
have to pay 100 percent of the monitoring costs, but only gain an increased return in 
proportion to their shareholdings. Other, usually small, shareholders enjoy the rest of 
the improved gain but without making any effort. A consequence is that the residual 
control rights fall into the hands of management, instead of the residual cash flow 
claimants. 
There is an increasing body of research that shows that the structure of share ownership 
can be an important source of incentives for management, for Boards of Directors, and 
for outside shareholders (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). The pattern and amount of stock 
ownership can influence managerial behaviour, corporate performance, and stockholder 
voting patterns in election contests (Grossman and Hart, 1988). However, the 
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interrelationship between ownership structure, firm characteristics, and corporate 
performance require further investigation, both in developed economies and particularly 
in transitional economies. In this chapter, we will investigate the relationship between 
firm performance and ownership structure, using a sample of 434 manufacturing firms 
listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The study involves two tests: 
the first on the link between corporate performance and ownership concentration, and 
the second on the link between corporate performance and different types of 
shareholdings. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the theories related to 
ownership and corporate performance. Section 5.3 introduces the data sample and the 
variables. Econometric methodologies and results are discussed in Section 5.4, and 
Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 Review of the Literature 
Two important characteristics of modem corporations are the separation of ownership 
and control, and the diffusion of equity among investors (Berle and Means, 1932). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the sum of "(1) the monitoring 
expenditures of the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, and (3) the 
residual lose'. More specifically, agency costs may involve both the direct expropriation 
of assets and/or losses due to managerial indulgence or incompetence. According to 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), management can expropriate assets in various ways, 
including directly stealing money from the firm's accounts, transferring the firm's 
wealth through Tavourable' pricing to their own firms, or selling expensive firm assets 
to their own firms at low prices. But management indulgence may be the worse form of 
the agency problem. Management may increase their consumption of luxuries at the 
firm's expense, or heighten their status by expanding the size of the firm (empire 
building) even if the expansion is not warranted on efficiency grounds. The direct 
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expropriation of a firm's assets is common in many developing countries and 
transitional economies, where legal systems are weak or in an immature state. But, in 
economies with more sound legal systems where asset appropriation can incur severe 
penalties, management overconsumption and incompetence has become the focus of 
attention for both theoretical research and policy formulation (La Porta et al, 1999). 
To mitigate the agency problem, an obvious remedy is to increase the management 
shareholding, making the manager a significant residual claimant. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that managers perform better, the greater their ownership stake within the 
firm. They hold that managers want to consume or pursue projects that benefit them 
personally. When managers own 100 percent of the company, they pay for a dollar of 
perquisite with a dollar of their own profits. But, when managers own only 10 percent 
of the company, they pay for a dollar of perquisite with only 10 cents of their own 
profits, and hence will overconsume perquisites. The argument is that, with a higher 
fraction of shares in hand, the manager may work harder to improve the performance of 
the corporation, which leads to an increase in firm value and hence his private wealth. 
The agency problem does not exist when management owns 100 percent of the equity. 
Empirically, Murphy (1985), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Denis and Sarin 
(1999), and Ang, Cole and Lin (1999) have found an inverse relationship between 
managers' shareholdings and agency costs. 
While stressing the importance of a management shareholding in reducing the agency 
problem, other research has focused on the role of the large shareholders. In the past 
two decades, a number of studies have begun to question the empirical validity of the 
Berle and Means model which conceptualises company ownership as a large number of 
small, heterogeneous shareholders, and to shed light on the role of large shareholders in 
monitoring management. As discussed in chapter 2, various studies have discovered 
significant concentrations of ownership around the world. Other research (e. g. Kang and 
Shivdasani, 1995; Yafeh and Yosha, 1995) reveals that these large shareholders are 
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active in corporate governance, in contrast to the Berle and Means idea that managers 
are unaccountable. This research suggests that the existence of large shareholders may 
provide another mechanism of corporate governance. 
At a theoretical level, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that larger shareholders can 
play an important role in corporations. They begin with the assumption that the firm is 
owned by one large shareholder, who does not participate in management, and a variety 
of small ones. In their model, the large shareholder has a large enough stake that it pays 
him to do some monitoring of the incumbent management. They conclude that, due to 
the fact that small shareholders are usually individuals, they prefer their returns in the 
form of capital gains. Large shareholders usually have corporate tax attributes so they 
prefer dividends to capital gains. Thus, some degree of ownership concentration 
improves control management and increases firm value. The most direct way to align 
cash flow and control rights of outside investors is to concentrate shareholdings. This 
can mean that one or several investors in the firm have substantial minority stakes, such 
as 10 or 20 percent. A substantial shareholding provides the large shareholder with the 
incentive to collect information and monitor management, thereby avoiding the 'free- 
rider problem' (Grossman and Hart, 1980). A large number of empirical studies have 
confirmed their predictions (see, for example, Wruck, 1989; Hertzel and Smith, 1993; 
Franks and Mayer, 1995), both in Germany and in the United States. However, the 
problem with the model is that it fails to take into account risk-sharing and the wealth 
constraint, both of which are basic features of the joint-stock company. 
In contrast, Hart (1995b) draws attention to two disadvantages of holding large 
shareholdings in a company. The first is that an investor owning a large fraction of the 
shares will lose many of the gains from going public, as the risk-reduction benefits from 
portfolio diversification are lost. The second is that, even though large shareholdings 
can mitigate the agency problems, they cannot eliminate'them. 
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All the above-mentioned literature treats corporate performance as dependent upon 
ownership structure. Some other research (Demsetz, 1983; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Kole, 1994; Cho, 1998) argues that ownership structure is 
endogenously determined in equilibrium, and that investors may select the ownership 
structure together with the optimal market value of the corporation. Whilst 
acknowledging the explanatory power of these studies, their argument is not really 
applicable in China where institutional shares cannot be freely traded. Institutional 
investors cannot sell their shares when the performance of corporations is poor, or buy 
when it is good. 
In addition to ownership structure, the capital structure is also an important influence on 
corporate performance through its effects on corporate governance (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Grossman and Hart (1982) predict that, in addition to the tax-shield 
advantages of debt over equity, the debt/equity ratio matters. The theory is that the 
distinction between debt and equity is fundamental to the way corporate governance 
works. Debt claims in general provide the holders with a fixed repayment schedule, but 
little in the way of rights to control the company as long as the repayment schedule (and 
sometimes certain other terms) is met. However, creditors can have a strong influence 
over a company if it gets into financial distress and, even if a company is financially 
sound, creditors can influence whether it can obtain additional funding for proposed 
new projects. As leverage increases, so does the risk of default by the firm, and hence 
the incentive for the lender to monitor the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Bolton and 
Scharfstein, 1990; Hart and Moor, 1995). While the primary purpose of this monitoring 
is to prevent risk-shifting by shareholders to debt-holders, increased monitoring should 
also inhibit excessive perquisite consumption by managers. 
A smaller but increasing amount of research has started to shed light on various 
corporate governance issues in transition economies, such as the role of banks in the 
corporate governance mechanism (Dittus and Prowse, 1996; Coffee, 1996). Xu and 
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Wang (1997) investigate the relationship between ownership structure and corporate 
performance in China, and find a positive effect of domestic institutional investors and 
the negative effect of State shareholding. But their research is limited to the roles of 
three groups of large shareholders. The current research is more sophisticated in that: 
(1) We classify the State-owned shares into two sub-categories: those held by State 
agencies through the Bureau of State Asset Management (BSAM), and those held 
by State-owned institutions. The aim is to test whether firms owned directly by 
the State Bureau perform better (or worse) than those owned by State-owned 
institutions. 
(2) We add management shareholding variables into the analysis. The argument is 
that a higher proportion of shares held by management can reduce the agency 
costs. Therefore better performance is expected to accompany a higher 
management shareholding. 
(3) There is virtually no market for corporate control in China, due to the fact that 
most shares are held by institutional investors, and there are restrictions on the 
floating of these shares. Nevertheless there are still 180 corporations (in the 
sample of 434 companies) where the tradable shares account for more than 30% 
of the total outstanding shares, and twenty where the tradable shares account for 
more than 50%. These corporations are under greater pressure than those with 
fewer tradable shares. 
Research into the link between ownership structure and corporate perfonnance will not 
be complete unless the above groups of shareholders are included explicitly into the 
analysis. 
5.3 The Model 
Ownership structure affects the efficiency of corporate governance and thus the intrinsic 
value of the firm, leading to a different corporate performance (Stoughton and Zechner, 
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1998; La Porta et al, 2002). The dependent variable in the model, corporate 
performance, is an amended form of Tobin's Q. Tobin's Q (Tobin and Brainard, 1968; 
Tobin, 1969) is the ratio of the market value of equity and debt, divided by the 
replacement cost of total assets: 
Tobin! sQ= market value of outstanding shares 
+ market value of total liability 
replacement cost of total assets 
(5.1) 
The basic idea is that the replacement cost is a logical measure of the alternative-use 
values of the assets. Unless the assets used by the firm are able to create at least as much 
value as the cost of replacing them, the assets would be better employed elsewhere. 
Thus those firms displaying a Tobin's Q greater than unity may be judged as using their 
scarce resources effectively, whilst those with a value of Tobin's Q less than unity may 
be judged as using their resource poorly. 
An alternative measure of corporate performance, the accounting profit rate, was used in 
the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) study, but all subsequent studies have used Tobin's Q. As 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, p. 213) point out, there are two important respects in 
which these measures differ. One is the time perspective: backward-looking for the 
accounting profit rate and forward-looking for Tobin's Q. In attempting to assess the 
effect of ownership structure on firm performance, is it more sensible to look at an 
estimate of what management has accomplished or at an estimate of what management 
will accomplish? The second difference relates to who is actually measuring 
performance. For the accounting profit rate, this is the accountant constrained by the 
standards set by his profession. For Tobin's Q, this is primarily the community of 
investors constrained by their acumen, optimism, or pessimism. Economists, most of 
whom have a better understanding of market constraints than of accounting constraints, 
tend to favour Tobin's Q. We adopt Tobin's Q as the measure of corporate performance, 
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bearing particularly in mind the notable differences in accounting practices and 
accuracy between different countries. 
In practice, few Chinese companies issue publicly-placed debt, so it is almost 
impossible to estimate the market value of the companies' debt. Furthermore, the 
companies do not report the replacement cost of their assets. To resolve these problems, 
we follow the practice adopted in a recent cross-sectional study of 27 countries (La 
Porta et al 2002) and in previous studies for the United States (Chung and Pruitt 1994, 
Demsetz and Villalonga 2001). We use total book liabilities as an approximation of total 
debt, and the book value of total assets as an approximation of the replacement costs of 
total assets. These approximations might be questionable in studies using time-series 
data, where inflation might have a large influence on the estimates of replacement cost, 
but are less problematic when cross-section data are being used. The following amended 
version of Tobin's Q is thus calculated: 
TobiW sQ= market valae 
of outstanding shares+ total liability 
book valueof totalassets 
outstandirg shares x year end share prices + total liability 
book valueof totalassets 
(5.2) 
The explanatory variables in the model may be sub-divided into those that relate to the 
ownership structure of the companies, and a number of control variables that have been 
identified in the previous literature. As regards the 'ownership' variables, these relate 
both to ownership concentration and to the shareholdings of different groups of 
shareholders. There are two measures of concentration: the first (TI) is the fraction of 
shares held by the single largest shareholder, and the second (TIO) is the fraction of 
shares held by the ten largest shareholders. The expected impact of these variables upon 
Chapter 5: Ownership Structure as a Corporate Governance Mechanism 151 
corporate performance is unclear, and depends upon the relative strength of the effects 
suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Hart (1995b). 
There are five variables that reflect the shareholdings of different groups of 
shareholders. The first three relate to the holdings of three categories of large 
shareholders, viz: State agencies, State solely-owned institutions, and domestic 
institutions. Maug (1998) identifies two effects that may have an impact on the 
behaviour of large shareholders: the 'lock-in effect' and the 'liquidity effect'. The 'lock-in 
effect' refers to the fact that a large shareholder may find it is more profitable to own a 
large stake, and hence provides a greater incentive to intervene. But holding a larger 
fraction of the total shares also makes the market less liquid in these shares. The 
'liquidity effect' thus reduces the large shareholder's expected returns from trading on 
private information. The size of institutions has several implications for activism 
(Carleton et al, 1998; Coffee, 1991). Many institutional shareholders' positions have 
become so large that they are essentially illiquid, unless they are willing either to accept 
a relatively large drop in price or to spread share sales over a long period of time. 
Furthermore, firms may wish privately to place restricted shares with institutions: 
because such shares are harder to sell, cut-and-run behaviour is reduced, and 
intervention becomes more attractive (Kahn and Winton, 1997). In China, the CSRC 
regulations forbid the floating on the stock markets of the above categories of shares 
that may therefore be regarded as restricted. The five variables are: 
The fraction of shares that are directly owned by State agencies (FSOS), usually in 
the name of the Bureau of State Asset Management. 
(2) The fraction of shares owned by State solely-owned institutions (FSOIS). These 
institutions are predominantly the parent holding corporations of the listed 
companies. All shares held either directly by State agencies, or by State solely- 
owned institutions, are State-owned but different interest groups effectively control 
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them. State agencies represent the State, whilst the State solely-owned institutions 
represent the controlling corporations of the listed companies. 
(3) The fraction of shares owned by domestic institutions (FDIS). 
(4) The fraction of shares that can be freely traded on the Stock Exchanges (FTS). The 
owners of tradable shares are various, ranging from individual investors, to non- 
banking financial institutions and other institutions that can buy and sell the shares 
on open markets. 
(5) The fraction of shares owned by the top management (FMOS), including the 
Directors of the Board, the CEO, the Deputy CEO, and the members of any 
supervisory committee. Following Brook et al (2000), we classify the Directors as 
top management because the Board members are State agents and are appointed by 
the State administration authorities. We expect a positive relationship between 
performance and the management shareholding. 
It is not clear at this stage whether the first four variables will have a positive or a 
negative impact upon corporate performance - this remains to be established 
empirically. But a positive relationship is expected between the fraction of shares 
owned by management (FMOS) and performance due the motivation provided by this 
incentive. 
In addition to the ownership variables, there are a number of other factors that have 
been shown in the extant literature to have an impact upon corporate performance: 
(1) Years of listing on the Stock Exchange. Ang et al (1998) argue that older firms are 
likely to be more efficient than younger ones, due to the effects of both the learning 
curve and of survival bias. In contrast, various studies (e. g. Pagano el al, 1998, on 
Italian corporations; Degeorge and Zeckhauser, 1993, Jain and Kini, 1994, and 
Mikkelson, et al 1997 on US corporations) have documented a reduction in 
profitability after corporations have been floated. Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) 
Chapter 5: Ownership Structure as a Corporate Governance Mechanism 153 
attribute this to 'window-dressing' by the corporations that are about to be listed. 
They massage the information in their accounts through practices such as early/late 
registration of accruals. Pagano et al (1998) suggest two more fundamental 
explanations for the decline in performance, viz: adverse selection and moral 
hazard. They point out that declining performance can be attributed to adverse 
selection existing during the pre-listing stage, at which a 'bad' firm might be 
wrongly chosen for listing, whilst a 'good' firm might not receive approval. Moral 
hazard, in their study, is defined as the misbehaviour of management after listing, 
when monitoring and protection for the legal rights of all related parties are weak 
and the management makes self-interested decisions at the expense of others. We 
include the number of years that a firm has been listed (Age) as an explanatory 
variable in the model. A positive effect upon corporate performance might thus be 
interpreted as reflecting the fact that firms with longer histories perform better 
because they have more experience in a market-oriented environment. A negative 
effect would tend to confirm the validity of the moral hazard and adverse selection 
explanations. 
(2) Firm size. There is a rich literature that investigates the relationship between firm 
size and corporate performance. Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) found that 
small firms had higher returns than large firms, even after adjusting for risk via the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Lang and Stulz (1994) report a significant 
negative relationship between firm size and Tobin's Q. Firm size may be measured 
in many different ways, but Gilson (1997) maintains that alternative measures do 
not materially affect the inferences. We use the natural logarithm of total assets 
QnAssets) as a proxy for firm size, and expect size to have a negative impact upon 
performance. 
(3) Firm growth. In an efficient market, companies with good growth prospects should 
be valued higher. We measure firm growth (Growth) by the average annual growth 
of sales over the most recent three years, and expect this variable to have a positive 
impact upon corporate performance. 
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(4) Stability of the business environment. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that firms 
with more stable prices, stable technology, and stable market shares exercise less 
managerial discretion, and therefore management can be monitored at relatively 
low cost. Stability should thus be associated with better performance. We use the 
standard deviation of the firm's sales over the previous three years (Instability) as a 
proxy for the instability of the environment: a greater standard deviation implies 
less stability. It is expected that this variable will have a negative effect upon 
performance. 
(5) Profitability. A higher return on assets should be more positively valued by the 
markets, and give rise to a higher Tobin's Q. We use after-tax profits divided by the 
book value of total assets (ROA) as a measure of profitability, and expect this to 
have a positive impact upon Tobin's 
(6) The debt-equity ratio. As the level of debt increases so too does the incentive for 
the lender to monitor the firm, which hopefully leads to better performance. There 
are several alternative measures available, but here we use total liabilities divided 
by the total book value of net assets (DAR) and expect this to have a positive 
impact upon Tobin's Q. 
Table 5.1 surnmarises the explanatory variables in the model, and their expected 
impacts upon corporate performance. The expected signs for the ownership structure 
variables are not specified, and this reflects the fact that the effects of ownership 
structure can not be determined a priori - large shareholders may play a positive role in 
corporate governance in one economy, but may be harmful in another. 
5.4 The Data 
The sample consists of 434 manufacturing firms listed either on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The reason that we choose manufacturing 
firms is that, under current regulations issued by the Chinese authorities, this is the most 
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clearly defined industry. Some firms, for which the industry classification was vague, 
were omitted from the analysis. The China Security Regulatory Commission requires 
both the Exchanges and the listed companies to publish Annual Reports, which should 
include data on capital structure, the ten largest shareholders, turnover, profit or loss, 
total assets, net assets, liabilities (long-term and current), and other important 
information. The data on the firms' ownership structures, their financial figures, and the 
holdings and classifications of the ten largest shareholders have been extracted from the 
CD-ROM containing the 1997 Annual Reports of all listed companies, published by 
Securities Times (Zhengquan Shibao). The prices of both A-shares and B-shares are 
taken from A Guide to Investors in Chinese Stock Markets 1998, also published by 
Securities Times. The H-share prices are from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Annual 
Report. All share prices refer to the end of 1997. The prices for both B-shares and H- 
shares are converted into Chinese currency at the year-end exchange rate. 
Table 5.1: The Explanatory Variables and their Expected Impacts 
_ 
Variables Description Expected sign' 
T1 Shareholding of largest shareholder 
TIO Shareholding of ten largest shareholders (%) 
FSOS Fraction of shares owned by BSAM (%) 
FSOIS Fraction of shares owned by State wholly 
owned institutions (%) 
MIS Fraction of shares owned by domestic 
institutions (%) 
FMOS Fraction of shares owned by the top + 
management (%) 
FTS Tradable shares as % of total shares 
Age Years listed on Stock Exchange 
LnAssets Natural log of total book assets (10,000 yuan) 
Growth Average sales growth over past three years (0/6) + 
Instability Standard deviation of sales over the previous 
three years (%) 
ROA Return on assets C/o) + 
DAR Ratio of debt to total assets + 
Notes: stands for the sign can be either direction. 
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Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics for both the dependent and the explanatory 
variables: 
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
Variable Mean Standard. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Q 2.90 1.49 1.00 11.84 
T1 47.97 17.59 4.19 88.58 
TIO 63.98 12.85 8.54 94.67 
FSOS 11.05 20.29 0 83.75 
FSOIS 28.29 29.27 0 88.58 
MIS 21.73 24.33 0 75 
FMOS 0.09 0.53 0 10.85 
FTS 29.06 12.85 1.11 99.98 
Age 1.9 1.94 0 7 
LnAsset 11.29 0.88 9.38 14.53 
Growth 28.63 101.68 -10.93 1352.19 
Instability 45.94 175.37 0.80 2347.66 
ROA 2.84 6.07 -26.1 31.68 
DAR 43.19 17.24 4.43 88.97 
Note: The data relate to 434 manufacturing companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges in 1997. 
Source: Annual Reports of Listed Companies, 1997; Hong Kong Stock Exchange 1997 Report 
These data show that the Tobin's Q for all firms was well above unity, with the mean 
value of 2.9 and minimum of 1.0. The largest Tobin's Q was 11.84, reflecting a high 
market valuation of that firm. The values of the ownership concentration ratios (TI and 
TIO) reveal highly concentrated shareholdings in the sample. The largest single 
shareholders held, on average, nearly 48% of the total shares. In one case, the single 
largest shareholder controlled 88.58% of total shares, leaving no doubt about the non- 
existence of a market for corporate control. Nearly 64 percent of the shares are held by 
the ten largest shareholders: a relatively high concentration ratio. 
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The Table also reports that State agencies' owned, on average, about 11% of the total 
shares. The shareholders with the largest proportion of shares were the State solely- 
owned institutions, with an average stake of 28%. Thus, the shares held by the State, 
either directly or indirectly, accounted for 39%. Domestic institutions ranked as the 
second largest shareholders (22%). Top management held only a tiny (0.1% on average) 
proportion of the total shares, but with a substantial range. This suggests that, while 
stock incentive schemes are prevalent in Western economies and perhaps other 
economies as well2, managerial shareholdings have not been widely adopted as an 
incentive instrument in China. Generally the firms are quite young, with an average 
listing of 1.9 years. Growth was fast, with an annual growth rate of sales of 29%. 
5.5 The Empirical Results 
As the sample consists of a cross-section sample of 434 firms with substantial 
differences in size, there is the possibility of heteroskedasti city. As is well-known, the 
presence of heteroskedasticity means that the OLS estimates of the regression 
parameters are unbiased but inefficient, whilst the estimated standard errors can be 
biased (Greene, 1993). Thus, in addition to OLS, we also apply the robust regression 
methods as discussed in the Data and Methodology section of Chapter 1. 
Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Ang et al (1998), two sets of regressions were 
performed with corporate performance as the dependent variable. The first set included 
the ownership concentration variables (either TI or TIO) as explanatory variables, 
together with the control variables. The second set omitted the ownership concentration 
variables, but included the explanatory variables related to the shareholdings of the 
different types of owners (i. e. the State agencies, the State solely-owned institutions, the 
1 The State agencies are the Bureau of State Asset Management at its various hierarchic levels, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
2 Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) report an average management shareholding of 1.54% in the United 
States. 
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domestic institutions, the management, and the public). All regression models were 
estimated using both OLS and the robust Huber procedure. 
5.5.1 The Relationship between Ownership Concentration and Corporate 
Performance 
The objective of the first set of regressions was to establish the effects of ownership 
concentration on corporate performance, as measured by Tobin's Q, but without 
distinguishing between the different types of shareholders. The model to be estimated 
was thus: 
a+ fl, OCR +, fl2 Age + 83 LnAsset + fl4 Growth + fl5 Instability 
fl6 ROA + fl7 DAR + pi 
where: 
Q= Tobin's Q 
OCR = ownership concentration ratio (either TI or T10) 
a= the intercept term 
, 
81 ... j67 = the slope coefficients to be estimated 
A= the error term. 
(5.3) 
The regression results are presented in Table 5.3, with TI being included in the first pair 
of equations and TIO in the second pair. The results are encouraging in that the adjusted 
Rý for both OLS regressions is 0.50, and all four regressions are highly significant 
according to the F-statistics. It is apparent that TIO has a positive, and highly 
significant, effect upon performance but that the effect of TI is insignificant. 
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Table 5.3: The Relationship between Ownership Concentration and Corporate 
Performance 
Explanatory OLS Robust Huber OLS Robust Huber 







0.0097 b 0.0110 a 
(2.391) (3.759) 
Control variables 
Age -0.0359 -0.0399' -0.0035 -0.0203 
(-1.215) (-1.834) (-0.120) (-0.972) 
LnAsset -0.4603a -0.4144a -0.5132a -0.4449a 
(-7.332) (-8.963) (-8.254) (-9.925) 
Growth 0.0073a 0.008a 0.0081a 0.0089a 






(-2.203) (-3.801) (-2.562) (-4.178) 
ROA 0.1 170a 0.1003a 0.1 154a 0.1073a 
(10.065) (11.718) (9.976) (12.859) 





(-1.890) (-1.489) (-1.607) (0.282) 
Constant 8.047a 6.9514 a 7.6072 a 6.5293 a 
(11.911) (13.970) (10.936) (13.020) 
Adj. Rý 0.50 0.50 
F-statistic 63.67 91.72 63.68 103.82 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: 
(1) The dependent variable is corporate performance, as measured by Tobin's Q. 
(2) Two estimation methods are used: OLS and robust regression, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
(3) The figures in parentheses are t-values. 
(4) The levels of significance are as follows: 1% significance is denoted by the letter a, 5% 
significance is denoted by b, 10% significance is denoted by c, and 15% significance is 
denoted by d. 
The significant impact of ownership concentration (as measured by TIO) on Tobin's Q 
supports the Shleifer and Vishny (1986) hypothesis that large shareholders may help 
reduce the free-rider problem of small investors, and hence are value-increasing. But 
such an explanation merits a word of caution. The majority of the ten largest 
shareholders in the listed companies are State agencies and institutions. For example, in 
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the Shenzhen sample, only 42 out of the 300 companies have individuals amongst their 
largest five shareholders (Xu and Wang, 1997). There are obviously more individual 
investors amongst the ten largest shareholders, but the numbers are fairly small. The 
figures are even more stark if we consider the percentage shareholdings: only 3.4% on 
average of the total outstanding shares in the 300 companies are owned by individuals 
amonst the ten largest shareholders. The variable TIO therefore essentially measures the 
degree of ownership by the State, and the results in Table 5.3 should be interpreted 
accordingly. 
As regards the control variables, the regression results suggest there is a negative, 
though not significant relationship between the firms' history of listing and their 
performance. This result recalls the negative but significant findings of Pagano el al 
(1998), who offered an explanation based on adverse selection and moral hazard 
arguments. If the adverse selection argument is correct, this means that the procedure 
for approving firms for flotation is defective. And if moral hazard leads to a 
deterioration of firm performance after being listed, the issue is even more serious. Is 
the transformation of the SOEs through the establishment of a joint-stock system a 
feasible way to improve the performance of firms? Lipton and Sachs (1990) and 
Shleifer and Boycko (1993) argue that corporatisation is a useful form of enterprise 
reform even without privatisation. They argue that the Directors of corporations become 
responsible for the assets of the company, and hence have an incentive to prevent asset 
appropriation, increase information exchange, and separate the State from the 
enterprises. But this study, plus the findings of the research on firms in other economies, 
throws doubts on this optimism. The reality of reform in Eastern Europe and Russia also 
suggests that this argument is simplistic. The question is thus how effective is the 
Chinese approach to SOE reform? Can corporatisation without privatisation improve the 
deteriorating performance of SOEs? We will investigate these questions further, when 
more time series data become available. 
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The regression results confirm the expected positive effects of both profitability and 
growth prospects on Tobin's Q, and also the expected negative effects of firm size and 
an unstable business environment. Larger firms and those operating in volatile business 
environments both tend to exhibit worse performance. 
But the debt-equity ratio has a negative, though insignificant, effect upon performance. 
This suggests that debt does not curb the agency problem, contrary to the hypothesis of 
Grossman and Hart (1982) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). A premise of this 
hypothesis was that the debt constraint should be hard enough to put pressure on 
management. If the firm cannot repay the principal and interest on its debt, the risk of 
bankruptcy will be imminent, and management will be in danger of the sack. But such a 
corporate governance mechanism may not currently be significant in China. 
In conclusion, the positive effect of ownership concentration on corporate performance 
suggests that an over-dispersed ownership structure may not be the best way to improve 
the economic efficiency of the public sector. But it would be premature to conclude that 
continuing State control would lead to an improvement. In the next section, we examine 
the effects of different groups of shareholders (i. e. State agencies, State solely-owned 
institutions or domestic institutional owners) on corporate performance. 
5.5.2 The Effects of Different Shareholders upon Corporate Performance 
To investigate the impact of different shareholders upon corporate performance, we 
estimate the following model: 
a +, 61 DTS + fl2Age + fl3LnAsset +, 64Growth +, fls Stability 
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a= The intercept term 
DTS = the shareholding of the selected group (i. e. FSOS, FSOIS, FDIS, FMOS, or 
FTS) 
fl7 = the slope coefficients to be estimated 
A= the error term. 
The regression results are presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. All five pairs of regressions 
are statistically significant (see the F-statistics) and have high values of the adjusted R2. 
Furthermore, the estimated coefficients for the control variables are stable across the 
different types of shareholders. In Table 5.4, the link between State shareholdings and 
corporate performance is explored. It appears as though there is an inverse relationship 
between the percentage shareholding held, either directly or indirectly, by the State and 
performance, though the results are not statistically significant. As Hart (1997) and 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), cited by Shleifer (1998), have suggested, a healthy 
economy should engage in two types of investments: those to reduce costs, and those to 
improve quality or to innovate. When assets are publicly owned, management has little 
incentive to make either of these investments, because the manager is not the owner and 
hence gets only a fraction of the return. In contrast, private investors have much 
stronger incentives because, as owners, they get more of the returns on the investment. 
In Table 5.5, the relationships between non-State shareholdings and corporate 
performance are investigated. First, there is a significant positive effect of a domestic 
institutional shareholding upon performance. Why is there such a link? The first 
explanation is that the domestic institutions mainly consist of profit-oriented 
organisations, such as Chinese Trust and Investment Corporations, securities 
companies, collectively-owned enterprises, township and village enterprises, Sino- 
Foreign enterprises, and private enterprises. They have a greater incentive to pursue 
profits than do State agencies or State solely-owned institutions, who often have 
objectives other than pure economic ones. 
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Table 5.4: The Relationship between State Shareholdings and Corporate Performance 
FSOS (the fraction of shares FSOIS (the fraction of shares 
owned by BSAM) included as an owned by State solely-owned 
explanatory variable) institutions) included as an 
explanatory variable) 
OLS Robust Huber OLS Robust Huber 







FSOIS -0.0030' -0.0015 
(-1.640) (-1.107) 
Control variables 




(-0.500) (-2.074) (-1.000) (-2.259) 
LnAsset -0.4954' -0.4150' -0.4584 
a 
-0.3943' 
(-7.969) (-9.065) (-7.130) (-8.325) 
Growth 0.0077' 0.0084 a 0.0080a 0.0079a 
(2.719) (4.039) (2.827) (3.833) 






(-1.702) (-3.749) (-2.437) (-3.546) 
ROA 0.1152 a 0.0964 a 0.1132 a 0.1007 a 
(9.891) (11.242) (9.712) (11.723) 
DAR -0.0061' -0.0043 
d 
-0.0072 -0.0044' 
(-1.702) (-1.624) (-2.014) (-1.682) 
Constant 9.0897 a 7.0796 a 7.8194 a 6.8708 a 
'(11.815) (14.039) (11.379) (13.573) 
Adj. Rý 0.50 0.50 
F-statistic 62.51 87.99 63.08 90.88 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: 
(1) The dependent variable is corporate performance, as measured by Tobin's Q. 
(2) Two estimation methods are used: OLS and robust regression, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
(3) Ile figures in parentheses are t-values. 
(4) The levels of significance are as follows: 1% significance is denoted by the letter a, 5% 
significance is denoted by b, 10% significance is denoted by c, and 15% significance is 
denoted by d. 
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Table 5.5 The Relationship between non-State Shareholdings and Corporate 
Performance 
MIS (the fraction of FMOS (the fraction of FTS (the fraction of 
shares owned by shares owned by the shares that are 
domestic institutions) top management) tradable) included as 
included as an included as an an explanatory 
explanatory variable) explanatory variable) variable) 
Explan- OLS Robust OLS Robust OLS Robust 
atory Huber Huber Huber 
variables regression regression regression 
Ownership variables 
MIS 0.0079a 0.0063 a 
(3.734) (3.150) 














(-0.634) (-2.251) (-0.666) (-2.109) (-0.210) (-1.356) 
LnAsset -0.4277' -0.3694' -0.4869a -0.4060a -0.5484' -0.4527 
a 
(-6.797) (-8.140) (-7.880) (-8.982) (-8.334) (-9.446) 
Growth 0.0080a 0.0063 a 0.0077' 0.0082 a 0.0082 a 0.0082a 
(2.892) (3.150) (2.742) (3.972) (2.914) (4.003) 
Instability -0.0040 
b 
-0.0036 a -0.0038 
b 
-0.0043 a -0.0057 
d 
-0.0045a 
(-2.209) (-3.142) (-2.379) (-3.675) (-1.604) (13.820) 
ROA 0.112 a 0.0932' 0.1154 a 0.103 ga 0.1 168a 0.1 149a 










(-2.209) (-2.089) (-1.728) (-1.345) (-1.604) (-0.929) 
Constant 7.2245 a 6.4906 a 7.9758 a 6.885 a 8.9293 a 7.4926 a 
(10.308) (12.839) (11.705) (13.813) (11.621) (13.389) 
Adj. 0.51 0.50 0.50 
F-statistic 66.33 88.98 62.41 94.11 64.09 104.43 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: 
(1) The dependent variable is corporate performance, as measured by Tobin's Q. 
(2) Two estimation methods are used: OLS and robust regression, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
(3) The figures in parentheses are t-values. 
(4) The levels of significance are as follows: 1% significance is denoted by the letter a, 5% 
significance is denoted by b, 10% significance is denoted by c, and 15% significance is 
denoted by d. 
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The second explanation is that, in addition to the incentive to pursue profits, the 
domestic institutions possess the ability to monitor management, and will do so as long 
as the gains from the monitoring are larger than the costs. They thus have an advantage 
over small investors, whose only mechanism to protect themselves is to follow the 
'Wall Street rule' - sell shares if they disapprove, but often with capital losses. 
Secondly, there is a positive, but insignificant, effect of a top management shareholding 
upon performance. The lack of statistical significance probably reflects the very low 
level of management shareholding in the Chinese listed companies, yet it is interesting 
that there is nevertheless a weak positive effect. And third, there is a significant negative 
relationship between the proportion of shares traded on the market and corporate 
performance. This suggests that the interests of minority shareholders might not be well 
protected in China, where there is a weak and unsophisticated legal system, and where 
the courts are not well equipped to deal with corporate affairs. 
Even though a larger shareholding by the domestic institutions helps improve firms' 
performance, restrictions on the tradability of shares may prevent the formation of the 
optimal ownership structure. Cole and Mehran (1998) found that firm performance 
improved significantly, and the fraction of the shares owned by the managers and the 
firm's employees increased, after conversion and the expiration of any restrictions on 
ownership structure. Changes in performance were positively associated with changes 
in ownership by managers, but negatively associated with changes in ownership under 
employee stock ownership schemes. 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
The findings of this study suggest that the influence of ownership structure upon 
corporate performance is considerably more complicated than had been previously 
understood. Not only does ownership concentration have an impact upon firms' 
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performance, but the nature of the large shareholders is also an important determinant. 
A State shareholding, either through a State agency or through a State solely-owned 
institution, leads to inefficient capital allocation. In contrast, the presence of domestic 
shareholders can improve firm performance. A management shareholding, as a 
mechanism for providing top management with a proper incentive scheme, needs more 
attention, both in theory and in practice. A negative response of corporate performance 
to the proportion of tradable shares signals the absence or immaturity of markets for 
corporate control. The tradable shares, mainly held by the public, do not have a 
sufficient influence, either through vote or by the 'Wall Street rule', to monitor 
management. This raises a number of issues related to the legal aspects of corporate 
governance, which require urgent attention both in China and in other transition 
3 economies (e. g. Russia) and also some developed countries such as Italy. This research 
also suggests that the stipulation that all shares held by institutional entities at the IPO 
should not be freely traded, retards the formation of an optimal ownership structure 
which maximises firm value. 
It is important to recognise that the results of this study are suggestive rather than 
definitive, and to be aware of the limitations. First, Tobin's Q requires a perfect stock 
market, which can accurately reflect all the information related to the firm and its 
environment, if it is to be a useful measure of corporate performance. This would be a 
strong assumption, even in many well-developed economies, and is certainly an 
optimistic portrayal of China. Second, there is substantial anomalous behaviour by 
individual firms, though the systematic effects of this can be minimised by analysing a 
large sample of firms. 
This study has discovered a positive relationship between ownership concentration and 
performance. Yet Bolton and Von Thadden (1996) show that either a concentrated or a 
3 There is also concern about corporate governance in the United States, following the scandals at many 
Wgh profile corporations. 
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dispersed ownership structure may be optimal, depending upon the characteristics of the 
firm and the environment in which it operates. They argue that when the average 
liquidity demand of investors is higher, the costs of controlling management lower, the 
potential benefits from correcting managerial failures higher, and the transaction costs 
for secondary market trading higher, it is optimal to have a dispersed ownership 
structure. 
The study of corporate governance is still at an early stage, and many more factors 
related to legal, institutional and cultural aspects have yet to be identified. For example, 
several authors have pointed out that legal and institutional factors can determine both 
the degree of ownership concentration and the corporate control mechanisms. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al (1998) analyse the costs and benefits of ownership 
concentration, and argue that the weak legal protection of minority shareholders' 
interests in many continental European countries helps to explain the high concentration 
of ownership. If the interests of small investors can be easily ignored, then the choice 
for investors is to sell or become large (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). In contrast, when 
there are strong mechanisms for the protection of small investors such as in the United 
Kingdom and in the United States, a more dispersed ownership structure may be 
observed. This is a legal aspect of corporate governance, and beyond the scope of this 
study. 
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Chapter 6 
The Determinants of Capital Structure' 
6.1 Introduction 
The idea that the general characteristics of a firm's capital structure can affect its 
performance has been receiving increasing attention from the financial profession. 
Modigliani and Miller's (MM) classic 1958 paper demonstrated that the value of a firm 
with given cash flows was not affected by its debt/equity ratio, in a perfect market 
where there are no friction costs, bankruptcy costs and taxes. However, extensions to 
their analysis, incorporating variables such as taxes, bankruptcy costs and agency costs, 
indicate that the mix of financial claims affects the value of the firm because changes in 
the mix change the firm's total cash flows. With the increasing interest in corporate 
governance issues, the link between corporate governance and capital structure has been 
attracting considerable theoretical attention2. 
This chapter investigates the determinants of capital structure in Chinese firms, and will 
contribute to our understanding of the corporate governance mechanism in China. 
Although there have been many studies of capital structure for developed and 
developing countries alike, this is the first such study for China. Furthermore, this study 
combines insights from various strands of finance theory, notably agency theory, 
signalling theory and the theory of corporate control, to establish a more comprehensive 
model of the determinants of capital structure. 
This study will also contribute to the increasing number of empirical studies from 
around the world, and fills a gap in the case of Chinese listed companies. The prevailing 
1 This chapter is an updated version of the paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Academy of 
International Business (UK) at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow in April 2000. 
2 See the detailed survey by Harris and Raviv (199 1) 
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view, as expressed by authors such as Mayer (1990) and Rajan and Zingales (1995), and 
as commented upon by Booth el al (2001), seems to be that financial decisions in 
developing countries are made somewhat differently from predicted by the standard 
theories derived from developed economies. Booth et al (2001) carried out a detailed 
study of ten developing countries, and showed that the determinants of capital structure 
are largely consistent with those in developed countries. This study will test the stylised 
facts we have learned from both developed and developing economies, and add new 
evidence on the determinants of capital structure in transitional economies such as 
China in which factors such as the taxation, accounting, banking and governance 
systems are rather different from the countries already studied. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section 6.2, we outline the theory of capital 
structure, beginning with the classic MM paper and then discussing various subsequent 
refinements and extensions. An econometric model to explain the debt ratio is 
developed in the following section, and we suggest the expected impacts of the various 
explanatory variables. The dataset is then identified, and the regression methods are 
described in section 6.4. Section 6.5 presents and discusses the empirical results from 
the regression analysis. Section 6.6 summarises the main findings. 
6.2 The Theory of Capital Structure 
The modem theory of capital structure originated with the paper by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) who demonstrated that, if investors can borrow and save on the same 
terms as firms, and if firms' financing decisions do not affect their total cash flow, then 
the firms' choice between debt and equity has no effect on their total market value. In 
other words, capital structure cannot create value unless it affects the total returns. This 
conclusion was based upon the rather restrictive assumptions that the capital market was 
perfect, and that there was no taxation. Furthermore, it is clear that in reality firms have 
very different capital structures. The MM model should thus be seen as a starting point 
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for modelling more realistic scenarios which explain why debt might be used in 
preference to equity. 
One early extension was to allow for the incidence of taxation and financial distress. 
Since the late 1970s, there have been new strands of research which originate more 
from the theory of the firm. First, agency theory has been used to demonstrate how debt 
might be used by entrepreneurs with limited resources who were faced with new 
investment opportunities and who did not want to dilute their position (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Second, it has been argued that the financial structure is an important 
source of corporate control and of imposing discipline on managers. Debt serves as a 
bonding or commitment device in that it places limits on the potential inefficiency of 
management, at least so long as management wants to repay the debt (Grossman and 
Hart, 1982). Third, debt can be used as a signal of differential prospects (Ross, 1977). 
Finally, a further strand of research has focused on the maturity structure of debt. 
6.2.1 The Trade-off Theory of Tax-Shield Benefits and Financial Distress Cost of 
Debt 
One of the crucial assumptions of the MM (1958) model was that there is no taxation. 
Later work by Modigliani and Miller (1963), and Miller (1977) add tax effects into the 
original framework. An implication of this newer work was that firms should finance 
their projects completely through debt in order to maximise corporate value. Clearly this 
contradicts reality in that debt constitutes only a fraction of firms' total capital. 
Subsequent theoretical work seeks an optimal capital structure which results from a 
tradeoff between the benefits of tax shield of debt and the costs of financial distress of 
debt. According to this line of theory, the benefits of debt arise from its tax exemption, 
which implies that a higher debt ratio will increase the firm's value. But the benefits can 
be offset by costs of financial distress, which may destroy the value of the firm. Thus 
the optimal capital structure is determined by the tradeoff between the tax-free benefits 
of debt and the distress costs of debt - see Figure 6.1. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), 
Ross (1985) and Leland (1994) have shown that, in the presence of taxation, it is 
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advantageous for a firm with safe, tangible assets and plenty of taxable income to take a 
high debt-equity ratio to avoid high tax payments. For a firm with poorer performance 
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Figure 6.1: The Optimal Capital Structure when Debt is 
associated with Tax-shield Benefit and Financial Distress Costs 
One problem with the theories based on consideration of the tax-shield benefits is that 
they cannot explain why capital structures vary across firms that are subject to the same 
taxation rates. Empirical evidence from the United States (Copeland and Weston, 1992) 
shows that the capital structure of corporations did not change much after corporate 
income tax came into existence. In Australia, where there is no dual income taxation at 
all, capital structure is roughly the same as in other economies (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995). 
6.2.2 Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory was the most important theory of capital structure during the 1970s 
and 1980s. Ross (1977) was the first to address the function of debt as a signalling 
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mechanism when there is information asymmetry between the firm's management and 
its investors. He argued that management has better knowledge of the firm than the 
investors, and that management will try to avoid debt when the firm is performing 
poorly for fear that any debt default due to poor cash flow will result in their job loss. 
The information asymmetry may also explain why existing investors may not favour 
new equity financing, as new investors may require higher returns to compensate for the 
risks of their investment thus diluting the returns to existing investors. Myers (1984) and 
Myers and MaJluf (1984) developed their so-called 'pecking order' theory of financing: 
i. e. that capital structure will be driven by firms' desire to finance new investments 
preferably through the use of internal funds, then with low-risk debt, and with new 
equity only as a last resort. However, Helwege and Liang (1996) found no empirical 
evidence for such a pecking order. 
6.2.3 Agency Theory 
Even if markets are perfect and there is no tax impact, agency theory suggests that the 
appropriate mix of debt and equity is still an important matter for corporate governance. 
In general, debt claims provide the holders with a fixed repayment schedule but little in 
the way of rights to control the company, as long as the repayment schedule (and 
sometimes certain other terms) is met. However, creditors can have a strong influence 
over a company if it gets in financial distress but, even if a company is financially 
sound, creditors can influence whether it can obtain additional funding for proposed 
new projects. For example, a bank that has loaned a company the money for factory 
expansion can make it easy or hard for the company to borrow more money for a new 
office building. 
Conversely, equity claims - in particular, common stock - give shareholders the right to 
vote for Boards of Directors and on other important corporate issues such as major 
mergers or plans that would dispose of substantial portions of the company's assets. 
Shareholders are also entitled to receive dividends or other distributions whenever the 
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company pays them or, if the company is liquidated, to receive the net assets of the 
company after paying all debts and any securities, such as preferred stock, that rank 
ahead of common shares. These two features, the right to vote and the right to receive 
dividends and other distributions, are the defining characteristics of common shares. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify two potential sources of conflict. On the one hand, 
conflicts between debt-holders and equity-holders arise because the debt contract gives 
equity-holders an incentive to invest sub-optimally. More specifically the debt contract 
provides that, if an investment yields large returns well above the face value of the debt, 
equity-holders will capture most of the gain. If, however, the investment fails, debt- 
holders bear the consequences because of limited liability. As a result, equity-holders 
may benefit from 'going for broke; i. e. investing in very risky projects, even if they are 
value-decreasing. Such investments result in a decrease in the value of the debt. The 
loss in value of the equity from the poor investment can be more than offset by the gain 
in equity value captured at the expense of debt-holders. Equity-holders correctly 
anticipate equity-liolders' future behaviour. In this case, the debt-holders receive less for 
the debt than they otherwise would. Thus, the cost of the incentive to invest in value- 
decreasing projects created by debt is borne by the equity-holders who issue the debt. 
This effect, generally called the asset substitution effect, is the agency cost of debt 
financing. 
On the other hand, conflicts between shareholders and managers arise because managers 
hold less than 100% of the residual claim. Consequently, they do not bear the entire cost 
of these activities. Managers may thus invest less effort in managing the firm's 
resources, and may be able to transfer firm resources to their own personal benefit, for 
example through 'empire-building' or by consuming 'perquisites' such as corporate jets, 
luxurious offices etc. The manager bears the entire cost of refraining from these 
activities, but captures only a fraction of the gain. As a result, managers overindulge in 
these pursuits relative to the level that would maximise firm value. This inefficiency is 
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reduced the larger is the fraction of the firm's equity owned by the manager. Holding 
constant the manager's absolute investment in the firm, an increase in the debt ratio of 
the firm increases the manager's share of the equity and mitigates the loss from the 
conflict between the manager and shareholders. Moreover, as pointed out by Jensen 
(1986), since debt commits the firm to pay out cash, it reduces the amount of 'free' cash 
available to managers to engage in the types of pursuits mentioned above. This 
mitigation of the conflicts between managers and equity-holders constitutes a benefit of 
debt financing. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 117) argue that an optimal capital structure can be 
obtained by trading off the agency cost of debt against the benefit of debt as shown in 
Figure 6.2. 
Agency costs AT(E) 
AT(E*) 
Figure 6.2: The Optimal Capital Structure according to Agency Theory 
The figure shows total agency costs, AT(E), as a function of the ratio of outside equity 
to total outside financing E= So/(B+So), for a given firm size, V*, and given total 
0 E* = S,, / (B+S. ) 1.0 E 
Fraction of outside equity 
Chapter 6: Detenninants of Capital Structure 175 
amounts of outside financing (B + So), where So stands for outside equity finance and 
B for debt finance. A,. (E) are the agency costs associated with outside equity, whilst 
AB(E) are the agency costs associated with debt. AT(E*) are the minimum total agency 
costs at optimal fraction of outside financing E*. 
A number of implications follow from this analysis. First, one would expect bond 
contracts to include features that attempt to prevent asset substitution, such as interest 
coverage requirements, prohibitions against investments in new unrelated lines of 
business, etc. Second, industries in which the opportunities for asset substitution are 
more limited will have higher debt levels ceterisparibus. Thus, for example, the theory 
predicts that regulated public utilities, banks, and firms in mature industries with few 
growth opportunities will be more highly leveraged. Third, it is optimal for firms with 
slow or even negative growth, and that have large cash inflows from operations, to have 
more debt. Large cash flows without good investment prospects create the resources to 
consume perquisites, build empires, overpay subordinates etc. Increasing debt reduces 
the amount of 'free cash' and increases the manager's fractional ownership of the 
residual claim. According to Jensen (1986) industries with these characteristics today 
include steel, chemicals, brewing, tobacco, television and radio broadcasting, and wood 
and paper products. The theory predicts that these industries should be characterised by 
high leverage ratios. In the Chinese case, one problem with the testing of this hypothesis 
is the ambiguous classification of industries. Currently there are six broad industry 
classifications (i. e. manufacturing, retailing, utility, property development, financial 
services, and conglomerates), and each covers a broad range of business activities. For 
example, manufacturing industry includes general machinery, chemical engineering, 
electronics, food processing, and iron and steel. There is no clear classification similar 
to the International Standard Industry Classification (SITC), or the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) in North America. Testing of the hypothesis must thus await the 
Chinese authorities compiling data according to a comprehensive and internationally 
comparable standard. 
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One limitation of agency theory is that it assumes the agency problem can be mitigated, 
or eliminated, by a comprehensive contract which postulates all the future contingencies 
and states the circumstances in which the manager should take what action, as criticised 
by Hart (1995a, 1995b). But, as discussed in Chapter 2, such a comprehensive contract 
would be very costly to design and/or execute (Williamson, 1988). It may well be 
optimal to leave the contract incomplete, and to assign the equity-holders the residual 
control rights beyond contractual control rights which are assigned to the debt-holders 
(Aghion and Bolton, 1992). This incomplete contract approach regards equity and debt 
as 'contingent state' securities. When the firm is financially healthy, it is the equity- 
holders who have control. But a default of debt repayment will trigger the transfer of 
control to the debt-holders. Liquidation of the firm and/or managerial sackings are then 
inevitable. Thus management is constrained by the requirement to ensure a smooth 
repayment of debt. 
Table 6.1: The Key Differences in Governance Structure between Debt and Equity 
Financial instrument 
Debt Equity 
Contractual constraints Numerous Nil 
Securities Pre-emptive Residual claimant 
Intrusion Nil Extensive 
Source: Williamson (1988) 
Two related models share a common concern with conflicts between shareholders and 
managers, though they differ in the specific ways in which the conflicts arise and in the 
role of debt. Harris and Raviv (1990) postulate that managers always want to continue 
the firm's current operations, even if liquidation of the firm would be the preferred 
option for investors. But debt can force managers to liquidate firms, because default 
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may well trigger the managers' job loss. The optimal capital structure is achieved by 
trading off improved liquidation decisions against higher investigation costs. A different 
model by Stultz (1990) is based on the assumption that managers always want to invest 
available funds so as to expand the size of the firm, even though investors might prefer 
higher dividend payouts. The optimal capital structure in Stulz's model is achieved by 
trading off the benefits of debt in preventing investment in bad projects with the costs of 
debt in preventing investment in good projects. Therefore, unlike in the Modigliani- 
Miller world, changing the capital structure of the firm changes the allocation of power 
between the insiders and the outside investors, and thus almost surely changes the firm's 
investment policy (La Porta et al, 2000). 
6.2.5 The Maturity Structure of Debt 
Not only does the debt ratio exert a discipline on management, but so too does the 
maturity structure of debt (Diamond, 1991; Berglof and Von Thandden, 1994; Hart, 
1995b; Barclay and Smith, 1995). In general, a firm will have more than one (class of) 
investor, and those investors will separate their claims across time and across states of 
nature, with one investor holding secured short-term claims and another junior long- 
term claims. If the firm is doing well in the short run, the short-term creditor is repaid, 
and long-term claim-holders receive all future returns. If the firm is unable to repay in 
the short-term, the short-term creditor forces the firm to transfer or sell part of its assets. 
The maturity of the remaining claims is extended at the expense of some (not 
necessarily all) junior long-term claim-holders. 
The principal reason for this separation is that the ex post bargaining position of an 
investor with short-term claims is weaker if s/he also has long-term claims because S/he 
internalises the impact of his/her actions on future revenues. On the other hand 
separating outside claims over time creates an externality on the side of the short-term 
investor, which strengthens his/her bargaining power if the firm should attempt to 
default. The separation of claims across high and low cash-flow states - i. e. making 
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long-term claims junior to unpaid short-term debt - further discourages strategic default 
by giving the short-term investor an extra incentive to be tough with the firm. 
Lehn and Toft (1996) argue that short-term debt is more likely to provide incentive 
compatibility between debt-holders and equity-holders, even though short-term debt 
does not exploit tax benefits as completely as long-term debt. Thus short-term debt must 
be balanced against bankruptcy and agency costs in determining the optimal maturity of 
the capital structure. They predict different term structures of credit spreads for different 
levels of risk 3. 
6.3 The Model 
The dependent variable in the model is the debt ratio. The most appropriate measure of 
capital structure depends upon the object of the analysis. For instance, the agency 
problems associated with debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977) largely relate 
to how the firm has been financed in the past, and thus on the relative claims on firm 
value held by equity and debt. Here, the relevant measure is probably the amount of 
debt relative to firm value. Other studies (see, for example, Aghion and Bolton, 1992) 
have focused on leverage as a means of transferring control when the firm is 
economically distressed, from shareholders (or their fiduciaries) to bondholders (or their 
fiduciaries). Here, the important question is whether the firm can meet its fixed 
payments, and consequently, a flow measure like the interest coverage ratio is more 
relevant. 
The effects of past financing decisions are probably best captured by the ratio of total 
debt to capital (defined as total debt plus equity): 
Leveragel. = 
Total liabilitie s (6.1) 
Total book value of (debt + equity) 
3 Sarig and Warga, (1989) find similar term structures empirically. 
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This measure, however, fails to take account of the fact there are some assets that are 
offset by specific non-debt liabilities. For example, an increase in the gross amount of 
trade credit is reflected in a reduction of this measure of leverage. Given that the levels 
of accounts payable and accounts receivable may jointly be influenced by industry 
considerations, it seems more appropriate to use a measure of leverage unaffected by the 
gross level of trade credit. A variant of the above definition is provided by the ratio of 
total debt to net assets, where net assets are total assets less accounts payable and other 
liabilities. Although this measure is not influenced by the amount of trade credit, it is 
affected by factors that may have nothing to do with financing. For example, assets held 
against pension liabilities may decrease this measure of leverage. 
An alternative measure of financial leverage is thus the ratio of total liabilities to the 
sum of long-term debt and the market value of common stock, as used by Bradley, 
Jarrell, and Kim (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), Opler and Titman (1994), and 
Gilson (1997). 
Leverage2 = 
Total liabilitie s+ leasing 
Total liabilitie s+ market value of (common stocks + preferred stocks) 
(6.2) 
Listed companies in China typically do not issue preferred stocks. Moreover, leasing is 
rarely reported in Annual Reports. So we focus on the roles of short and long-term debt, 
and of common stock. We record long-term debt according to a one-year standard, but 
also include the debt with maturity over one year but which will be returned within one 
year 4. To fully capture the determinants of capital structure and look at whether firms 
are more sensitive to book values or market values when they make financial decisions, 
Long-term debts are recorded as reported if they are positive, and as zero otherwise. 
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we use both measures of leverage in this chapter, following the practice of RaJan and 
Zingales (1995), Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) and Booth el al (200 1). 
As regards the explanatory variables, we include the following. The agency costs 
associated with asset substitution will be lower when the firm has a reputation for the 
selection of safe projects. The longer the firm's history of repaying debt, the easier it 
will be to raise debt finance at lower borrowing cost. Diamond (1989) has shown that 
younger firms typically have less debt than older ones, other things being equal. Thus 
we hypothesise that the age of listed companies (AGE), as measured by the years of 
listing on the Stock Market, will be an important indicator of corporate credibility, and 
expect there to be a positive relationship between AGE and the debt ratio. 
Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) both predict that high leverage can add value by 
reducing the resources available to managers to finance investments in negative net 
present value projects. High leverage can also add value by making default more likely, 
thus increasing the penalty on managers for poor performance (Grossman and Hart, 
1982; Gilson, 1989). We therefore hypothesise that the market-to-book value ratio 
(MIBR) should have a negative impact upon the debt ratio. 
Several studies have shown that leverage is positively correlated with the extent of 
managerial equity ownership (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Kim and Sorensen, 1986; 
Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; Harris and Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 1988; Amihud el al, 
1990; Berger el al 1997) though they give different explanations. For example, Berger 
et al (1997, p. 1420) find a positive relation between leverage and management 
shareholdings and explain it on the grounds that managers whose financial incentives 
are more closely tied to stockholder wealth will pursue more leveraged capital structures 
to raise the value of the company. We therefore include the fraction of shares owned by 
management (XIF) as an explanatory variable, and expect it to have a positive effect 
upon the leverage ratio. 
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The impact of state ownership on firms' capital structure is rarely studied, either in 
developed or in developing economies. Yet, as noted in chapter 3, the amount of debt in 
the capital structure of SOEs first rose, but later fell, after the onset of reform, 
particularly after firms were listed. Perhaps the largest shareholder is able to influence 
the leverage level in line with their interests, irrespective of the wider interests of other 
shareholders and interested parties. We therefore include the fraction of equity held by 
the largest shareholder (TI) as an explanatory variable, to capture the effects of this 
aspect of corporate governance. However, the expected impact upon the debt ratio is 
unclear. On the one hand, the State may well provide loans on favourable terms to listed 
companies which are majority-owned by the State. Berger el al (1997, p. 1421) suggest 
that managers are forced to take on more debt when an influential monitor is present, 
and when Board shareholders and debt-holders act as monitoring complements rather 
than as substitutes. On the other hand, the incumbent management may choose a low 
level of leverage to avoid the risk of bankruptcy (Berger el al, 1997). Both Amihud et al 
(1990) and Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) found a negative relationship between the 
presence of large shareholders and firm leverage. 
The combination of the two variables measuring the fraction of shares held by the 
largest shareholder (TI) and the fraction held by management (MR) provides an insight 
into the impact of control over the firm's capital structure. Although the Directors of 
Chinese firms personally hold very small fractions of the shares, they often represent the 
ownership of State or other institutional shareholders. 
The rate of corporate income tax has long been identified as a potential determinant of 
capital structure. Firms will prefer to have more debt than equity finance because of the 
tax-shield on interest when the corporate income tax rate is higher, holding the personal 
income tax rate and the rate on dividend income constant. In China, different corporate 
income tax rates apply to different types of firms, even though they are all listed 
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companies5. Listed companies are normally faced with a 15% tax rate if local tax 
bureaux permit, but a small number of corporations face a higher rate of 33%. 
Companies with foreign investment enjoy a tax holiday during their first two years of 
establishment, and then only pay 7.5% for the following three years. And companies in 
high-technology industries also need to pay tax at a rate of only 7.5%. Booth el al 
(2001) find a negative relationship between the level of leverage and corporate income 
tax. Following Miller (1977), we expect a positive relationship between the corporate 
income tax rate (TR) and the debt ratio, in that the higher tax rate will reduce the cost of 
capital, other things being equal. 
The costs associated with the agency relationship are likely to be higher for firms in 
growing industries, as they have more flexibility in their choice of future investments. 
More specifically, improvements in a firm's growth opportunities lead to an increase in 
the agency costs of debt and to a reduction in the agency costs of managerial discretion 
(Booth et al, 2001). This argument is supported by the empirical findings by Smith and 
Watts (1992), and Titman and Wessels (1988). We therefore expect the growth of sales 
(GROWTH) to be negatively related to the debt ratio. 
Various studies have shown that a firm's optimal debt level is a decreasing function of 
the volatility of its earnings (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Titman and Wessels, 1988, 
Booth et al, 2001). We use the standard deviation of the return on equity over the three 
previous years (1995-97) as a proxy for the volatility of operating conditions 
(BUSRISK), and expect this to have a negative impact upon the debt ratio. It has also 
been suggested that the maturity structure of debt has an important role to play in 
curbing agency costs. Myers (1977), for example, notes that the agency problem is 
mitigated if the firm issues short-term rather than long-term debt. We therefore include 
the ratio of long-term to short-term debt (LSR) as an explanatory variable, and expect it 
to have a positive impact upon the level of leverage. 
' In some cases, listed companies can face tax rates that are different from their subsidiaries. Consolidated 
tax figures are recorded when companies exert a controlling interest in other firms. 
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Theory suggests that large firms are more likely to be debt-financed than their smaller 
counterparts, for a number of reasons. Large companies are more diversified and thus 
have more stable cash flows, which helps reduce the risk of the debt. Additionally, large 
firms may be able to exploit economies of scale in issuing securities. Smaller firms are 
likely to face higher costs for obtaining external funds, because of information 
asymmetries. Large firms may also be more mature and hence have a larger fraction of 
firm value accounted for by assets in place, as opposed to growth opportunities. 
Diamond (1991) shows that large firms are likely to have established reputations and 
more firm-specific information publicly available than do small firms, facilitating the 
issuance of public debt. We thus include firm size as a control variable in our analysis. 
Firm size can be measured in many different ways. Gilson (1997) uses the natural 
logarithm of total assets as a proxy of firm size. Anderson and Makhija (1999) measure 
firm size as the book value of assets, minus the book value of equity plus the market 
value of outstanding equity. Their research also shows that alternative measures of size, 
based on annual sales or total asset values, do not materially affect the inferences. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) use the natural logarithm of sales as their proxy of firm size, 
and they also report a high correlation (0.98) between the natural logarithm of sales and 
the natural logarithm of assets. Here we use the natural logarithm of sales (LNSALES) 
as our proxy of firm size, following Booth el al (2001). 
Finally, Chang (1987) argues that there is a negative relationship between the debt ratio 
and profitability, as more profitable firms can finance higher growth rates internally. 
Chang's theory is empirically supported by Kester (1986), Friend and Hasbrouck 
(1988), Titman and Wessel (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wald (1999), and Booth 
et al (2001). These findings are robust for both developed economies as well as 
developing economies. We therefore expect a negative relationship between 
profitability, as measured by the before-tax return on assets (ROA) and the debt ratio. 
Table 6.2 summarises the explanatory variables included in the model and their 
expected impacts upon the debt ratio. It should be noted that the model does not include 
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all the variables that have been hypothesised in previous studies to have an impact upon 
capital structure. The theory of capital structure, whilst very complex, is still in its 
infancy (Harris and Raviv 1991). There is a lack of agreement among different 
researchers in different economies about which variables are important, what measures 
are appropriate, and about the correct interpretation of the statistical results. 
Table 6.2: The Explanatory Variables and their Expected Impacts on the Debt Ratio 
Variable Description Predicted sign 
Age Years of the company being listed + 
MBR Ratio of market value of equity plus 
total liability to book assets 
Nff(%) Fraction of outstanding shares held 
by the management 
TI (1/o) The fraction of shares held by the 
largest shareholder 
TR (%) Corporate income tax 
GROWTH Average growth of sales over past 
three years, 95,96,97 
BUSRISK Standard deviation of growth of ROE 
over past three years 
LSR Long-term to short term debt ratio 
LnSALES Natural Logarithm of sales 
ROA (%) Before tax return on assets 
6.4 The Data 
The sample consisted of 433 manufacturing firms publicly traded on either the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SHSE) or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 1997. Table 6.3 
provides descriptive statistics for both the dependent variable(s) and the explanatory 
variables. The sample exhibits considerable variation in both firm size and capital 
structure. Firm size is measured by sales denominated in millions of Renminbi, and 
range from a minimum of 118.5 million yuan to 20.43 billion yuan. The average debt 
ratios for the sample (43.23% book leverage; 19.38% market leverage) are small by 
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international standards. Rajan and Zingales (1995) report corresponding figures for the 
United States (52%, 44%), Japan (69%, 49%), Germany (73%, 55%), and the United 
Kingdom (54%, 40%). The debt levels are also modest (Booth et al 2001) when 
compared with Brazil (30.3%, book measure only) and South Korea (73.4%, 64.3%). 
Table 6.3: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in the Model 
Standard 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
Leveragel. 43.2343 17.2357 4.4308 88.9729 
Leverage2 (0/o) 19.3762 12.9288 0.6121 63.6040 
Age 1.8961 1.9331 0.0000 7.0000 
MBR 2.9013 1.4878 1.0026 11.8382 
W (0/0) 0.0630 0.1293 0.0000 2.0804 
TI Clo) 48.0011 17.5908 4.1898 88.5819 
TR (0/o) 12.5087 6.8574 -2.7700 33.5200 
GROWTH 28.7092 101.7901 -40.9300 1352.1900 
BUSRISK 9.7337 16.0445 0.0500 257.2600 
LSR 0.2378 0.3955 0.0000 3.9000 
LnSALES 10.4823 1.2046 0.0000 14.2649 
ROA (%) 0.0705 0.0686 -0.2616 0.3725 
A number of observations may be made with regard to the explanatory variables. First, 
the fraction of shares held by the management (MF) is small, being only 0.063% on 
average. This confirms that the personal stake of top management is still insignificant in 
the Chinese economy, and is much lower than the average managerial shareholding of 
2.7% reported by Berger et al (1997) in their US study. In contrast, the average 
shareholding of the largest shareholder (TI) is 48%, as has already been the subject of 
discussion in Chapter 5. The average corporate income tax rate is 12.5%, with a 
minimum rate of -2.8% (i. e. a tax refund) and a maximum rate of 33.5%. The average 
Chapter 6: Detcrininwits of Capital Structure 186 
growth rate of the companies in the sample was 28.7%, with a minimum rate of -41% 
and a maximum rate of plus 1352%! These growth rates reflect the fast expansion of the 
Chinese economy over the past two decades. Naturally, the high growth rates are 
accompanied by high business risk, as measured here the standard deviation of the 
return on equity over three years (BUSRISK): the average figure was 46%. 
6.5 The Empirical Results 
The model has been estimated using three different regression methods. First we use 
simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). One potential problem with the use of OLS in 
cross-section models is the presence of heteroskedasticity, with the result that the 
coefficient estimates are inefficient and the estimates of the standard errors are biased. 
Thus we also apply the formula below to obtain robust estimates of the coefficients: 
ýýN, ý v= V( E ujuj)V 
j=l (6.3) 
Where V= (_a2 In L/ ag2)-l is the conventional OLS estimator of variance and u, (a 
row vector) is the contribution from thejth observation to the scores alnVag 
The third estimation method tries to eliminate further the influence of outliers. Robust 
estimates are generated, Cook's D is calculated, and those observations for which D>I 
are discarded. Then, following Huber (1964), those observations with small residuals 
from the robust regression are given weights of unity, whereas those with larger 
residuals are given gradually smaller weights. Those observations with non-zero 
residuals are then downweighted according to a smoothly decreasing biweight function. 
The following econometric models were then estimated using the two alternative 
measures (Leveragel and Leverage 2) for the debt ratio: 
Debt Ratio = cc + Pi Age + 02 MBR + 03 NU + 04 TI + 05 TR + 06 GROWTH 
07 BUSRISK + 08 LSR + 09 LnSALES + Plo ROA + Ili 
(6.4) 
Chapter 6: Detenninants of Capital Structure 
where 
Debt ratio = Leverage I or Leverage 2 
a= intercept 
, 61 ..., 6, o = the regression parameters to be estimated 
'"i = the 
(heteroskedastic) error term 
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The regression results are tabulated in Table 6.4 (with Leveragel as the dependent 
variable) and in Table 6.5 (with Leverage2 as the dependent variable) respectively. Two 
general observations may be made. The first is that the signs and magnitudes of the 
regression coefficients are very stable, whichever regression method is adopted, though 
the standard errors and hence the t-statistics vary. The second is that the equations with 
Leverage2 as the dependent variable give rise to much higher coefficients of 
determination (approx 60%, compared to approx 33%). 
We find that firm size (LnSALES), the market to book ratio (MBR), and profitability 
(ROA) all have highly significant effects upon the debt ratio as predicted, particularly 
with the market measure of leverage. The positive coefficient for firm size is as 
expected, though it is not clear whether this is due to economies of scale, 
diversification, or the ease of borrowing. All three regression methods show the 
expected impact of the years of listing (AGE) upon the debt ratio, and the coefficients in 
the model with the market-valued debt ratio (i. e. Leverage2) are highly significant. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients for the two measurements of leverage are roughly 
identical at around 0.55 to 0.70, suggesting that each additional year of history on the 
stock exchange is associated with, on average, 0.6% - 0.7% more debt. These findings 
suggest that corporate credibility may well reduce the cost of borrowing from the banks, 
and enable firms to establish better lines of credit. An alternative and more fundamental 
explanation might be that the longer history on the stock market implies greater 
monitoring from the banks, and thus a reduction of the agency costs of providing debt 
finance. 
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ook value of debt / book value of total assets) 
Explanatory OLS Robust Robust Huber regression with 
variables Regression biweights 
Age 0.5634 0.5634 0.6465 d 
(1.38) (1.40) (1.53) 
MBR -1.1403' -1.1403 
d 
-0.6041 
(-1.72) (-1.54) (-0.88) 
4.3426 4.3426 5.6914 
(0.81) (0.99) (1.02) 
TI -0.0815' -0.0815 
b 
-0.0816' 
(-1.90) (-1.97) (-1.85) 
TR 0.0640 0.0640 0.0725 
(0.57) (0.54) (0.62) 
GROWTH 0.0091 0.0091 0.0090 
(1.33) (1.31) (1.27) 
BUSRISK 0.1171' 0.1171 b 0.1207 a 
(2.63) (2.43) (2.63) 
LSR 2.7773 d 2.7773' 2.7205 d 
(1.58) (1.87) (1.50) 
LnSALES 3.5956 a 3.5956 a 4.0022 a 
(5.73) (5.81) (6.19) 
ROA -111.9053 a -111.9053 a -126.6043 a 
(-7.07) (-5.12) (-7.75) 
Intercept 16.4460b 16.4460b 11.7300c 
(2.32) (2.21) (1.60) 
Sample size 433 433 433 
R2 0.35 
AdjustedR 2 0.34 0.35 
F-statistic 22.89 27.20 23.70 
_P-value 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: 
(1) The dependent variable is the debt ratio, as measured by Leverage I. 
(2) Three estimation methods are used, as discussed in the text and in Chapter 1. 
(3) The figures in parentheses are t-values. 
(4) The levels of significance are as follows: 1% significance is denoted by the letter a, 5% 
significance is denoted by b, 10% significance is denoted by c, and 15% significance is 
denoted by d. 
Chapter 6: Detenninants of Capital Structure 189 
Table 6.5: The Regression Results using Leverage2 as the Dependent Variable 
Dependent 
variable (book value of debt 
Leverage 2 
(book value of debt + market value of equity) 
Explanatory OLS Robust Robust Huber regression 
variables Regression with biweights 
Age 0.7008 a 0.7008a 0.5577 a 
(2.88) (2.74) (2.60) 
MBR -3.1337 a -3.1337 a -2.3709a 
(-7.93) (4.82) (-6.89) 
MF 2.3105 2.3105 5.0716' 
(0.72) (1.25) (1.79) 
TI -0.0266 -0.0266 -0.0233 
(-1.05) (-1.26) (-1.04) 
TR -0.0626 -0.0626 -0.0420 
(-0.93) (-0.75) (-0.71) 
GROWTH 0.0038 0.0038 0.0038 
(0.94) (1.42) (1.06) 
BUSRISK 0.0319 0.0319 0.0209 
(1.20) (1.35) (0.89) 
LSR 1.6615 d 1.66150 1.3150 
(1.59) (1.69) (1.43) 
LnSALES 2.6546 a 2.6546 a 2.8354 a 
(7.11) (6.04) (8.61) 
ROA -70.701 a -70.701 a -105.1338 a 
(-7.50) (4.44) (42.65) 
Intercept 5.3949 5.3949 3.1980 
(1.28) (1.03) (0.86) 
Sample size 433 433 433 
R2 0.59 
AdjustedR 2 0.58 0.59 
F-statistic 61.12 29.01 92.84 
_P-value 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: 
(1) The dependent variable is the debt ratio, as measured by Leverage2. 
(2) Tbree estimation methods are used, as discussed in the text and in Chapter 1. 
(3) The figures in parentheses are t-values. 
(4) The levels of significance are as follows: 1% significance is denoted by the letter a, 5% 
significance is denoted by b, 10% significance is denoted by c, and 15% significance is 
denoted by d. 
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The coefficients of the market-to-book value ratio (MIBR) are all negative, consistent 
with our prediction that firms with higher MBR ratios have higher costs of financial 
distress. This finding may also indicate that the banks' managers make lending 
decisions comparatively more by reference to the book value of the assets of the 
borrowing firm. This would agree with the conclusion of Booth et al (2001), in their 
study of ten developing countries, that the marginal borrowing power on market value 
was less than that on book value. 
The coefficients of the profitability variable (ROA) are negative in all the regressions, 
as expected. The significance of the coefficients is striking, and indicates that firms with 
more profitable projects are more inclined to use internally generated funds rather than 
debt. This may be interpreted, with reference to agency theory following Jensen (1986), 
as management preferring to use internal funds (less monitoring by banks) than debt 
(more monitoring from banks). But the confirmation of such an interpretation requires 
further work when additional data, such as on interest rates, are available. 
As regards the corporate governance variables in the model, the estimated coefficients 
for the fractions of shares owned by management (MF) and the largest shareholder (TI) 
are consistent with our predictions, though the MF variable is insignificant in all 
regressions but one. The variable TI has a significant negative effect upon the book 
value measure of leverage, but an insignificant effect upon the market value measure. 
One possible explanation is that the agency costs may be reduced when there is a large 
shareholder, due to the greater willingness of large shareholders to monitor the 
performance of the managers. An alternative explanation, related to the finding in 
chapter 5 that corporate performance is negatively related to the size of the State 
shareholding, is that the largest shareholders prefer lower levels of debt so as to avoid 
financial distress, regardless of the value of the companies. 
It is also important to consider the direction of causality between the capital structure 
and the ownership structure. Friend and Hasbrouck (1988) suggest the possibility of 
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reverse causality: a high level of debt may increase the risk attached to the firm stock, 
and drive out outside shareholders. However, it should be noted that the ownership 
structure of many Chinese firms is rather inflexible in comparison to other economies, 
in that large shareholders don't have the freedom to alter their shareholdings according 
to the financial position of the firm. Their scope for financial decision-making is limited 
to the choice of debt level, and not to adjusting the ownership structure. 
The corporate tax rate (TR) and the expected growth rate (GROWTH) both have 
coefficients that are significant at the 10% level. However, the negative coefficients for 
the tax rate were unexpected, though significant in only one regression. Perhaps this is 
because those firms in China, which pay the higher rates of tax, are usually those in 
which the State has a greater stake. And the State-controlled banks are either more 
willing, or obliged, to lend to such firms, hence a positive link is observed between the 
tax rate and the level of debt. Also unexpected is the positive coefficient of growth, 
which appears to be against the argument that equity-controlled firms have a tendency 
to invest sub-optimally. The volatility in operating conditions (BUSRISK) is significant 
at the 5% level in the regression on the book measure of leverage, and insignificant in 
the regression on the market measure of debt. The 'surprising' positive sign agrees with 
the findings by Booth et al (2001), who detected a positive relationship between 
business risk and the debt level in four of the ten countries under study. Booth et al 
(2001) offered no explanation. Perhaps the interpretation is that firms have more 
chances to finance their activities through debt in a more volatile business environment, 
or maybe that more risky firms find it harder to repay debts (cf. the situation with Enron 
in the United States). 
Finally the ratio of long-term to short-term debt (LSR) has a marginally significant 
effect upon the debt ratio, and the coefficient is positive as expected. This result is 
consistent with the findings by Booth at al (2001). It shows that those Chinese firms 
with higher proportions of long-term debt tend to have more total debt. In other words, 
firms prefer to take on more debt only when they have access to long-term debt, rather 
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than to short-term debt. Since long-term debt is usually used to finance tangible assets, 
and short-term debt is used for intangible assets, the results could also imply that firms 
may have better access to debt servicing when the debt is for long-term investment. 
Alternatively, we can draw upon the theoretical discussion of the effects of the maturity 
structure upon the agency problem (Barclay and Smith, 1995), and suggest that the 
financial decision-makers in the firm prefer long-term debt to short-term debt to avoid 
more frequent monitoring from the debt providers. 
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we have examined the determinants of capital structure in a sample of 433 
Chinese listed companies in the manufacturing sector. It has been the first ever such 
study for China. We have found that older firms, and those with higher market-to-book 
value ratios, are likely to have more debt. And larger, faster-growing and more 
profitable firms are likely to have less debt. The extent of the shareholding held by 
management does not have a significant impact upon the debt level, whereas that by the 
largest shareholder has a negative impact. For the most part, our findings have been 
consistent both with our theoretical predictions and with the conclusions of the studies 
carried out by Booth et al (2001) for emerging markets, and Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
for developed countries. According to Booth et al (200 1, pp. 3 1-32): 
'In general, debt ratios in developing countries seem to be affected in the same 
way and by the same types of variables that are significant in developed 
countries. However, there are systematic differences in the way these ratios are 
affected by country factors, such as GDP growth rates, inflation rates, and the 
development of capital markets. ' 
However, it is still important to be aware of the legal and institutional differences 
between China and the Western economies. Here we want to stress two points that are 
particularly relevant to China. First, Baer and Gray (1996) argue that debt is often 
considered to be a 'soft' rather than a 'hard' constraint in many transitional economies, 
and this has certainly been true for the State-owned enterprises in China. But the debt 
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constraint is undoubtedly hardening for Chinese listed companies in which the 
Government acts as a shareholder, rather than as the sole owner6. The Annual Reports 
of the listed companies show that the majority of legal cases between them and other 
parties are related to debt repayment. And the decisions of the Courts are being 
implemented sooner. Second, the markets for corporate control are still not mature in 
China. Listed companies in the West have the freedom to issue equity even when 
performance is poor. The shares of the majority of listed companies in China are under 
the control of the State authorities or other institutional shareholders, and may not be 
traded on stock markets, though this is currently under review by the policy-makers. 
There are occasional cases where the shares held by the State or by the institutional 
shareholders have been traded to other parties, but the transference was only effected 
with the permission of the State authority and/or other shareholders. Furthermore, 
Chinese companies are not allowed to make seasonal equity offerings, and debt may be 
the only channel for raising additional finance. 
What are the implications of these findings in the context of China? The average debt 
level of Chinese listed companies is low compared to their counterparts in Western 
economies. Managers will typically employ more debt finance, the more confident they 
are about the outcome of projects. But, in China's business environment as in other 
emerging and transitional economies where the economic and legal systems to protect 
foreign investors' interests are weak, agency costs are likely to be high. As Kogut 
(1996) has pointed out, foreign investors may sometimes require an equity stake as high 
as 75% in order to ensure effective control of a firm, whereas a local investor may only 
need a 25% shareholding. Furthermore, foreign investors have a variety of options for 
providing capital to China. Debt finance may be the safest option: the investor receives 
a steady return when the business is doing well, and can assume control if/when the 
business runs into difficulties. Equity investment may however be the more attractive 
option because of the potentially higher returns, as long as there is a sound governance 
6 Both the requirement upon, and the expectation of, the Government to provide other benefits such as 
housing and full employment to the listed companies, have also been reduced though not eliminated. 
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system. The positive link between the level, and the term structure, of debt confirms this 
point. Management will choose a higher level of debt only when it has access to long- 
term debt finance, but long-term debt comes with potentially higher agency costs 
compared to short-term debt due to the less frequent screening. 
Finally it is important to realise that foreign investors are rarely completely passive 
adherents to the corporate governance systems of their host countries. They shape and 
mould those systems, either wittingly or unwittingly, through their presence. Hopefully, 
they promote sounder governance mechanisms by introducing good codes of behaviour 
and, to the extent that this is the case, China is more fortunate in being the recipient of a 
much greater inflow of foreign direct investment than the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union. 
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Chapter 7 
Chinese Corporate Groups: 
A Perspective from Governance Structure' 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have focused on various issues related to corporate governance in 
Chinese listed companies. However, the listed companies, which have been transformed 
into "modem enterprise systems" in the light of "market economy" principles, only 
constitute a part of the whole Chinese economy. More importantly, they occupy a lower 
level in the hierarchy of governance structure under the corporate groups. The task of 
this chapter is a critical investigation of the behaviour of corporate groups. 
We begin the investigation of Chinese corporate groups with two quotes that focus on 
the management and the internal architecture of modem business organisations: one 
from Francis Fukuyama (1995), and the other from Alfred Chandler (1980): 
"The Chinese constitute the world's largest racial, linguistic and cultural group. 
They are spread across a vast geographical area and live in variety of states, from 
the still communist People's Republic of China to overseas Chinese settlements in 
Southeast Asia to industrial democracies like the United States, Canada and Great 
Britain. Despite this variation in political environment, it is nonetheless possible 
to speak of a relatively homogenous Chinese economic culture. " (Fukuyama 
1995, p. 70). The hallmark of this Chinese economic culture is "small scale 
enterprises" and the cause is the "very great difficulty Chinese family businesses 
seem to have in making the transition from family to professional management" 
(Fukuyama 1995, p. 74). 
1 An earlier version of this paper was co-authored NNith Athar Hussain and presented as 'Political 
Economy of Chinese Corporate Groups' at the International Conference on the 'Emergence and the 
Structuring of Corporate Groups in PR China: an International Perspective' at the University of Hong 
Kong in November 1999. 
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"The modem business enterprise is defined by its two major characteristics. First, 
it contains many distinct operating units, each with its own administrative offices, 
its own full-time salaried manager, and its own sets of books and accounts that 
can be audited separately from those of the larger enterprise. Theoretically, each 
could operate as an independent business enterprise. The second salient 
characteristic of the modem business enterprise is therefore that it employs a 
hierarchy of middle- and top-salaried managers who supervise the work of the 
units under its control and who form and entirely new class of businessmen. " 
(Chandler 1980, pp. 10-11). 
We quote Fukuyama not to refute his facile generalisation, but to focus on the crucial 
importance of salaried managers in the emergence of the "modern enterprise" which, in 
organisational architecture, is akin to the large enterprise or corporate group. The two 
attributes of the modem enterprise that Chandler singles out refer exclusively to its 
managerial organization, and neglect its financial architecture. We would argue that 
financial factors play a central role in shaping large enterprises and corporate groups in 
China, so we would add a third attribute. This attribute is that the modem enterprise 
derives its capital from a diversified mix of debt instruments and equity, usually traded 
on the stock market. 
The fine details aside, there are an abundance of modem enterprises in China with the 
characteristics identified by Chandler. As yet, not all such enterprises possess the third 
characteristic, though many of them have been converted into shareholding 
corporations. The plan is eventually to transform all large enterprises into joint-stock 
corporations with their shares listed on the stock market. This would facilitate a 
diversification of the sources of capital, but the degree of diversification will depend 
crucially on attitudes towards State ownership, which are changing, and on the 
development of the financial sector. 
The State-led industrialisation in the PRC skipped the historical stage that each 
capitalist economy went through in its own way, of a transition from family businesses 
to managerial businesses. What is called the "managerial revolution" in business 
histories of capitalism (Chandler, 1977) was simply a by-product of this process. This is 
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not only true of China or of post-Communist economies, but also of capitalist 
economies where public enterprises have played a lead role in industrialisation. Starting 
in 1952, when the socialist command economy officially began, China spawned a huge 
economic bureaucracy, which is not fundamentally different from bureaucracies found 
in large enterprises in market economies. As pointed out by Wilson (1989, p. 114), 
"business firms are also bureaucracies, and McDonalds is a bureaucracy that regulates 
virtually every detail of its employees' behaviour by a complex and all-encompassing 
set of rules. " The principal problem in China is not one of the transition from family 
management, as it still is in Korean chaebols, but of re-orienting the enterprise 
management from just organizing production to seeking higher returns on assets and 
investment. 
Multi-divisional units have also been a prominent feature of the Chinese economy. Such 
units include not only large enterprises but, more importantly, industrial Ministries and 
bureaux (at the sub-central levels), especially after the extension of financial and 
managerial autonomy to enterprises. In fact, the latter group fits particularly well with 
Chandler's qualification that each constituent unit should have its own administrative 
office, its own full-time salaried manager, and its own sets of books and accounts that 
can be audited separately from those of the larger enterprise. This latter group is of 
special importance in the Chinese context because many of the recent additions to the 
list of Chinese corporate groups are commercial reincarnations of industrial Ministries, 
or provincial or municipal industrial bureaux. This trend will continue for some time 
given that many provincial or municipal bureaux have yet to be transformed into 
companies. Here it is also important to point out that multi-divisional organization and 
conglomerates are not alien to planned economies. Well before the downfall of 
Communism, a number of East-European economies undertook groupings of 
independent enterprises to improve their industrial performance (Granick, 1976). In the 
1950s, following the example of the then Soviet Union and the command economies of 
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East Europe, China organised industrial trusts (enterprise groups). Some of them still 
survive, albeit in a modified form. 
Our purpose in pointing to the homology between the economic organizations of a 
command economy and the present-day Chinese enterprises is not to deny the 
importance of the institutional change in China that is underway, but to establish an 
evolutionary link between the two. This link matters because, in structure and 
personnel, many Chinese enterprises continue to bear the deep imprints of their 
genealogy. On a general note, genealogy is important in gaining an understanding not 
only of large enterprises in China, but also in market economies. Were it not so, we 
would observe a far greater uniformity in the structures of firms across economies than 
we actually do. The transactions cost approach to industrial organization, pioneered by 
Coase and currently popular in economics, has contributed valuable insights but it 
cannot explain why differences in the institutional and financial structure of firms 
continue to persise. 
Related to this, we would also argue that the influence that Korean chaehols or Japanese 
conglomerates have had on Chinese industrial policy is due as much to the fact that 
China already has in place large and multi-divisional economic organizations as to their 
central role in the meteoric rise of their parent economies. There are structural 
similarities between large Chinese corporate groups and their East Asian counterparts 
but, as we point out later, also major differences. The particular features of Chinese 
enterprises (large or small) arise from the fact that they emerge and operate in an 
economic environment permeated with government decision-making with the following 
two features: 
0 The distribution of economic decision-making between the central and territorial 
governments and intra-government relations - later referred to as the "territorial 
division of the government". 
Chapter 7: Chinese Corporate Groups: A Perspective from Governance Structure 199 
0 The division of economic activities into branches running through the "economic 
administration" consisting of the central industrial ministries and their territorial 
counterparts (industrial bureaux), which is currently undergoing a radical change - 
later referred to as the "industrial division of economic administratiorf'. 
The main theme of this chapter is that the division of the government into territorial 
jurisdictions, and of the division of economic administration by industrial branches, 
imposes a two-way grid on economic decision-making that has had wide ramifications 
for the structure of large enterprises/corporate groups in China and their evolution. This 
grid is currently undergoing a radical change because of the abolition of many of the 
central industrial Ministries and also of industrial bureaux in territorial governments, 
that may in time have a profound influence on the organizational structure of corporate 
groups. But the territorial division of the government has been, and will continue to be, 
of special importance in China because of its geographical expanse and regional 
diversity. There are no developed market economies, apart perhaps from the United 
States and Canada, which compare with China in this regard. In contrast to China, the 
territorial dimension seems to have had only a marginal, if any, influence on the 
industrial structure in South Korea and Japan. 
In China the corporate group Uituan) does not seem to be an appellation controlie: i. e. 
there is no particular organisational and financial structure as, for example, there is in 
developed market economies. A varied range of Chinese enterprises now carry the label 
"corporate group", and the term seems to be treated as synonymous with "modern 
enterprise". For example, four (the Panda Group, the Hualu Group, the Rainbow group 
and the Changjiang Group) of the eleven "group corporations" in the electronics 
industry consist of just one enterprise each, whilst another three (the Zhongshan Group, 
the Shenzhen Saige Group and the Zhenghua Corporation) consist of more than ten 
enterprises each. Here we treat the term "corporate group" as synonymous with large 
See Winter (199 1) for a critique of the transactions cost approach. 
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enterprise, and use the terms interchangeably. The adjective 'large' should be 
interpreted relative to the Chinese, rather than the international, standard. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 draws up a list of the salient features of 
corporate groups and large enterprises, to serve as a background for the subsequent 
discussion. Section 7.3 discusses the ownership pattern of Chinese industrial 
enterprises. Section 7.4 analyses the relative importance of large enterprises/corporate 
groups in the wider context of industrial structure. Section 7.5 discusses the current 
trends in industrial restructuring, and Section 7.6 concludes. 
7.2 The Salient Features of Corporate Groups 
This section focuses on the principal activities and historical origins of a representative 
sample of large enterprises/corporate groups. Most of these are "National 
Corporations", which currently number around one hundred and forty. Their 
establishment represents a shift of the focus of enterprise reform towards organizational 
restructuring and internal management, and away from the re-allocation of control rights 
between the enterprise management and government agencies which culminated in the 
3 "14 Rights of Enterprise Managers" 
Arguably, the National Corporations are underpinned by an industrial strategy that 
draws its inspiration from East Asian experiences, and the expectation is that these 
would be the driving forces in the modernisation of Chinese industry. These 
Corporations report to the State Council and, compared with other Chinese enterprises, 
their managers have more discretion in decision-making and preferential access to bank 
credit. Many of them have also been granted the keenly sought-after privilege of listing 
on the domestic and also on foreign stock markets. In principle, the status "National 
3 The "14 Rights" were enunciated by the State Council in 1992. In various ways they have been 
surpassed by changes in recent years, especially the reorganisation of industrial ministries and bureaux. 
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Corporation" is conditional, and subject to withdrawal in the case of poor performance. 
However, no withdrawal has yet to be enforced. 
The representative sample of large enterprises/corporate groups exhibits the following 
ten salient features, though this list is not exhaustive and the features are not mutually 
exclusive: 
1. Although the "National Corporation" is a recently invented status, many of these 
enterprises have a long history dating back to the pre-reform period or even before, 
and were large State enterprises even at the start of the reform period. Several of 
these "old" enterprises are the offspring of the 156 projects aided by the then Soviet 
Union during the first-five year plan (1952-56). Most of the National Corporations 
with a pre-1979 history are in the metallurgy, chemicals and machine building 
industries, reflecting the heavy industry bias of the period. Examples include the 
giant Anshan Iron and Steel Group (Angang), which were founded by the Japanese 
in the 1930s during their occupation of the Northeast, as was the Benxi Iron and 
Steel Corporation (bengang). All steel enterprises with the status of a National 
Corporation date back to the pre-1979 period, with the exception of the Baoshan 
Iron and Steel Group (Baogang) which was established in the early 1980s. Other 
examples are the First and Second Heavy Machinery Groups. These corporations 
still retain many of their old features, though they have undergone mutations over 
the reform period. 
2. There are as yet not many large enterprises/corporate groups that have resulted 
from the mergers of previously independent enterprises. Among the few exceptions 
are the Dongfeng Automobile Group, the China Ealing Group (motor bicycles), and 
the China Petroleum Corporation (Sinopec) after its re-configuration in 1998. This 
may change in the near future as the restructuring of large and medium enterprises 
and industries proceeds and, as will be discussed in section 7.5 below, mergers have 
risen in frequency. 
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3. Among the list of National Corporations, there are a notable number of natural 
resource-based enterprises or public utilities, with varying degrees of monopoly 
power arising from a mixture of industry characteristics, such as natural monopoly 
and network externalities, and entry control by the Central Government. Aside from 
some enterprises in the electricity industry, most of these owe their large size to the 
rapid growth of their respective markets over the reform period. Examples include: 
" In the telecommunications industry: China Telecom (which in 1999 was 
split into four components) and its supposed competitor, China Unicorn. 
" In the electricity industry: various regional power groups which date back to 
the pre-1979 period, and post-1978 establishments such as the Huaneng 
Power group and the State Power Corporation. 
" In the air transport industry: Air China, and the regional airlines such as 
East China Airlines and South China Airlines. 
" In natural resource-based industries: the China Minerals and Metals Import 
and Export Group (Minmetal) and the recently established China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), a transformation of the former Ministry of 
Oil and Gas. 
Reflecting the central government control of their industries, many of these 
enterprises have been formed from the central cores or offshoots of now-abolished 
industrial Ministries or government Departments. Likely additions to their ranks 
include the Post Office and perhaps, in time, the railways. In many ways, they 
resemble State-owned enterprises in developed market economies. As a result of 
the rapid expansion of their respective domestic markets since 1979, several of 
these enterprises already rank as large firms by international standards. The China 
National Petroleum Corporation ranks among the Fortune top 500 and, in terms of 
the number of fixed lines (though not in turnover), China Telecom is already the 
second largest telephone company in the world. It is important to emphasise the 
close link between the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, and the emergence of 
these large Chinese enterprises/corporate groups on the international stage. Given 
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that these enterprises are expected to be profit seeking, their monopolistic position 
raises the as yet unresolved issue of their regulation. 
4. There are a number of large enterprises in industries that are either new in China or 
have only become sizeable in recent years. Examples include: 
In the electronic and computer industries: the Legend (Danxiang) Group, 
the Stone (Sitong) Group, and the Great Wall Computer Group. 
In the passenger vehicles industry: the First, Second, and Shanghai 
Automobile Groups, each of which has a controlling share in an associated 
Sino-foreign production venture. 
In the consumer durables industry: the Sichuan Changhong and Qingdao 
Hisense and Haier Groups. 
The enterprises in this category are in industries producing internationally traded 
goods, are already competitive, and will become even more so when China is 
finally able to enjoy the full benefits of WTO membership. One result of intense 
competition in the consumer durables industry is the widening differentiation 
between the market leaders and the laggards, and a growing importance of brand 
names. Take-overs and mergers are already common in these industries, and a 
likely outcome is the elimination of most of the small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Given the size of the Chinese market, those surviving the process of 
natural selection should be large enterprises by world standards. 
5. The sample also includes enterprises from China's huge military industrial complex 
covering both military hardware and associated civilian products. In fact, some of 
the leading Chinese corporate groups of today started off as military enterprises. 
For example, the Changhong Group, the largest enterprise in the electronics 
industry, was initially a producer of radars. There are ten large enterprises/corporate 
groups under the control of the "Commission for Science and Industry for National 
Defence", including the following: 
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" The North China Industries Group Corporation (Norinco) and the South 
China Industries Group Corporation: both are conventional weapons 
producers, which have diversified into a wide range of other activities. 
" Two corporations in the nuclear industry. 
" Four corporations in aerospace and aviation, covering both civilian and 
military products. 
Two shipbuilding corporations, one military and another civilian. 
Given China's position as a major world power, these military-cum-civilian 
enterprises should always constitute a significant proportion of Chinese corporate 
groups. However, China's military industry is undergoing radical change because of 
two trends: the technical upgrading of the armed forces, and the recent policy to 
divest the military of its economic activities. A significant proportion of the 
Chinese State enterprises in severe financial difficulties are enterprises specializing 
in military hardware. 
6. There are two geographical features of the Chinese corporate groups that stand out. 
First, rather than being confined to the developed coastal provinces only, they are 
fairly widely distributed. This is due partly to various policies to disperse industry 
geographically, which date back to the Third Front policy of the late 1960s and the 
1970s (Naughton, 1988). But it is also partly due to the keen competition among 
territorial governments to develop local industry, and to obtain centrally-funded 
projects. As a result, a number of corporate groups are based in the relatively under- 
developed southwestern and northwestern provinces. The second characteristic is 
that many of the Chinese corporate groups are confined to just a city or a province. 
This is linked closely with the dispersion of enterprise ownership rights among the 
territorial governments, which we discuss later. There are two main exceptions to 
this general rule: the off-shoots of central industrial Ministries which supervised 
"centrally-controlled" enterprises all over China (e. g. the China National Petroleum 
Corporation, the China National Power Corporation, and the Huaneng Power 
Group), and some groups in newly-developed industries such as consumer durables 
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(e. g. the Sichuan Changhong, Qingdao Hisense and Shenzhen Konka (kanjia) 
groups). 
7. Notwithstanding their size and multi-unit structure, most of the Chinese corporate 
groups are specialised along the industrial classification that runs through the 
economic administration. As yet, there are no Chinese counterparts of multi- 
industry conglomerates such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Samsung or Hyundai (Ungson 
et al, 1997). Related to this, there is a relative absence of vertically integrated 
groups cutting across the administrative division of industries. For example there is 
no heavy machinery enterprise that is prominent in metallurgy. The usual 
observation that command economies tended to encourage a greater degree of 
vertical integration than in market economies does not seem to apply to large 
Chinese enterprises. By international standards, they tend to be less diversified and 
vertically integrated. The reason is that the industrial divisions running through the 
economic administration creates vested interests that act as barriers to the 
expansion of enterprises across industries. 
8. The list of Chinese corporate groups includes a number of international trading and 
shipping enterprises, reflecting the control of international trade by the Central 
Government. These include the China Chemical Industry Import and Export Group 
(Sinochem), the China Food and Oil Import and Export Corporation, and the China 
Shipping Company (Cosco) - all of which are divided along the industrial 
classifications used for economic administration. These enterprises owe their large 
size to the rapid growth since 1978 of China's GDP, and the even more rapid 
growth of China's foreign trade. The Chinese trading groups tend to be more 
specialised than the Japanese and Korean trading companies. Their monopolistic 
positions are under strong threat from two sources: first, the extension of direct 
international trading rights to more enterprises including those in the non-State 
sector and, second, China's membership of the WTO. 
4 The ratio of exports and imports to GDP rose almost four-fold from 9.7% in 1978 to 36.5% in 1999. 
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9. Some industries are notably absent from the list of large enterprises/corporate 
groups. There are none in the retail trade. Moreover, despite its huge construction 
market, China does not yet have construction groups that stand out at the national 
level, let alone at the international level. The reason is that Ministries, large 
enterprises, and territorial governments have tended to run their own in-house 
construction companies. Construction is the one major activity in China that tends 
to be integrated with other activities. Financial institutions are also absent from the 
list, not because there are no large finance companies in China but because they 
still have the hybrid status of enterprises and Government Departments. All four of 
the main State-owned commercial banks are large enough to figure in the Fortune 
500 list. 
10. Finally, the relations between the financial institutions and large 
enterprises/corporate groups in China are distant compared to those in market 
economies. Though large State enterprises have been heavily reliant on bank loans 
since the mid-1980s, the four main commercial banks have little control over the 
use of the loaned funds and no say in enterprise governance. This is changing, 
albeit slowly, with the decision to convert a part of the non-performing debt of 
selected State enterprises into equity held by "Asset Management Companies" 
(AMCs) controlled by the creditor banks. Besides, though many corporate groups 
are share-holding companies, equity-holders other than government agencies play 
little role, if any, in enterprise governance. This may also change in the near future 
as Chinese corporate groups tap the domestic and foreign stock markets for 
investment funds, and with the establishment of the AMCs controlled by the four 
State-owned commercial banks. The relationship between the enterprises and the 
financial institutions and markets is discussed further in the next section. 
There is thus a considerable diversity of large enterprises/corporate groups. Their 
ownership structure, and their relative importance in the Chinese economy are discussed 
in the next two sections. 
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7.3 Ownership Structure 
In this section, we consider two sets of issues drawing on the discussion in Hansmann 
(1996): 
0 Enterprise governance, in particular the appointment and monitoring of managers, and 
of performance and control over enterprise activities and boundaries. 
The relationship between the enterprise and the suppliers of its capital, including those 
without a formal ownership stake. 
The discussion is not confined to the large enterprises/corporate groups, but covers all 
enterprises in the industrial sector for which data are readily available. We thus exclude 
seven-and-half million small and micro industrial enterprises, and focus on the 162,033 
'independent accounting' industrial enterprises at and above the township level. Table 7.1 
provides an analysis of these enterprises classified by their formal ownership status: 
Table 7.1: The Ownership Status of Industrial Enterprises with Independent Accounting 
Systems, 1999 
Type of Number Gross Net Fixed Employment 
Enterprise (0/o of total) Output Output Assets N 
N N N 
SOEs and State 61,301 48.9% 56.3% 61.6% 54.5% 
controlled (37.8%) 
enterprises 
Collective-owned 42,585 17.1% 14.7% 8.5% 15.2% 
enterprises (26.3%) 
Shareholding 4,480 7.2% 7.5% 7.6% 
enterprises (2.8%) 
Foreign-funded 26,837 26.1% 22.5% 28.2% 30.3% 
enterprises (16.6%) 
Others 26,830 0.7% N/A N/A 
(16.61/o) 
Source: State Statistical Bureau (2000) 
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The first two ownership forms, State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and collective-owned 
enterprises (COEs), are pre-reform categories, but have since undergone various changes 
both in governance structure and in the sources of their capital. The next two categories, 
shareholding enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises, are post-1978 categories, and 
most of these enterprises are mutations of SOEs or COEs. The 'others' category includes 
enterprises with the status of Government Departments, and private enterprises which, as 
distinct from household enterprises (geli hu), have become significant only recently. 
A salient feature of the four categories is that government ownership permeates all of 
them. COEs are close, but lesser, kin of the SOEs in that they are controlled by lower 
government tiers, at the county-level or below or their urban counterparts. Of the 4,480 
share-holding enterprises, around 1,000 of the largest are listed on the domestic stock 
markets, and a small percentage of them are also listed on foreign stock markets. 80% of 
them are at least majority government owned, and only slightly more than 10% of them are 
COEs. And a substantial percentage of foreign-funded enterprises (around 70%) are joint 
or cooperative ventures with, in most cases, a SOE or a COE. Thus the diversification of 
ownership forms since 1979 has, for the most part, involved a mutation in government 
ownership, along the following four lines. 
0 The assignment of ownership claims in proportion to capital contributions (usually by 
territorial governments). This is a common principle in market economies, and was 
first used in the second half of the 1980s to finance large projects in the electricity 
industry; 
0 The proliferation of multi-level ownership, whereby a government-owned company 
fully or partly owns enterprises with different ownership forms (including SOEs, 
COEs, and joint ventures). 
0 Mixed government-private ownership as in Sino-foreign joint ventures. 
The introduction of tradable equity, but mostly with majority government ownership 
as in the corporations listed on the domestic and foreign stock markets. 
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The common element in the above four mutations is a diversification in the sources of 
investment funds which, as we argue below, has been and is likely to be a principal 
driving force in the transformation of the ownership pattern especially of large 
enterprises/corporate groups. In the case of Sino-foreign joint ventures, additional 
motives have been the acquisition of advanced technology and raising exports. 
The data in Table 7.1 also highlight something of the current plight of the SOEs. The 
SOEs remain the bedrock of Chinese industry, accounting for 56.3% of net output and 
61.6% of fixed assets. This gap between their shares of fixed capital and of net output 
reflects their domination of the capital-intensive and high-technology industries. However, 
their share of industrial employment (54.5%) is only slightly lower than their share of net 
output, whereas the usual pattern in market economies is that the employment share should 
be substantially less than the output share. One reason for this anomaly is the employment 
of surplus labour; another is the extensive social and welfare responsibilities which occupy 
a substantial part of their labour force. As a group, the SOEs are weighed down by 
comparatively high endowments of capital and labour, and their future survival depends 
crucially on reducing their employment share relative to their output share. This is now 
clearly recognised in China. Over the last few years, the SOEs have shed a substantial 
percentage of their labour force and the aim of the current social security reforms is to 
transfer social and welfare responsibilities from enterprises to the Mnistry of Labour and 
Social Security, and its provincial counterparts. Furthermore, the current round of 
enterprise reforms envisage "conglomeration" in the case of large and medium-size SOEs, 
and "flexibility" in the case of small SOEs. Flexibility covers a wide range of possible 
mutations, including take-overs by large SOEs, outright sales, and conversion into 
employee partnerships. The SOE, as currently constituted, is an endangered species. 
The large enterprises and corporate groups do not fit exclusively within any one ownership 
category. Some are SOEs, but most are either former SOEs or government departments 
now converted into shareholding enterprises, but with majority or full goverment 
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ownership. Comparatively few large units are shareholding corporations with only a 
minority public stake, or are foreign-funded enterprises. Foreign-funded enterprises tend 
to be small, though the category includes some of best-known brand names in China. 
Furthermore, a large SOE or a shareholding enterprise with majority government 
ownership (e. g. a National Corporation) can have subsidiaries with differing forms of 
ownership (termed above as "multi-level ownership"): COEs, Sino-foreign joint ventures, 
or private enterprises. 
Under its initiative to modernise enterprises, the Chinese Government plans to convert all 
large and medium SOEs into shareholding corporations. But the significance of this 
proposal for enterprise governance will depend crucially on whether such corporations are 
ccopen", or "closed" with all equity held by government organizations. A substantial 
majority (around 60%) of the existing shareholding corporations fall into the "closed" 
category, which means that their ownership is not markedly different from the SOEs. 
However, there are two current initiatives that are crucial to the future evolution of the 
large enterprises: the transformation of the closed shareholding corporations into open 
corporations, and the creation of a governance structure for diversified ownership, 
including multi-level ownership. The transformation of closed into open shareholding 
enterprises, with their equity traded on the domestic and foreign stock markets, is 
motivated by the pressing need to raise investment funds for modernisation. One recent 
example of this was the sale, in April 2000, of a substantial percentage of equity in the 
China National Petroleum Corporation on the Hong Kong and New York stock markets. 
What are the implications of the dominance of government ownership in many large 
enterprises? As noted by many observers, government ownership in China is not a unified, 
but an intemally-divided phenomenon reflecting the division of the government into 
territorial jurisdictions and their hierarchy. The ownership rights in government-owned 
enterprises (supervisory oversight and claim on profits) are dispersed across many 
government tiers, from the centre down to the township (or its urban equivalent), and even 
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further down to the level of "mass" (quasi-governmental) organizations such as villages or 
urban neighbourhoods. Moreover, government-owned enterprises are not all on a par; they 
are ordered according to the government hierarchy. Corporate groups and large enterprises 
tend to be under the ownership of the central or provincial governments, whilst those 
enterprises owned by lower government tiers tend to be smaller. However, this has begun 
to change with the growth of successful (or market-selected) enterprises owned by lower 
government tiers. For example, Changhong - the largest enterprise in the electronics sector 
and now a shareholding corporation - started off as an enterprise owned by a medium-size 
city (i. e. Mianyang). A number of rural enterprises (TVEs) are now counted among the 
corporate groups: for example, the Kelon (Guangdong) and Chunlan (Jiangsu) groups both 
are both well-known in the consumer durables sector. Furthermore, the Central 
Government has exclusive jurisdiction over certain industries, such as the oil and gas 
industry and many of the public utilities. All government tiers can establish enterprises 
subject to this central jurisdiction over industries and, as we shall see in the next section, 
this has played a central role in shaping China's industrial structure. A large Chinese city 
would normally have enterprises owned by all government tiers, from the centre down to 
the urban district. 
The dispersion of ownership rights across government tiers has had wide ramifications for 
both the functions of the government tiers and for relations between them. All government 
tiers (down to the lowest level) have departments devoted to the supervision of enterprises 
in their respective domains. Over the reform period, these departments have developed into 
hybrid organizations with two distinct roles, which are being separated by the government 
reorganization currently under way. First, these organizations performed the functions of 
co-ordination and supervision in relation to enterprises in their domain, similar to that of 
Head Offices of multi-divisional firms or conglomerates. From this standpoint, an 
industrial Ministry or bureau, together with its subordinate enterprises, resembled an M- 
form conglomerate (to use a term coined by Williamson, 1991) specialising in a particular 
product range. This analogy has begun to take a concrete organizational form over the past 
few years with the conversion of industrial Ministries at the central level, and bureaux at 
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the sub-central levels, into limited-liability companies (or corporations) encompassing 
enterprises they had previously supervised. The establishment of these corporations marks 
an important departure from the enterprise reforms, undertaken from 1979 to the early 
1990s, that focused almost exclusively on the transformation of enterprises, but not of 
industrial departments. This shift of focus was prompted by the realisation that the reform 
of enterprises requires not only their restructuring, but also the granting of operational 
autonomy to the enterprise management. We explore the implications of this for industrial 
restructuring in Section 7.5. Second, the industrial departments also performed regulatory 
functions covering all enterprises in the industry regardless of their ownership status, a role 
which in a market economy would be performed by a government agency or a non- 
commercial public body. These regulatory functions are being transferred to the State 
Trade and Economic Commission at the central level, and to its territorial subsidiaries. The 
separation of the two functions is an important step towards a disengagement of the role of 
the government as owner, from its regulatory role. 
What are the ramifications of the dispersion of ownership rights for horizontal and vertical 
relations between government tiers? In developed market economies, inter-tier relations 
are dominated by fiscal issues, such as the distribution of taxation power and expenditure 
responsibilities, and enterprise ownership is of marginal significance. The reverse is the 
case in China. Fiscal issues, although important, take second place to enterprise ownership 
in inter-tier relations, as the revenue (both from taxation and other sources) that a 
government tier has at its disposal depends crucially on the enterprises under its control. 
This gives government tiers a powerful incentive to protect and enlarge the portfolio of 
enterprises under their control, which engenders a rivalrous relationship between them. 
The establishment of National Corporations with special privileges, and the transformation 
of the components of industrial Ministries, have significantly extended the role of the 
Central Government in the governance of large enterprises. Provincial and lower-tier 
governments have responded to this potential, if not actual, threat to their span of 
economic control by encouraging the formation of their own corporate groups. Thus the 
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proliferation of such groups in recent years is in part underpinned by intra-government 
rivalry. 
in the broader context of enterprise governance, a large Chinese enterprise is a nexus of 
(economic, social and political) practices, not just of contracts - as market-economy firms 
are usually characterised. Enterprises are important political organizations, and function as 
nodes of the Party organization. All large enterprises have a Party Committee, headed by a 
Secretary equal in rank to the chief executive officer (CEO). Furthermore, the appointment 
of the CEOs of large public enterprises is subject to approval by the Party organization at 
the relevant level. The implication is that political considerations cast a long shadow on the 
management of large enterprises and the selection of their chief executives. 
How much impact does this have on the functioning of large enterprises and their 
evolution? The impact has to be judged with reference to the likely state of affairs without 
the Party having any say in enterprise governance. Views within the Party about ownership 
transformation and industrial restructuring are as diverse as those outside the Party. Even if 
the Party had no say, the CEOs would be drawn from largely the same pool as at present. 
There does not seem to be any strong evidence that the current system of appointment 
excludes significant numbers of potentially capable managers. Here it is instructive to 
point out that, in East European economies that have undergone enterprise privatisation on 
a large scale, most of the CEOs of privatised enterprises have managerial experience 
dating from the pre-transition period. Similarly, the top management of privatised LJK 
companies are largely drawn from those who occupied senior managerial positions in the 
same companies before privatisation. This is not surprising given the informational 
advantage of incumbent managers over outsiders. In the Chinese context, political 
reliability and managerial capability do not seem to be mutually exclusive. But there is a 
problem of alignment between the ownership status and the political role of the enterprise 
which, although minor at present, is likely to grow. In principle, the problem does not arise 
in enterprises with majority government ownership. But it does arise in enterprises in 
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which the government holds no more than a minority stake. The problem exists in Sino- 
foreign joint ventures, and is currently resolved through makeshift arrangements. The 
numbers of such enterprises will increase with the growth not only of private ownership 
and majority foreign ownership, but also of open shareholding corporations. The 
implication is that the current political role of enterprises acts as an impediment to a 
transformation in the ownership structure, especially the large enterprises and corporate 
groups which are seen as the bulwark of the one-party State. The likely pattern of 
evolution is a loosening political control in small and medium-sized enterprises, but not in 
the key large enterprises and corporate groups. 
Turning to the relationship between enterprises and the sources of their capital, the external 
investment funds for the SOEs and COEs took the form of grants from the Government, or 
quasi-government organizations such as rural communes, in the pre-reform period. These 
grants were akin to capital subscription by the owners, and the sources of capital were fully 
aligned with the allocation of ownership and control over the enterprises. Over the course 
of the reform period, however, there has been a progressive divergence between, on the 
one hand, the ownership and control pattern of enterprises and, on the other hand, their 
sources of capital. From the early 1980s onwards, loans have progressively replaced 
investment grants and, in 1999 for example, budgetary appropriations accounted for a mere 
9.7% of investment funds in all State-units (in industry and other sectors). Domestic banks 
and financial markets accounted for 23.4% and 14% of funds respectively. One result of 
the heavy dependence for investment funds on bank loans for almost twenty years is the 
relatively high ratio (by international standards) of long-term debt to assets. In the large 
SOEs, which have been the principal recipients of bank loans, the average ratio was 62% 
in 1999 (State Statistical Bureau, 2000, p. 439) and in some it was as high as 90%. If short- 
term bank debt is also included, the amount of debt exceeds their total assets. 
In contrast to their market-economy counterparts, the Chinese commercial banks, although 
nominally financially-independent, have neither the rights of debt-holders nor equity in the 
Chapter 7: Chinese Corporate Groups: A Perspective from Govcmance Structure 215 
indebted enterprises. Even in the event of debt default (which is widespread), they have 
neither a pre-emptive claim on enterprise assets, nor play any role in enterprise governance 
as banks do even in economies, such as the United States, where they do not hold equities. 
The implication is that the current assignment of ownership rights in enterprises rests 
crucially on a faulty enforcement of debt claims, the counterpart of which is a non-solvent 
commercial banking sector. There is a widening incompatibility between making the four 
main commercial banks solvent, which is essential for an overhaul of the financial sector, 
and maintaining the current pattern of ownership of large enterprises and of investment 
financing. This has to change, as is increasingly realised in China. A significant step 
towards reducing this incompatibility is the decision to swap non-performing debt for 
equity in large enterprises. The potential implications of this swap for the ownership 
pattern and the governance structure of large enterprises run wide and deep, even though it 
is no more than an exchange of assets within the State sector,. First, this will within a few 
years create sizeable blocks of shares in large enterprises held by non-governmental 
organizations, albeit by Asset Management Companies (AMCs) under the umbrella of the 
four State-owned commercial banks. The proposed AMCs are likely to behave differently 
from government organizations holding enterprise equities, because they are expected to 
be profit-seeking. Second, the creation of concentrated equity ownership will in time have 
a knock-on effect on the monitoring of managers and on enterprise performance. Third, as 
the equity acquired by AMCs is potentially saleable not only to domestic but also to 
foreign investors, the swap opens up scope for a large-scale transfer of equities, and thus 
for mergers and take-overs and eventually a market in corporate control. An example of 
this is the sale to a US corporation by Cinda (the AMC attached to the Construction Bank) 
of its majority stake in the Bengbu Thermal Electricity Station in April 2001. 
7.4 The Structure of Chinese Industry 
In this section, we seek to answer two related questions: 
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How important are large enterprises and corporate groups in Chinese industry, and has 
their relative importance changed over the reform period? 
What are the salient features of China's industrial structure, given the particular nature 
of government decision-making? 
As in the previous section, the analysis is limited to industrial enterprises with independent 
accounting systems at the township level and above. Table 7.2 provides a statistical picture 
of the relative importance of large, medium, and small enterprises according to their 
numbers, gross output and net outpue. 
Table 7.2: The Size Distribution of Industrial Enterprises with Independent Accounting 
Systems, 1999. 
Numbers Gross output Net output Relative size" 
Size % of total) (% of total) (% of total) 
1981 1999 1981 1999 198 1' 1999 1981 1999 
Large 1,500 7,864 25.4% 43.4% 29.0 48.7% 112 17.8 
(0.4%) (4.9%) 
Medium 3,500 14,371 17.7% 13.6% 16.8 12.9% 33 3.1 
(0.9%) (8.9%) 
Small 376,500 139,798 56.9% 43.0% 54.3 38.4% 11 
(98.7'Yo) (86.3%) 
Notes: (1) The 1981 figures for net output are estimates calculated by using the ratio of net to 
gross output in 1999 for the corresponding category. 
(2) The figures for 'relative size' are derived by dividing each category's share of gross 
output by the number of firms, and the normalising the results by setting the ratio for 
small enterprises equal to unity. 
Source: State Statistical Bureau (2000) 
One striking feature of China's industrial structure to emerge from this Table is the 
polarisation between a comparatively few large enterprises (mostly SOEs or 
5 The classification, set by the State Economic and Trade Commission in 1988 and still in use at present, 
is based on production capacity and the size of fixed assets. Different criteria have been set in accordance 
with the characteristics of different sectors, where as there is no strict requirement regarding the 
employment and sales volume of each enterprise. Those criteria are mainly targeted at state owned 
industrial enterprises and there are no clear and unified criteria for enterprises of other types. 
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shareholding enterprises with majority government ownership) and numerous small 
enterprises. Each group accounts for similar shares of net output (48.7% and 38.4% 
respectively in 1999), whilst medium-sized enterprises are relatively unimportant, only 
accounting for 12.9% of net output. If the figures for 1981 and 1999 are compared, it is 
evident that large enterprises have raised their gross output share by around 18 
percentage points largely at the expense of small enterprises. it is likely that their share 
of net output will have risen even more, though the data for 1981 are estimated It thus 
appears that, over the reform period, large enterprises have risen in importance in the 
industrial sector, and this sector accounts for almost half of GDP in China. 
However, caution is necessary when interpreting these statistics so this conclusion needs 
to be qualified in two respects. First, the apparent rise in market concentration may well 
be a statistical artefact, and concentration may actually have fallen. Second, by 
international standards, the Chinese industrial structure is marked out by the relative 
importance of small not large enterprises. We discuss these in turn. 
The change in output shares between 1981 and 1999 has been accompanied by 
substantial increases in the numbers of large and medium enterprises. The numbers of 
large and medium-sized enterprises have multiplied almost four-fold, whereas the 
numbers of small enterprises have fallen. However, the reduction in the numbers of 
small enterprises is due largely to the re-classification of many as "too small to be 
counted as sizeable enterprisee'. As the increase in the numbers of large enterprises far 
exceeds the rise in their share of gross output (4.4 compared to 1.7 times), the 'average' 
large enterprise of 1999 was far smaller than the 'average' large enterprise of 1981. The 
same also holds for medium-sized enterprises. The final column of Table 7.2 highlights 
these changes by comparing the average gross outputs of large and medium-sized 
enterprises with that of the average small enterprise. The change between 1981 and 
1999 is dramatic. An average large enterprise in 1999 accounted for 17.8 times the gross 
output of an average small enterprise, compared to 113 times in 1981. And an average 
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medium-sized enterprise had only 3.1 times the gross output of the average small 
enterprise in 1999, compared to 33 times in 1981. The relative differences between 
large, medium and small enterprises were far smaller in 1999 than in 1981, especially 
between medium and small enterprises. Furthermore, the apparent rising importance of 
large enterprises is due to the increase in their numbers, and not to the faster growth of 
extant large enterprises compared to other enterprises. 
When assessing the rising importance of large enterprises and their economic power in 
the Chinese economy, it is thus important to keep in mind the fact that their numbers 
have risen sharply over the reform period, as have the numbers of medium-sized 
enterprises. To the extent that market competition depends on numbers and on relative 
differences between large, medium and small enterprises, Chinese industry is far more 
competitive in 1999 than it was in 1981. Here it is instructive to compare China with 
other economies. In South Korea, the top 30 chaehols accounted for around 30% of 
GDP at the end of 1997 (on the eve of the financial crisis). By international standards, 
the Chinese economy is characterised by the relative importance of small enterprises 
rather than by the dominance of large enterpriseý. Although large enterprises are 
ubiquitous in developed market economies, the relative importance of small enterprises 
varies widely amongst them. 
What explains the proliferation of large and medium-size industrial enterprises? This 
can be explained in terms of the role of government in the establishment and 
disappearance of enterprises, through closures or mergerS6 .A paradox is that 
government control over enterprise establishment (or entry) is usually associated with a 
restriction in enterprise numbers, rather than a proliferation that we observe in the 
Chinese context. The explanation lies in the structure of government decision-making 
with the two-way division, between territorial jurisdiction and economic administration 
6 To a degree the government also plays a central role in the birth of private or fully foreign- 
owned enterprises, though not in their closure. 
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by industrial branches, as mentioned in the introduction. As a result, the relations 
between government tiers and departments in China are both hierarchical and rivalrous 
(or competitive). They are hierarchical in the sense that the discretion at the disposal of 
each government tier depends on the tier above, though this hierarchy leaves ample 
room for lower government tiers to pursue their interests, but within limits. The intra- 
governmental relations are also rivalrous in that each government tier and industrial 
department differentiates between enterprises under and outside its control, and aims to 
promote those under its control through the growth of existing enterprises, the 
establishment of new enterprises, and the sustainment of non-viable enterprises. Such 
rivalry also existed in the pre-reform period, but the latitude open to territorial 
governments for promoting enterprises was restricted for two reasons. First, there was 
centralised control over the distribution of key materials and inputs, and limited 
international trade. Second, there was an almost complete absence of credit facilities. 
Together, these two factors constituted a substantial barrier to the establishment of new 
enterprises, especially medium and large ones. 
Both factors began to erode in importance from the early 1980s, and had largely 
disappeared by the early 1990s. The market-oriented reforms led to a huge increase in 
the establishment of new enterprises, aided and abetted by government tiers and 
industrial departments all keen to enlarge the local industrial base. Given the rarity of 
closures and mergers until recently, each newly-establi shed unit has been a net addition 
to the enterprise population. The proliferation of enterprises has been particularly 
pronounced in those segments of industry where the set-up investment is low (such as 
assembly), and in industries that are not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central 
Government (such as oil and gas, and telecommunications). Two examples illustrate the 
result of the combination of a high entry rate, and an exceptionally low exit rate, of 
enterprises that has been a central feature of Chinese industry until recently. First, the 
vehicles industry consists of 112 assembly factories with a total output of around 1.8 
million vehicles, and all but a few with an installed capacity well short of the minimum 
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for technical efficiency. Second, the number of enterprises producing television sets is 
around eighty, and of these the top ten account for 80% of sales. There is both a positive 
and negative side to the enterprise proliferation. The positive side is the emergence of a 
competitive industrial structure, without any anti-monopoly policy on the part of the 
government. The intense market competition evident over the last few years is a 
cumulative result of the competitive investment by territorial governments in old and 
new industries since the early 1980s. The negative side is that, in many industries, the 
numbers of enterprises exceed the sustainable level. Thus, unlike in some other 
transitional economies, the principal problem in China is not the dominant position of a 
few large industrial enterprises, but a surfeit of enterprises producing similar products 
with many too small to exploit economies of scale or scope. Thus the major issue for 
industrial restructuring in China is more the consolidation of fragmented productive 
capacity, and less the break-up of large enterprises. 
7.5 Industrial Restructuring 
"Restructuring and consolidation" have been forced on to the top of the reform policy 
agenda by the mixture of intense market competition and a concomitant deterioration in 
the financial position of enterprises. Our discussion of industrial restructuring in this 
section revolves around two sets of issues: 
* How effective are the evolving procedures for the exit of non-viable enterprises, 
assuming that the present industrial structure is non-sustainable? 
* What is the role of holding companies or corporate groups in industrial restructuring? 
Though enterprise closureS7 are still rare, a wave of enterprise groupings or mergers is 
sweeping Chinese industry. As an instrument of enterprise rational i sation, mergers are 
7 We use the term 'closure' in preference to 'bankruptcy', because the latter covers a wide range of 
outcomes including closure, merger and take-over. 
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not new in China. The first regulation to facilitate vertical and horizontal mergers was 
issued in 1980, and then put into practice a few years later to set up the Dong Feng 
motor group, now a National Corporation (Chen, 1997). This first major exercise in 
industrial restructuring took a number of years to complete and, despite the general 
recognition that many Chinese industries were too fragmented for efficiency, enterprise 
mergers remained rare occurrences until the mid 1990s. 
Since then, restructuring has become the centrepiece of enterprise reform. Mergers are 
regarded as the preferred method for dealing with insolvent enterprises, which have 
grown in numbers as the combined result of deterioration in the financial position of 
enterprises and an increase in enterprise numbers over the reform period. For example, 
around 1,500 (23%) of the 6,599 large and medium-size SOEs making a loss at the end 
of 1997 had disappeared within a year, mostly as a result of mergers or groupings with 
other enterprises but with some closures. Furthermore, mergers also extend to small 
SOEs and COEs (including TVEs), rather than being confined to large and medium 
SOEs. Finally, a notable feature of the current situation is that the impetus for mergers 
not only comes from the Central Government as it did in the 1980s, but also from 
provinces and cities. Mergers are now also initiated by enterprise managers, whereas 
previously they were arranged only by government agencies. There is now an emerging 
market in enterprises, which may in time develop into a market in corporate control. To 
complement the moves to secure the exit of non-viable enterprises, the Central 
Government is trying to stem future additions to the ranks of non-viable enterprises by 
banning the establishment of new enterprises in over two hundred industrial branches 
with substantial excess capacity. 
In comparison to market economies, mergers and take-overs in China are distinguished 
by two related features: 
e They do not involve any financial transactions in property titles, but only an 
administrative flat. 
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* The government (taken as a tiered network) is always a central party. 
Given that government has an ownership stake in most enterprises, mergers and 
consolidations in China are administrative measures and do not involve any financial 
transactions. A notable example was provided by the creation in 1998 of the China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China Petrochemical Corporation 
(SINOPEC)', both large enough to rank in the Fortune 500. Previously both 
corporations were hybrids - government organisations-cum-enterprise groups - with 
CNPC specialising in the upstream end, and SINOPEC in the downstream end, of the 
oil industry. In 1998, as part of the abolition of the Ministry of Chemicals Industry 
(which controlled SINOPEC) and the Ministry of Oil and Gas, both were transformed 
into diversified oil corporations through an administrative re-apportionment of the 
upstream and downstream facilities between them. The operation, although huge in 
terms of assets, involved no financial transactions as all the enterprises were SOEs, but 
it did involve considerable pressure by the government on CNPC to part with some of 
its upstream enterprises. 
Although mergers and the re-arrangement of enterprises in China do not involve 
financial transactions, there are still transactions costs when they cut across 
departmental or territorial jurisdictions, especially the latter. The most important of 
these costs concerns devising a formula for the exercise of ownership rights in the 
entities resulting from mergers and consolidations. Arguably these transactions costs 
were high enough in the past to have precluded mergers and restructuring which might 
have made economic sense then, but which have only taken place recently. 
Given that they are intermediated by the government, mergers and consolidations in 
China are deeply affected by intra-government relations and government priorities. A 
8 SINOPEC was not created in 1998, but was transformed from a petrochen-dcal to a diversified corporate 
group through a transfer of upstream enterprises. 
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pressing concern for government departments or tiers is to reduce the number of loss- 
making enterprises under their respective jurisdictions, and much of government policy 
towards mergers is driven by this imperative. With closures regarded as too extreme for 
general use, government tiers and departments employ a mixture of pressure and 
incentives to induce profitable enterprises to take over loss-making or non-viable 
enterprises. A common form is to make the grant of a privilege or preferential treatment 
conditional upon taking over one or more loss-making enterprises. This is illustrated in 
the selection of enterprises for listing on the stock market (domestic or foreign) that is 
keenly sought by large enterprises. New listings are rationed, as are further primary 
issues of shares by already-listed companies. Provincial governments are each allowed 
to put forward a specified number of enterprises for listing. A tacit condition for an 
enterprise to be selected for listing is that it takes over one or more loss-making 
enterprises in the province. 
At a general level, there are two aspects to mergers and conglomerations with 
implications for the future evolution of the industrial structure in China. First, their 
scope is usually limited to enterprises in the jurisdiction of the government tier or 
department arranging the merger. Thus one arranged by the Central Government would 
normally be confined to enterprises controlled by the Central Government, and similarly 
for mergers arranged by provincial governments. There have been in recent years 
instances of take-overs cutting across territorial government boundaries, such as the 
take-over of loss-making TV firms by the Shenzhen Konka (Kanjia) and the Sichuan 
Changhong groups. But such mergers and take-overs are severely restricted by the 
transactions costs of negotiating agreements on the future status of the acquired 
enterprises and on the distribution of ownership rights. The second aspect is that an 
enterprise may agree to take over a loss-making enterprise only because of the 
associated side benefits, such as the acquisition of land, tax concessions, debt write-offs, 
or the promise of investment funds from the government. In many cases, these side 
benefits, rather than industrial rational isation, may well be the primary motive of the 
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enterprise agreeing to a take-over. The implication is that the current wave of mergers 
and consolidations is not a simple process of industrial rationalization, but a process 
overlaid with a variety of motives including cross-subsidisation and the protection of the 
local industrial base against erosion from market competition. It is creating corporate 
groups with both high and low chances of survival as viable entities. 
A salient feature of the current wave of industrial restructuring is that it is combined 
with a radical reorganization of the industrial administration. Most of the industrial 
Ministries have been abolished. The enterprises in their jurisdictions have been 
regrouped, and turned into National Corporations or limited-liability companies, and 
their policy role has been taken over by the State Trade and Economic Commission 
(SETC). Similar changes are taking place further down the territorial ladder, at the 
provincial and municipal levels. A number of provinces and municipalities, following 
the initial examples of Shanghai and Shenzhen, have converted their industrial bureaux 
into holding companies (or Asset Management Companies) and others are due to follow 
suit. The National Corporations, or companies arising out of the overhaul of the 
industrial administration, comprise the group of enterprises supervised by their 
respective parent industrial Ministries or bureaux. But they are more akin to corporate 
groups or holding companies in market economies, than were the abolished Ministries 
and bureaux. Their establishment, though initially no more than a change in formal 
status combined with a regrouping of enterprises, introduces two elements that hold 
important implications for the future evolution of large enterprises and corporate 
groups. First, they have greater managerial control over subordinate enterprises, 
compared to the parent Ministries or bureaux. Second, being financially independent, 
these holding companies have a much greater economic incentive to aim for a profit- 
enhancing restructuring or merger of enterprises under their control. Some of them 
(such as CNPQ are pressing ahead with a radical overhaul of their subsidiaries. Thus 
the likely impact of the current round of administrative reorganization will be to 
facilitate a conglomeration of previously-independent enterprises into corporate groups. 
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But mirroring the configuration of National Corporations or holding companies, much 
of this regrouping will involve enterprises within an industry, and between enterprises 
in the same territorial jurisdiction. Examples of the regrouping of enterprises across 
territorial jurisdictions and industries, especially the former, will be few and far between 
until the development of a market in corporate control which, at present, is no more than 
a distant possibility. 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
We conclude this chapter by re-iterating the principal themes: 
Large enterprises/corporate groups have risen in importance over the reform period, 
especially in the industrial sector. The increase in their share of gross industrial 
output is due to a growth in the number of such enterprises, not to the faster growth 
of the large enterprises inherited from the planning period. As a result, the average 
large industrial enterprise/corporate group in 1999 was smaller than at the outset of 
economic reforms in 1981. An implication is that the rise in the relative importance 
of large enterprises has not been associated with a concentration of economic power 
in the hands of a few enterprises. By international standards, the Chinese industrial 
structure is marked by the relative importance of small, not large enterprises. 
0 The rise in the importance of large enterprises/corporate groups is due to the 
exceptionally rapid growth of per capita income since 1979, the huge size of the 
Chinese population, and the sharp growth in China's international trade. A 
substantial percentage of the Chinese enterprises that are large by international 
standards are public utilities, banks or trading companies, or in natural resource- 
based industries. Nine Chinese enterprises were listed in the 1999 Fortune top 500, 
of which two were public utilities, four were banks, two were international trading 
companies, and one was an oil company. The export market is a minor contributor 
to the size of the large Chinese enterprises/corporate groups, unlike with the Korean 
Chapter 7: Chinese Corporate Groups: A Perspective from Govemance Structure 226 
chaehols. 
0 The structure of the large Chinese enterprises/corporate groups, and their pattern of 
specialization, bear the deep imprint of both the division of the government into 
territorial jurisdictions, each jealously controlling a group of enterprises, and the 
division of economic administration on industrial lines. The latter is becoming 
blurred because of the reorganization of the government. But, given China's 
geographical expanse and regional diversity, the territorial division of the 
government, and the hierarchy and rivalry that go with it, will continue to play a 
central role in shaping China's industrial structure. Here it is important to note that 
the territorial dimension has played no significant role in the evolution of Korean 
and Japanese corporate groups. 
0 The large Chinese enterprises/corporate groups do not fit one format, but are 
diverse in their genealogy and structure. Some date back to the planning period, 
whilst others are post-1979 developments. The large Chinese enterprises/corporate 
groups tend to be less diversified and vertically-integrated, compared to those in 
Japan and Korea. Most are focused on one industry, and there are no Chinese 
counterparts of multi-industry conglomerates such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Samsung 
or Hyundai. 
0 The large Chinese enterprises/corporate are diverse in terms of formal ownership 
status. A large majority of them are either SOEs, or former SOEs or government 
departments now converted into shareholding enterprises predominantly with full 
government ownership. Comparatively few large units are shareholding 
corporations with only a minority public ownership stake, or foreign-funded 
enterprises. Most large enterprises/corporate groups embrace a variety of ownership 
forms in that their subsidiaries may be collectively-owned enterprises, or joint 
ventures with foreign firms or, recently, with private enterprises. All large SOEs are 
due to be converted into shareholding corporations. But the exact significance of 
the proposed conversion for enterprise governance will depend crucially on whether 
such corporations are "open", or "closed" with all equity held by government 
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organizations. The latter are not much different from SOEs. There is evidence of a 
trend towards the conversion of all closed shareholding enterprises into open 
enterprises, motivated by the pressing need to raise investment funds for 
modernization. 
The driving force behind the mutation of the pattern of ownership of large Chinese 
enterprises/corporate groups is the need to diversify the sources of finance. A 
crucial factor in this regard is the widening incompatibility between, on the one 
hand, maintaining the present ownership pattern of enterprises and, on the other 
hand, a further reform of the commercial banking sector. It is the former that has to 
give, given the urgent necessity of the latter. The decision to swap non-performing 
debt for equity held by profit-seeking Asset Management Companies is an initiative 
with far-reaching ramifications for the enterprise ownership structure. 
40 The large Chinese enterprises/corporate groups are important nodes of political 
organisation and control, and are regarded as the bulwarks of the one-party State. 
The diversification of the ownership pattern of large enterprises/corporate groups 
will sooner or later bring to the fore the issue of the role of the Party in enterprises. 
This is an issue that has been occasionally raised, only to be glossed over, and it 
does not lend itself to a straightforward solution. 
The transformation of the entrepreneurial operations of the industrial Ministries and 
bureaux into companies with their own budgets is likely to accelerate the process of 
regrouping and enterprise restructuring. The change has already set in motion a 
process of the consolidation of enterprises into corporate groups. However, given 
the structure of government decision-making in China, much of this consolidation 
will be confined to enterprises in the same industry, and owned by the same 
government tier. Such a consolidation, though limited in scope, should enhance 
efficiency by reducing fragmentation and should also avoid the dangers of a rise in 
monopoly power, except in industries that are exclusively controlled by the Central 
Government. 
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8.1 The Findings and the Implications of the Study 
The specific subject of enquiry in this thesis is corporate governance in the context of 
the Chinese economy, with particular reference to the companies listed on the two 
official Stock Exchanges. This is the first systematic and comprehensive study of these 
issues in China from a positive perspective and using econometric methods to analyse 
rich datasets, some of which were obtained directly from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
The main theories underpinning the thesis are the theory of incomplete contracts and 
agency theory. It is argued that the separation of ownership and control in modern 
corporations, and the impossibility of foreseeing, writing, and enforcing a 
comprehensive contract lead to agency problems. The basic argument is thus that 
corporate governance matters, and has an impact upon corporate performance. 
The specific findings of the individual chapters will now be summarised. The 
institutional background of the Chinese financial system reform was reviewed and 
analysed in chapter 3, and the main findings were: 
1. Financial reform in China, and the corporatisation of the SOEs, has been motivated 
by the expansion of the Chinese economy, and the need for capital beyond the 
capacity of public fiscal revenues. As local government has taken a greater and 
greater share of fiscal income, Central Government has found it increasingly 
difficult to finance projects through the State budget. Given the high levels of 
personal savings in the State Bank, the Chinese Government first decided to reform 
the financing of the SOEs by funding new State projects (except some key projects) 
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with debt instead of equity. The underlying motive was to make the project 
managers accountable for the repayment of debt, that is to make the capital invested 
by the government a'hard constraint'. 
2. But the corporatisation of the SOEs is not just about the search for new sources of 
capital, and can only be properly understood in the context of the reallocation of 
resources. This is also true for the formation of the new governance structures, 
where there has been a shift from monopoly State control to shared control, even 
though control is still dominated by various State authorities. 
3. In choosing a model of corporate governance, the policymakers have favoured a 
stylised Anglo-American model in principle, but the reality has been a mixture of 
the Anglo-American and German-Japanese models. Furthermore, although the 
stated objective is an open, fair, multiple and competitive shareholding system, and 
the policy-makers have been trying to reduce over-concentrated State shareholdings, 
progress in moving from the current situation of insider-dominated shareholdings 
and a main bank system has been a gradual process and the end is not yet in sight. 
The implications of chapter 3 are that, notwithstanding the fact that there is no perfect 
corporate governance mechanism, and that the development of an appropriate 
mechanism for China is a gradual and path-dependent process, there is still an 
imperative to move forward as quickly as possible in order to minimise the associated 
costs. However, the maturity of a sound corporate governance system that sustains 
longer-term development is inextricably linked to the success of economic, legal and 
cultural development in Chinese society as a whole. 
The underpricing of IPOs was investigated in chapter 4 in the context of corporate 
control and its private benefits, in the particular case of China. We found evidence of 
high IPO premiums in a sample of 467 listed companies that had publicly issued equity 
to outside investors. We then linked the IPO underpricing to the corporate control 
mechanism, and found that the underpricing was negatively related to the proportion of 
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shares held by the largest single shareholder, after controlling for other well-known 
factors. This finding confirms our argument that, when the regulatory environment is 
poor, the controlling shareholders are able to pursue their private benefits more easily 
and without penalty. The outside investors perceive this, and take a more cautious 
strategy to IPOs, leading to lower IPO pricing. This study further examined the impact 
of the ownership of the largest single shareholders on IPO underpricing. We found 
lower IPO returns in firms where the largest shareholders are State-owned, and higher 
returns in firms with larger domestic shareholdings. This implies the potential for a 
good corporate governance mechanism. 
These findings support the predictions of the extant literature, but add to it by 
highlighting the importance of corporate control in providing private benefits. Whilst 
the asymmetric information theory provides a powerful explanation of why IPOs should 
be underpriced, the theory cannot explain why there are different returns across the 
IPOs. But this can be explained by a consideration of the corporate control mechanism. 
The findings in chapter 5 suggest that the influence of ownership structure upon 
corporate performance is considerably more complicated than had been previously 
understood. Not only does ownership concentration have an impact upon firms' 
performance, but the nature of the large shareholders is also an important determinant. 
A State shareholding, either through a State agency or through a State solely-owned 
institution, leads to inefficient capital allocation. In contrast, the presence of domestic 
shareholders can improve firm performance. A management shareholding, as a 
mechanism for providing top management with a proper incentive scheme, needs more 
attention, both in theory and in practice. A negative effect upon corporate performance 
of the proportion of tradable shares signals the absence, or immaturity, of the markets 
for corporate control. The tradable shares, mainly held by the public, do not have a 
sufficient influence, either through vote or by the 'Wall Street rule', to monitor 
management. This raises a number of issues related to the legal aspects of corporate 
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governance, which require urgent attention both in China and in other transition 
economies (e. g. Russia) and also some developed countries such as Italy. This research 
also suggests that the formation of an optimal ownership structure, which maximises 
firm value, is retarded by the stipulation that all shares held by institutional entities at 
the IPO should not be freely traded. 
A conclusion that emerges from the analysis of chapters 4 and 5 is that the ownership 
structure matters. More specifically, State ownership leads to poor market performance 
either during the IPO stage or the after-market stage. This points to the need for a retreat 
of State ownership in public corporations, as suggested by Qian (2001), though perhaps 
not at the speed experienced in Russia. 
The focus of attention was extended in Chapter 6 to the determinants of capital structure 
in a sample of 433 Chinese listed companies in the manufacturing sector. It was the first 
ever such study for China. We found that older firms, and those with higher market-to- 
book value ratios, are likely to have more debt. And larger, faster-growing and more 
profitable firms are likely to have less debt. The extent of the shareholding held by 
management does not have a significant impact upon the debt level, whereas that by the 
largest shareholder has a negative impact. For the most part, our findings have been 
consistent both with our theoretical predictions and with the conclusions of the studies 
carried out by Booth et al (2001) for emerging markets, and Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
for developed countries. 
However, it is still important to be aware of the legal and institutional differences 
between China and the Western economies. Here we want to stress two points that are 
particularly relevant to China. First, Baer and Gray (1996) argue that debt is often 
considered to be a 'soft' rather than a 'hard' constraint in many transitional economies, 
and this has certainly been true for the State-owned enterprises in China. But the debt 
constraint is undoubtedly hardening for Chinese listed companies in which the 
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Government acts as a shareholder, rather than as the sole owner'. The Annual Reports 
of the listed companies show that the majority of legal cases between them and other 
parties are related to debt repayment. And the decisions of the Courts are being 
implemented sooner. Second, the markets for corporate control are still not mature in 
China. Listed companies in the West have the freedom to issue equity even when 
performance is poor. The shares of the majority of listed companies in China are under 
the control of the State authorities or other institutional shareholders, and may not be 
traded on stock markets, though this is currently under review by the policy-makers. 
There are occasional cases where the shares held by the State or by the institutional 
shareholders have been traded to other parties, but the transference was only effected 
with the permission of the State authority and/or other shareholders. Furthermore, 
Chinese companies are not allowed to make seasonal equity offerings, and debt may be 
the only channel for raising additional finance. 
A political perspective into the governance structure of the Chinese corporate groups 
was taken in chapter 7. The principal findings were listed in the final section of that 
chapter, and will not be repeated here. 
The findings from this thesis not only enrich our knowledge about the functioning of the 
Chinese corporate governance system, but also provide a guide for future policy-making 
at both the government level and the corporate level. Thus corporate governance 
matters, though it is not a panacea for all the problems faced by the SOEs. There is a 
need to point out corporate governance is a dynamic issue not only in the sense that it 
interacts with its surrounding environment, but also in that it is a framework within 
which the constituent parts must support each other to achieve a smooth functioning. In 
the Anglo-American model, for example, the existence of the market for corporate 
control is essential to correct managerial failures, yet such a market is missing in China 
1 Both the requirement upon, and the expectation of, the Government to provide other benefits such as 
housing and full employment to the listed companies, have also been reduced though not eliminated. 
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due to the concentrated and illiquid system of shareholding. The smooth functioning of 
a corporate governance system relies upon, and complements, the existence of 
competitive markets, properly implemented commercial and contract legal systems, and 
independent professional legal and accounting services. As Kester (1994) pointed out, 
the existence of product market competition, and mutual monitoring and selective 
intervention by large, equity-owning stakeholders, can be highly effective means of 
controlling agency and transaction costs. Kester also suggests that extensive reliance on 
implicit, relational contracting in the context of long-term commercial relationships may 
yield other substantial operating and transactional efficiencies. Thus a corporate 
governance system should be implemented in a way that is complementary with other 
systems that have evolved in history, and may only be understood in this context. 
8.2 The Limitations of the Study 
This study of corporate governance in China, as the first of its kind, is limited in both 
depth and scope. In particular, we would like to draw attention to the following 
limitations: 
0A perfect stock market, which can accurately reflect all the information related to 
the firm and its environment, is required if Tobin's Q is to be a useful measure of 
corporate performance. This would be a strong assumption, even in many well- 
developed economies, and is certainly an optimistic portrayal of China. There is 
also substantial anomalous behaviour by individual firms, though the systematic 
effects of this can be minimised by analysing a large sample. 
0 The data used in this study relate to the listed companies, the majority of which are 
large, key SOEs. These companies were selected for listing by the appropriate 
Ministries and/or local governments, receive priority access to the stock markets to 
raise finance for their projects, and banks are instructed to provide them with loans 
at favourable rates. The sample is thus not representative of all firms in the Chinese 
Cbapter 8: General Conclusions and Future Work 234 
economy. The findings and conclusions of this study are thus limited to the listed 
companies, and should not be extrapolated to the economy as a whole. 
Furthermore, the conclusions should be considered in the light of the overall 
process of SOE reform. 
0 One possible criticism of all such studies in emerging or transitional economies is 
that the underpinning theories, which have generally been formulated on the basis 
of the experience in developed countries, may be invalid. In this study, there are 
two tiers of theories. The first tier relates to the theory of incomplete contracts and 
agency theory, and is concerned with the existence of corporate governance issues. 
Here, it is reasonable to assume that the forecasting of the future, the writing of 
contracts, and the enforcement of those contracts are even more difficult in 
transitional economies, and that the contracts are likely to be even more incomplete 
than in developed economies. As to the applicability of agency theory, there is a 
huge literature reporting serious agency problems in transition economies, and 
these problems are probably more complex than those in the western economies. 
The second tier of theories includes those that focus more on the specific issues of 
corporate governance (i. e. IPO underpricing, ownership structure and corporate 
performance, and capital structure). In these chapters, we have proceeded 
cautiously and pointed out both the assumptions and the institutional background 
required by the standard theory. For example, the theory of capital structure 
requires debt to be a hard constraint on management, but this assumption arguably 
does not hold in the Chinese context. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the 
findings of chapter 6 confirm that the determinants of capital structure in China are 
qualitatively consistent with those in other emerging markets (Booth et al, 2001) 
and those in developed economies. 
0 The fast growth of the Chinese Economy since the adoption of economic reform 
has been impressive. This has not only provided numerous subjects for researchers 
to study, but also difficulties in presenting a "true" picture of the Chinese economy. 
The data used in this thesis relate to the period 1995-99 in chapter 4 (EPOs), to 1997 
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in chapters 5 and 6 (ownership structure and capital structure), and 1999 for chapter 
7 (corporate groups). There is thus a slight mismatch in the data used in the various 
empirical chapters, but it is our belief that the fundamental institutional background 
did not change markedly over this period in a way that might radically amend our 
findings. 
8.3 The Need for Further Research 
Research on corporate governance is in its infancy, and there is considerable scope for 
future work. First, the theories themselves are in development, even though tremendous 
advances have been made in recent years. Second, a major part of the literature is based 
upon conditions in the developed economies, and the assumptions and preconditions of 
the various theories should be carefully examined before applying these theories to 
Put prices right 
Put market right 
Put institutions right 
Figure 8.1: The Development of Economics 
Source: Williamson (1995) 
transitional economies. Third, the scope of corporate governance stretches far beyond 
ecqnomics, into the legal and institutional arrangements that have evolved from the 
history of each individual economy. The above schematic diagram from Williamson 
(1995) illustrates the evolution of the study of corporate governance. 
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More specifically, the collection of additional data could generate additional 
understanding of the corporate governance system in China. The data used in the studies 
of both ownership structure and capital structure relate only to the year 1997. Further 
years of data would enable these issues to be investigated not only in a cross-sectional 
manner, but also in time series analysis. Additional data on the long-term returns after 
IPOs would enable us to extend our research into the long-term performance associated 
with various ownership structures. This would not only provide more interesting 
conclusions than a study of short-term returns, but would also be a topic that has yet to 
be investigated either in developed or developing economies (Ritter, 1991; Loughran 
and Ritter, 1995). This work will be started after the completion of this research. 
As regards ownership structure, there are two obvious avenues in which the current 
work could be extended. First, it would be sensible to consider more fully situations 
where the largest single shareholder is holding only a few more shares than the second 
largest shareholder. The current model ignores the second largest shareholder, yet it 
might be relatively easy for the second largest shareholder to become the largest by 
simply purchasing a small proportion of the outstanding shares. In short, a more 
comprehensive analysis should take account of the relative sizes of the large 
shareholders. Second, it would be interesting to investigate the role of foreign capital in 
listed companies. There are more than 100 listed companies with foreign-owned shares, 
some of them with controlling positions. The availability of information on these 
companies provides an excellent opportunity to study whether the foreign investors are 
passive profit-takers or active managers. 
The Chinese stock markets are ranked third in Asia in terms of market capitalisation. 
Should the future development of these markets be based upon the Anglo-Saxon model, 
where the stock market provides both a major source of finance and a mechanism for 
corporate control, or the Germany-Japanese model, where the banks play a stronger role 
in finance and governance? Or should development be based upon a distinctive mixture 
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of the two? The Chinese evidence reveals the co-existence of a free-rider problem, 
which is a typical concern in the Anglo-Saxon model, and poor protection of minority 
shareholders, which is commonly seen in other economies - see La Porta et al (1998, 
2000,2002). 
This is a positive (what is happening) rather than a normative (what should be) study of 
corporate governance. Nevertheless, the findings are important as a governance system 
should not only provide monitoring and incentives for performance, but should also 
encourage experimentation, adoption, and the diffusion of better practices (Kogut, 
1996). However, given the path-dependence of institutional evolution (North, 1992), it 
is perhaps unwise to adopt wholesale the corporate governance system of another 
country. A more realistic approach may be to allow the emergence and development of 
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